PA Supreme Court Session from Philadelphia, recorded on September 10, 2025
00:01 - Good morning everyone.
00:03 - Welcome to the second day of our fall
00:06 - 2025 oral argument session here in Philadelphia.
00:10 - As you may know, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
00:12 - is the oldest appellate court in North America.
00:16 - Our roots date back to William Penn's Provincial Court of 1684,
00:22 - and our Supreme Court was formally established
00:25 - pursuant to the Pennsylvania Judiciary Act of 1722.
00:31 - In May of 2022, our court
00:33 - celebrated its 300th anniversary here in Philadelphia.
00:38 - And, we are privileged to sit on this historic court
00:44 - and to sit in three historic courtrooms in Harrisburg,
00:48 - Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.
00:52 - Here in City Hall, the facade of the bench is constructed of Mexican onyx,
00:58 - with each of the seven panels divided by bronze statuary
01:02 - representing the Greek figures of justice, law, and jurisprudence.
01:08 - To the right of the bench is an Italian marble bust of John Banister
01:12 - Gibson, Chief Justice of Pennsylvania
01:17 - from 1827 to 1851.
01:20 - To the left of the bench is a bronze bust of George Scott,
01:24 - Chief Justice of Pennsylvania from 1879 to 1882.
01:30 - Chief Justice Charles Wood was a well-respected member of the Philadelphia Bar.
01:36 - Directly behind the
01:37 - bench is a mural completed in 2002
01:41 - by two local artists, Michael Webb and Max Mason.
01:45 - The view is of Independence Hall's southern facade,
01:49 - with a historic Pennsylvania Supreme Court courtroom.
01:54 - To the left, the interior of both the courtroom
01:59 - and the justices conference room were designed by George Herzog,
02:04 - an American interior designer and decorative painter.
02:08 - While you are here, I hope you will take a moment to observe
02:11 - the majesty of our courtroom and its tributes to our system of justice.
02:17 - Before we hear the first case, I'd like to remind Council of a few things.
02:22 - Appellants.
02:22 - Counsel, please approach the podium when your case is called.
02:26 - I will then give a short summary of the case.
02:29 - Please begin by introducing yourself
02:32 - and your co-counsel and identifying the party.
02:35 - Represent.
02:36 - The justices are familiar with your cases.
02:39 - So we ask that you avoid any unnecessary recitation of facts or procedural history,
02:45 - and instead focus on the main issues that we granted review.
02:50 - Counsel as welcome to rely on their briefs for particular issues
02:54 - in cases in which there are multiple parties represented by separate counsel.
03:00 - Council should avoid repeating the same arguments as prior counsel.
03:05 - Please try not to interrupt the justices when they're asking you a question.
03:09 - A justice's question is not meant to trip you up.
03:12 - Rather, it indicates there are particular issues we would like to explore further.
03:18 - I remind you that we do not allow rebuttal.
03:21 - Finally, we have no set time limit for argument.
03:25 - I will advise counsel when the court is satisfied
03:28 - that all of its questions have been answered, and at that time,
03:32 - I will ask that you conclude your argument.
03:35 - Mr. Miller, please call the first case.
03:40 - All right.
03:40 - Next case I'm going to talk about in preview for the audience is Baxter
03:44 - versus the Philadelphia Board of Elections.
03:48 - This case is the next chapter in litigation
03:52 - involving validity of Mail-In ballots, something that we have seen litigated
03:58 - both in Pennsylvania state courts as well as the federal courts.
04:02 - I think largely since the 2020 election,
04:05 - going on five years now.
04:08 - I will speak about the issues, and then let's get into the argument
04:12 - and see what's going to be presented to this court, because it is a
04:16 - lot of material and a lot of nuance in the argument.
04:19 - You know, generally speaking, the issue that's going to be,
04:23 - argued before our court today
04:26 - involves a statute that requires
04:30 - Mail-In ballots to be dated in part, among other things,
04:35 - with a handwritten date on the outside of a return envelope.
04:39 - Now, what you'll
04:40 - hear argued is that the and this is actually not disputed.
04:44 - The handwritten date on the return envelope does not determine the timeline
04:48 - timeliness of the ballot.
04:49 - Rather, there's a time stamp.
04:51 - So what occurs in specifically with Baxter is there is an election.
04:55 - There are multiple mail in ballots, 60, some ballots, I believe 69.
05:01 - A number of them do not have any date handwritten on the outside.
05:05 - A number of them have the wrong date.
05:07 - Notwithstanding that these are ballots that have been submitted timely.
05:11 - They have a time stamp inside the ballot that shows they were mailed on time.
05:16 - Additionally, everybody here who's having,
05:19 - the ballots with an error on the written envelope or,
05:23 - otherwise registered to vote and capable of casting a vote in the election.
05:29 - So what has happened is that the
05:32 - the fight is whether or not these ballots should count or not.
05:37 - Count?
05:41 - It goes back
05:42 - and forth in the trial court and in the Commonwealth Court.
05:45 - Ultimately, the Supreme Court stays the Commonwealth court's ruling
05:49 - so that it can hear argument on this issue, and it can be the one
05:52 - to make the determination as to if the handwritten signature on the return
05:56 - envelope of the ballot should, if it's in error,
05:59 - should preclude the ballot, the vote from counting or not.
06:03 - A a high level summary of some of the argument
06:06 - you're going to hear is that the, ACLU and those,
06:11 - in favor of the votes counting are going to be arguing that the,
06:16 - handwritten exterior,
06:19 - the I'm sorry, excuse me, the handwritten date on the exterior of the envelope,
06:23 - has no significance and should not disenfranchize voters
06:27 - from having their votes counted in elections.
06:30 - A counter argument that you
06:31 - will hear from the RNC, from the Republican National Committee,
06:36 - who will argue here today is that the statute requires this to happen,
06:40 - and failure to comply with the statute should preclude the votes from counting.
06:44 - And it will be more complex than that and more, like I said, nuance, but
06:47 - high level.
06:48 - That's some of the argument we're going to hear.
06:51 - This is obviously a highly contested issue,
06:53 - and I don't think I need to, to, to
06:56 - I can't overstate the importance of the issue because,
07:00 - it impacts every election in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
07:02 - and elections in the Commonwealth in Pennsylvania can have impact on,
07:06 - local, state and national elections.
07:09 - So we will all be watching this argument with great interest.
07:12 - Morning.
07:13 - Good morning.
07:14 - Chief Justice Todd and may it please the court.
07:16 - John Gore for appellants,
07:19 - Pennsylvania Republican party and Republican National Committee.
07:22 - I'm joined today by my co-counsel, Miss Kathleen Gallagher.
07:27 - We usually see Mr.
07:28 - King from Butler.
07:30 - I wish you were here as well, Your Honor.
07:34 - Please proceed.
07:35 - Thank you.
07:36 - Over a century ago in Winston, this court
07:39 - unanimously adopted a clear rule that it is adhered to.
07:43 - Ever since the General Assembly's neutral,
07:47 - generally applicable rules for how voters complete and cast their ballots
07:51 - do not violate the free and equal elections Clause
07:54 - unless they make voting so difficult as to amount to a denial of the franchise.
07:59 - That is a high standard, and this court
08:02 - has never invalidated a neutral ballot casting rule.
08:06 - Under it.
08:07 - A police in this case do not even meaningfully engage that standard.
08:11 - They do not argue their compliance with the declaration, mandate or state
08:16 - requirement component is so difficult as to amount to to know the franchise.
08:21 - Nor could they.
08:23 - There's nothing objectively difficult about completing the declaration
08:26 - or filling in the preprinted date boxes
08:30 - on the ballot return envelope.
08:32 - In fact, following the Secretary's redesign, the compliance rate
08:36 - with the date requirement hit 99.77%
08:41 - in the 2024 general election.
08:43 - The compliance rate has always been exceedingly high and exceeded 99%
08:48 - since the enactment of act 77.
08:51 - And for voters who do not want to comply
08:53 - with the date requirement, they can simply vote in person.
08:57 - The date requirement does not apply to in-person voting,
09:00 - which is the most popular method of voting in Pennsylvania.
09:03 - It's just to just to clarify, it's usually
09:06 - not a question of a voter not wanting to comply.
09:10 - It's usually a mistake.
09:13 - Certainly, Your Honor, but if a voter wants
09:14 - to avoid the requirement entirely, the voter can simply vote in person,
09:18 - which is the most popular method of voting here in Pennsylvania.
09:22 - That's the end of this case.
09:25 - A police free and equal elections claim fails.
09:29 - A police response to this is to ask the court
09:31 - to adopt a radical reinterpretation of the Free and Equal elections clause,
09:36 - and to turn the clause into a judicial blue pencil for rewriting
09:39 - the election code.
09:42 - Police would have this court extend strict scrutiny
09:45 - to every word, phrase and provision in the election code
09:49 - that bears on how voters complete and cast their ballots, no matter how mundane.
09:54 - This court has already rejected that approach in prior cases,
09:57 - and with good reason.
09:59 - It would turn that judicial,
10:02 - blue pencil into
10:03 - a virtually automatic revision of the election code
10:07 - and open the floodgates to litigation
10:10 - on every word and phrase in the election code.
10:13 - The General Assembly's legislative power to make
10:15 - the rules of elections would be transferred to the judiciary,
10:19 - and this court would sit as an election super legislature in a deluge of cases.
10:25 - And to top it all off, a police requested relief
10:29 - would trigger act 77 non severability provision
10:33 - and invalidate the grand political compromise
10:36 - that gave Pennsylvanians
10:38 - the convenience of universal mail voting in the first place.
10:42 - The court.
10:43 - That's well said, and I have no idea
10:46 - how we're going to ultimately view your argument,
10:49 - but the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is charged
10:54 - with the obligation to construe the provisions of our state constitution
11:00 - does not mean that we would be acting as a super legislature.
11:04 - I take your point, Your Honor.
11:06 - I think my point was that if the,
11:09 - if the court would adopt strict scrutiny,
11:12 - as the appellate is invited to do, it would be hearing a deluge of cases.
11:17 - And in that sense, would would be rewriting the election code all the time
11:22 - because where we witness is daily pages,
11:26 - we would be asked to decide if we.
11:31 - Take this case as an example.
11:33 - Just as Danny,
11:35 - litigated.
11:36 - Correct.
11:37 - Okay.
11:38 - The other thing I like
11:40 - there are going to be challenges to any provision
11:42 - or any phrased in the election code under strict scrutiny.
11:45 - So for example,
11:48 - requirements around the signature on the mail
11:50 - ballot, requirements for filling out the declaration requirements
11:54 - for, voting in person requirements around provisional voting,
11:58 - including signature required sets, including requirements around poll books.
12:03 - The election code sets out a detailed and reticulated scheme
12:07 - for how voters complete and cast their ballots.
12:10 - There could be challenges about polling place, locations, polling places, election,
12:16 - polling place hours.
12:18 - Anything that's in the election code that bears on how voters
12:21 - show up to the polls or receive a ballot completed and cast.
12:25 - It would be within the purview of the challenges here.
12:30 - The point is, it's applying strict scrutiny to the election code
12:33 - if something this court has already declined to do.
12:36 - It perhaps set it best in the bird case
12:39 - at 713 a second.
12:42 - 1107 where it said that, of course, voting
12:45 - is a fundamental significance in our constitutional order.
12:50 - But to extend strict scrutiny to every voting regulation
12:53 - would tie the hands of states seeking to assure that elections
12:57 - are operated equitably and efficiently.
13:00 - This court has never extended strict scrutiny, to a claim
13:04 - brought against a neutral ballot casting rule under the wall standard.
13:09 - It didn't do that in Winston.
13:11 - It didn't do that in Pennsylvania Democratic Party,
13:14 - even though it recognized that the right to vote is fundamental.
13:17 - It didn't do so in last year's case. And Walsh,
13:20 - in doing so,
13:21 - would again open up the floodgates and erode
13:25 - the General Assembly's legislative power to enact election laws.
13:29 - The Secretary attempts a variation on that theme.
13:32 - The Secretary argues
13:34 - for something resembling more along the lines of rational basis scrutiny.
13:38 - Again, that is not an approach this court has taken.
13:41 - This court has simply looked at the Winston Standard of
13:44 - whether the rule itself makes voting so difficult
13:48 - as to amount to a denial of the franchise.
13:52 - Rational basis.
13:52 - Scrutiny, again, would erode the General Assembly's authority in this area,
13:57 - and subjected to judicial review and potentially open this court,
14:02 - to hearing cases in cases about the election code.
14:07 - But even if this court were to adopt rational basis,
14:09 - the scrutiny, the date requirement would easily satisfy it.
14:13 - Look no further than the state's anti-fraud interest.
14:16 - The state doesn't even need to have evidence of fraud within its borders
14:21 - before it can act to enact measures to deter, detect and punish voter fraud.
14:26 - But here we have a live example from the Mahalia case.
14:30 - That was a case in which the date requirement
14:32 - was used to identify fraud when it happened.
14:36 - Now, their response is to point out that the ballot in that case
14:39 - wouldn't have been counted anyway, because the individual
14:43 - in whose name the ballot was returned had already passed away.
14:47 - And that's correct.
14:48 - But that alone did not give a basis to suspect fraud.
14:51 - It was only because the outer envelope had been dated with the date
14:56 - after the decedent had passed away, that there was a reason to suspect
15:00 - fraud and open the investigation.
15:02 - Fraud was discovered and the fraudster was criminally sentenced.
15:06 - That alone is sufficient to justify the date requirement and we don't need to.
15:13 - That is it.
15:15 - You're correct, Justice Donaghy, that they identified
15:18 - that the ballot was invalid and shouldn't be counted,
15:22 - and it was not counted?
15:24 - That's correct.
15:25 - But that would have happened regardless of whether there was fraud or not.
15:29 - It was only because the,
15:31 - the date requirement that the fraud element of the case was detected
15:35 - ultimately prosecuted and resulted in a criminal sentence.
15:40 - But all of that is beside the point, because what the court should do is adhere
15:44 - to its consistent precedent from Winston through Walsh,
15:48 - and simply examine whether the date requirement
15:51 - is so difficult to comply with that it amounts to a denial of the franchise
15:56 - that hasn't been seriously argued here, and it certainly hasn't been shown
16:00 - because the date requirement, like the broader declaration
16:03 - mandate, is not objectively difficult to comply with.
16:07 - It can be avoided through in-person voting
16:09 - and even among voters who choose the convenience of mail voting.
16:14 - The compliance rate is exceedingly high.
16:16 - As I said before now appellate also dispute that this court
16:21 - already decided to question in Pennsylvania Democratic Party.
16:25 - But they even recognize on page 42 of their brief
16:29 - that the question of the constitutional validity of the date
16:32 - requirement was antecedent to the remedial question
16:35 - that was presented in Pennsylvania Democratic Party.
16:38 - I'll also point out that what they're seeking in this case,
16:41 - or what they now say they're seeking in this case, is identical
16:44 - to what the petitioners sought in Pennsylvania Democratic Party.
16:48 - They say they don't want to strike the date requirement
16:51 - from the election code or remove the date field from the ballot.
16:55 - They just want relief from enforcement of it.
16:57 - They want the date requirement not to be enforced.
17:01 - That's exactly what the Pennsylvania Democratic Party petitioners wanted.
17:04 - They wanted a remedy of notice, ensuring from the date requirement.
17:09 - So Pennsylvania Democratic Party is on all fours with this case.
17:13 - Even if the court does not believe that
17:15 - the antecedent question was resolved there, as we've argued in our briefs.
17:20 - Ball.
17:21 - Ball also addressed,
17:23 - free and equal elections clause arguments with respect to the date requirement.
17:27 - Now, they've pointed to footnote 156 from the ball opinion,
17:32 - which was joined by three justices.
17:35 - But that footnote was addressing a different free
17:38 - and equal elections clause issue than the one we have here today
17:41 - that in that case, recall that there was a group of voter
17:45 - petitioners who argued that counting other voters, ballots
17:50 - that did not comply with the date requirement,
17:52 - would somehow violate the petitioners free and Equal
17:55 - Elections Clause rights.
17:58 - And this the three justices were simply expressing the view
18:01 - that that wasn't correct.
18:03 - So either this court in Pennsylvania Democratic Party involved did address
18:07 - and consider the free and equal elections clause clauses, application
18:11 - to the date requirement
18:12 - and resolved it in favor of the appellants or it didn't address it.
18:16 - And we still win because,
18:19 - of the Winston and Walsh standard,
18:22 - being the governing standard and this being a requirement,
18:25 - that's not so difficult to comply with as to amount to denial of the franchise.
18:30 - I would like to,
18:32 - address a couple more points on the first question, Your Honor.
18:35 - First,
18:37 - the appellants have argued
18:39 - our police have argued a couple of things.
18:42 - They've said that, the date requirement must be unconstitutional
18:47 - because it results in a certain number of ballots being rejected every election.
18:52 - But that's not the Winston test.
18:54 - The Winston test examines the burden or difficulty of complying with the rule.
18:58 - It doesn't address the consequences of noncompliance with the rule.
19:03 - It doesn't consider what happens when voters fail to comply with the rule.
19:06 - If it did, then every mandatory rule in the election code,
19:11 - would trigger scrutiny under the Free and Equal Elections clause.
19:15 - And that's not what this court's jurisprudence holds.
19:18 - They also argued that the right to vote is fundamental.
19:21 - We agree with that.
19:23 - But the right
19:23 - the fundamental right to vote is not a right to be exempt from the rules.
19:28 - It's not a right to an exemption from neutral, generally
19:31 - applicable rules for making a ballot effective.
19:34 - And as this court held in Burge and other cases, the fact that voting is
19:37 - a fundamental right does not mean that, strict scrutiny should apply here.
19:43 - I'd also like to briefly address the Third Circuit panel opinion in econ,
19:48 - which I know has been brought to this court's attention.
19:51 - That decision actually proves our point.
19:53 - It proves our position that the appellate free and equal elections, claim fails.
19:58 - Even the Third Circuit panel agreed
20:01 - that any burden imposed by the date requirement is minimal.
20:05 - So the Third Circuit panel has likewise confirmed
20:08 - that the rule does not make voting so difficult as to deny the franchise.
20:14 - The Third Circuit panel also recognized
20:16 - that the date requirement does advance Pennsylvania's anti-fraud interest.
20:21 - As evidenced by the Mahalia case.
20:24 - So if there's any doubt
20:26 - on that score, the Third Circuit panel decision actually supports our reading
20:30 - and our construction of the date requirement
20:33 - and the state's interests that are advanced by the.
20:36 - Are you going to discuss the holding of the Third Circuit?
20:39 - Yes, I'm getting to that now.
20:42 - If the court is interested in holding on a third circuit,
20:45 - there's no basis to follow that panel decision here for a couple of reasons.
20:49 - First, it's not final.
20:51 - We have a petition for rehearing en bloc just yesterday.
20:54 - So has the attorney general.
20:56 - We expect that the Third Circuit will rule on that at some point.
21:00 - And there may be further appellate proceedings, even in the United States
21:03 - Supreme Court.
21:05 - Even the Third Circuit panel, however, recognized that its decision
21:09 - implicates multiple circuit splits under the Anderson Burger framework.
21:14 - It implicates a split on whether rational basis of scrutiny applies.
21:17 - It implicates a split on whether states and defenders of election
21:22 - laws are required to adduce evidence in support of the state interests.
21:27 - It also implicates, split about the proper standard of review under
21:31 - Anderson verdict, and whether Anderson Burdick even applies to mail voting,
21:36 - and to regulations when there's an alternative method of voting.
21:42 - The appellate have also argued that the Anderson verdict framework is
21:45 - not the same as the standard under the Free and Equal Elections clause.
21:50 - We agree with that.
21:51 - The standard is the Winston Walsh standard.
21:54 - The standard is whether the rule makes voting
21:57 - so difficult as to amount to a denial of the franchise.
22:01 - They failed to show that here.
22:03 - The Third Circuit decision actually confirms that on the facts.
22:06 - And so there's no basis to follow the holding
22:10 - or outcome of the Third Circuit, which was
22:13 - which was that the date requirement violates the Anderson
22:16 - verdict, the federal constitution under the Anderson verdict framework.
22:19 - Thank you.
22:22 - Now, let me turn to the second question.
22:25 - Asked by the court.
22:27 - Act 77 non severability provision is clear
22:31 - and it is clearly applicable in this case.
22:34 - It states if any provision of this act
22:37 - or its application to any person or
22:40 - circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions
22:44 - of this application or applications of this act are void.
22:48 - The non severability provision covers section eight of act 77,
22:52 - which is what created mail voting and extended the date requirement to it.
22:57 - So any order holding invalid the application
23:01 - of the date requirement triggers the provision.
23:05 - That is what we have here in the Commonwealth Court
23:07 - and in the Court of Common Pleas.
23:09 - Was there any time limit to the
23:12 - applicability or enforcement of that provision?
23:15 - Not with respect to the non severability provision, your Honor,
23:18 - there was a special jurisdictional provision to bring certain challenges
23:21 - before this court on direct 180 day with 101.
23:25 - Why doesn't that apply as well to assertions of severability?
23:30 - Because there was no within that 180 day period.
23:33 - There was no act.
23:34 - There was no invalidation of the act or its application
23:38 - that would have triggered the non severability provision. Okay.
23:41 - So what happens then the act 77 is actually
23:46 - it becomes part of the election code
23:49 - at that point right.
23:51 - It it was it is an amendment to the election.
23:54 - That's correct.
23:55 - Right.
23:56 - It is now a part of the election code. Yes.
23:59 - That's correct. Right.
24:01 - And what is the general approach to severability?
24:05 - As to the election code,
24:07 - the general approach, which again, is consistent with what
24:10 - the General Assembly prescribed in the statutory Construction Act, is that
24:15 - provisions can be severable.
24:18 - If they can stand into the rest of the act, can stand it.
24:20 - So how do we square that with your position on severability?
24:24 - A couple of ways, Your Honor.
24:26 - First, the fact that it's an amendment or a merger
24:29 - under the cases we've cited in our brief,
24:32 - doesn't mean the non severability provision from act 77 disappeared.
24:36 - In fact, with the Statutory Construction Act directs.
24:39 - And what this court's cases have held, is that both a specific statutory
24:44 - provision prevails over a general one and that a later
24:47 - enacted statutory provision prevails over an earlier enacted.
24:51 - Does that conflict?
24:52 - I'm sorry to interrupt you.
24:54 - Does that specific provision actually survive after the 180 days
24:59 - and after the act 77 is just now part of the election code?
25:04 - Yes it does.
25:05 - There was nothing about the non severability provision
25:08 - that limited it to the 180 day period, or said that it would go away
25:13 - during the merger, after a merger or amendment into the election code.
25:17 - But after the merger, doesn't it, doesn't that provision conflict
25:21 - with the prevailing provision on non severability?
25:25 - I don't believe that it does, Your Honor, because it only applies to the act
25:28 - seven to act 77.
25:30 - So the general
25:32 - severability approach in the election code survives for everything else.
25:35 - And then we have a specific later enacted provision
25:38 - that governs the act 77 provisions.
25:43 - And so those two can actually be read in harmony with each other.
25:46 - But to the extent there were any conflict,
25:48 - it's hard for me
25:48 - to see how they can be read in harmony when they say opposite things.
25:52 - But maybe maybe you can explain that.
25:54 - Well, they can be read side by side because the general provision,
25:58 - as I mentioned, can apply to the rest of the election code as the default rule.
26:02 - And the General Assembly adopted a specific rule
26:05 - for just those provisions within act 77.
26:09 - If that weren't the case, then the general Assembly
26:11 - could never adopt an amendment specific non severability provision,
26:15 - which of course is exactly what it wanted to do and needed to do an act
26:18 - 77 as part of the political compromise
26:21 - that led to universal mail voting here in Pennsylvania.
26:25 - Let me let me ask another question about severability.
26:28 - Whose decision is it ultimately as to
26:32 - whether a provision is severable or non severable?
26:36 - I mean, the legislature has said in act 77 one thing
26:41 - does that compel the court to construe it that way?
26:45 - Or is this the court's decision as to whether severability applies or not?
26:50 - Well,
26:50 - I obviously we're here before the court asking the court to make a ruling on that.
26:55 - We believe that the down severability provision is binding
26:57 - and enforceable on the court, that the court should enforce it based on.
27:02 - Based on what do you believe a provision of the legislature,
27:06 - regarding severability or non severability is binding on the court.
27:10 - I think this court said still that as a general matter,
27:13 - non severability provisions are enforceable.
27:17 - It's consistent with the Statutory Construction Act
27:19 - to enforce this non severability provision here
27:22 - because the General Assembly's intent was clear from the language.
27:25 - There's no ambiguity as to what the General Assembly was trying to accomplish.
27:30 - And that's consistent with this court's case law, including in still where
27:33 - the court pointed out that non severability provisions can be informed.
27:39 - By political compromises and that's exactly what we have here in act 77.
27:44 - The non severability provision as we've shown, was integral
27:48 - to the political compromise that was brokered in the general Assembly.
27:52 - And that gave Pennsylvanians the convenience of universal mail voting.
27:56 - Okay.
27:56 - Can you distinguish for us?
28:02 - The difference that
28:03 - the, police are relying on the difference
28:07 - between the severability,
28:11 - sorry, the provision that we're you're seeking,
28:14 - the provision you're arguing about, in terms of it being severed
28:19 - by its language being severed or just the remedy or penalty.
28:23 - Is that still the same issue,
28:26 - or are those two, issues separate?
28:30 - That was an a very clear question.
28:32 - I'm sorry, but do you know, let me let me do my best, your honor.
28:36 - And I'm sure that you're correct. Me?
28:38 - The relief that they see
28:40 - here does trigger the non severability provision.
28:43 - They've said they're not seeking to strike the word.
28:46 - They're okay with
28:47 - the language, not severing the language but attacking the penalty.
28:52 - The enforcement. Other. Right.
28:53 - But the non severability provision covers that because it says
28:57 - if any application to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
29:02 - then the remaining provisions and applications of the act are void.
29:07 - And that's exactly what we'd have here.
29:09 - An injunction against enforcement of the date requirement is an injunction
29:13 - against its application to a particular ballot or circumstance or voter.
29:18 - Is that different, though, than applying a penalty?
29:20 - I mean, you can perhaps say the provision exists.
29:24 - And yes, we recognize it's enforceable,
29:27 - but we're not going to penalize the voter.
29:30 - Is there a way to distinguish those two things?
29:33 - I don't believe that there is, Your Honor.
29:35 - And I think in ball, this court already held
29:37 - that as a matter of the statute, the date requirement is mandatory.
29:40 - So to now come in and preclude
29:43 - or order or enjoin enforcement of that.
29:48 - Requirement is
29:49 - enjoining an application of acts 77 that triggers
29:53 - the clause, the question of can it be mandatory?
29:56 - And yet the penalty not be enforceable?
30:02 - I don't believe that it can.
30:03 - I think mandatory means mandatory and that there's an enforceable consequence,
30:08 - for noncompliance, always have an enforceable consequence.
30:13 - It's far as I understand, this court's, jurisprudence in the election code.
30:16 - Yes. That's correct.
30:19 - They make a couple of other arguments on the non
30:21 - severability provision as well that I'd like to briefly address.
30:25 - They argue that enforcement of the date requirement doesn't happen through act 77,
30:30 - but instead happens through the declaration sufficiency provision
30:34 - in section 3140 6.8.
30:37 - But this court already rejected a similar argument
30:40 - when the Secretary advanced it in ball, and it should do so again.
30:43 - Here.
30:45 - 3140 6.8 directs election officials to determine whether declaration
30:50 - is sufficient, but it does not say what makes the declarations sufficient.
30:55 - That comes from acts 77.
30:57 - So determining determining that a declaration is sufficient
31:00 - even though it doesn't comply with the date requirement, is again
31:05 - holding void the application of the date requirement to a particular ballot
31:08 - or circumstance.
31:10 - Moreover, their reading of 3140 6.8
31:13 - simply proves too much under that reading.
31:16 - Election officials making a sufficiency determination
31:20 - could ignore other of the General Assembly's
31:22 - requirements for declarations like the signature requirement
31:25 - or the requirement that the declaration be filled out,
31:29 - and appellate are also incorrect when they say
31:31 - that the declaration sufficiency provision is outside of act 77.
31:35 - Non severability clause.
31:37 - Act 77 specifically amended
31:40 - the declaration sufficiency provision to bring mail in ballots within its ambit.
31:44 - It had to because those ballots hadn't existed prior to 2019.
31:50 - I've addressed
31:51 - already their amendment and merger argument.
31:54 - They pointed to the stealth case as I mentioned,
31:57 - that case actually bolsters our position because it holds
32:02 - that non severability provisions are enforceable as a general matter.
32:06 - The reason the court did not enforce the non severability
32:09 - provision in still is that it was basically a poison pill.
32:13 - It eroded the independence of the judiciary
32:17 - and its institution interests by tying judicial compensation
32:21 - to unconstitutional expense reimbursements sought by the General Assembly.
32:26 - Doesn't your interpretation do the same thing?
32:29 - I mean, we have judicial elections in Pennsylvania and retention elections,
32:33 - certainly.
32:34 - But if that were the case,
32:34 - then the court would would be facing that all the time in these election cases.
32:39 - And it's not the same kind of, interim effect here
32:42 - because it's not the institutional independence of the judiciary.
32:46 - The judiciary still maintains its independence even under act 77.
32:50 - That was not the case.
32:51 - And still it was a poison pill, an attempt to force the judiciary,
32:55 - to approve an unconstitutional statute.
32:59 - House,
33:00 - how do we maintain our independence in terms
33:03 - of our exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution?
33:08 - If the legislature can tell us how to do that?
33:13 - I don't think the legislature is telling the court how to interpret
33:16 - the Constitution.
33:17 - I think the court has made clear how it should interpret the Constitution.
33:20 - So we agree the court shouldn't even have to reach the non severability provision
33:24 - because it said clearly in Winston,
33:25 - through Walsh, that rules like these are constitutional.
33:29 - But what the General Assembly has said is that
33:32 - if there is a determination that something is invalid,
33:36 - there's a consequence for that.
33:37 - This is the remedy.
33:38 - The remedy is if the entire act goes.
33:40 - And that was part of the political compromise.
33:43 - The General Assembly reached.
33:45 - If there's any interim effect here, it would be
33:48 - from not enforcing that non severability provision.
33:51 - The General Assembly would be chilled from adopting new election innovations,
33:55 - and it would be chilled from entering into political compromises
33:59 - and using these non severability provisions to do so.
34:03 - They also claim that it would be messy
34:06 - to invalidate act 77 and to take away the convenience of mail voting.
34:11 - We certainly agree that it could be
34:14 - there were later amendments to the to the act.
34:17 - The General Assembly could have addressed what to happen with what
34:20 - it wanted to happen with those things it was aware of.
34:22 - Act 77 non severability provision at the time.
34:25 - It did so but we agree
34:28 - that the court should not trigger the non severability provision.
34:32 - Because the court should uphold the date requirement
34:34 - as constitutional under the Free and Equal Elections clause,
34:38 - following its unbroken line of cases from Winston through Walsh.
34:42 - I'm happy to answer any further questions the court may.
34:44 - Any other questions for Mr. Gore?
34:47 - Well-argued. Thank you. We'll hear from.
34:50 - Let's see who is next.
34:52 - Mr. Graham, we asked the court to reverse.
34:55 - We we inferred that they think
34:58 - we figured it.
35:01 - Good morning.
35:17 - Madam Chief Justice, and may it please the court.
35:19 - My name is Brett Graham.
35:20 - I serve as a deputy attorney general, and I represent the Commonwealth
35:23 - in this appeal.
35:25 - I want to be very mindful of this court's instruction
35:27 - about not repeating argument made by Mr.
35:29 - Gore.
35:30 - But if I may offer a brief framing of the argument,
35:35 - there are slight differences between the way in which Mr.
35:38 - Gore and I have argued this case.
35:41 - Chiefly, we rely less upon the quote unquote, Winston Standard,
35:46 - and we ground our interpretation in the text
35:48 - and history of the Free and Equal Elections Clause.
35:51 - Act 77 requires a de minimis neutral,
35:56 - dating handwrite
35:57 - written date of, an outer return envelope.
36:00 - And as a result, elections are no less free and no less equal in Pennsylvania,
36:05 - we look to the text of the free
36:08 - and equal clause and this court's history with it.
36:11 - This court has offered a very robust interpretation of the clause,
36:15 - but it has been equally steadfast in recognizing
36:18 - that the task of effectuating the clauses mandate lies with the legislature,
36:24 - and specifically, over the course of the past several years,
36:27 - this court has reminded us the so-called
36:30 - technicalities of the election code must be strictly enforced
36:34 - when there is no ambiguous text within the election code.
36:38 - The interpretive canon offered by the free and equal clause has no relevance.
36:42 - That was this court's holding in Walsh.
36:44 - My friends on the other side sort of bypass,
36:48 - in Ray Scroggins and, the provisional ballots case in 2020 for Walsh
36:53 - because their view of how to treat this unambiguous mandatory election
36:58 - code language cannot be squared with those instructions.
37:03 - Indeed, in case after case, this court has been satisfied for free
37:07 - and equal purposes that the legislature is putting every voter
37:12 - in the same position, that each voter has the same opportunity to cast a ballot,
37:18 - and that they must satisfy the same conditions.
37:21 - That's this court's holding in Otten, in Winston and Shanky.
37:25 - And it continues on even in League of Women Voters.
37:29 - The crux of the matter was the opportunity to cast a ballot.
37:34 - Again, I would
37:35 - emphasize that the Commonwealth takes a bit of a broader view
37:39 - than, the, the RNC
37:42 - in this case, because election
37:45 - the way that we run elections is constantly changing.
37:49 - As this court has recently noted, the Australian ballot
37:52 - did not appear in Pennsylvania until 1892.
37:55 - The method by which everyone in this room is familiar
37:57 - with voting was foreign to Pennsylvanians at the time.
38:01 - The free and equal clause was adopted as a result, this is a much broader,
38:06 - and much more foundational guarantee.
38:08 - I'd also like to briefly address the facts of this case
38:11 - in which one of the voters, Kennedy specifically, was afforded an opportunity
38:16 - to cure a defect on her ballot, but did not do so, as the Commonwealth Court
38:21 - recognized in reliance on a now vacated Commonwealth Court decision.
38:27 - Elections.
38:29 - And the application of the election code.
38:31 - I'm sure this court would agree, benefits from very clear rules.
38:35 - And to the extent there has been confusion over the last several years, as Mr.
38:40 - Gore stated, that confusion has largely been ameliorated by clear directives
38:44 - from courts
38:45 - and by a redesign of the declaration form and the declaration requirement.
38:50 - The Commonwealth Court agreed by not only looking to these statutory
38:55 - construction cases, which are an app as it,
38:58 - but also by allowing the materiality provision case
39:02 - question that this court addressed in ball to sort of drive
39:05 - its analysis of government interests and burdens.
39:08 - I would reiterate, what Mr. Gore said.
39:11 - I know I said that I would avoid that.
39:13 - But the Commonwealth has sought,
39:16 - petition and has filed a petition for rehearing en banc in Aiken.
39:20 - And we believe that penalties decision to be contrary
39:23 - to a whole host of applications of the Anderson Burdick standard.
39:27 - And so is it your position that the free and equal election
39:31 - clause does not generally protect the franchise?
39:35 - Not at all, Your Honor.
39:36 - Our position we why are the cases,
39:40 - involving statutory
39:42 - interpretation irrelevant for our consideration?
39:46 - Because those cases are driven by protection of the franchise.
39:51 - They are driven by that, Your Honor.
39:52 - But then they they arrive at an ambiguity in the election code there to.
39:57 - Not necessarily.
39:58 - I mean, that those canons that we've applied for over
40:03 - well over 100 years are often or have been used in unambiguous statutes,
40:09 - situations, because the purpose of the construction
40:13 - is to determine whether the franchise is being infringed, applying.
40:18 - Your Honor, I'm not aware of cases,
40:20 - at least not those cited by the Commonwealth Court
40:23 - or by my friends on the other side where the interpretive canon that stems
40:27 - from the free and equal clause has been applied to unambiguous language.
40:31 - And as we go through it, pages.
40:33 - How about the statute that required the use of this
40:36 - specific colored pen in filling out a ballot?
40:39 - That was unambiguous?
40:41 - It was unambiguous.
40:42 - Well, one thing I would point out, Your Honor, is that that post stated
40:46 - the enactment of the Statutory Construction Act, which at least
40:50 - that's sort of an interesting point.
40:51 - The Statutory Construction Act has always, started
40:56 - with the proposition that we're driven by the text of the legislation.
41:00 - Then nothing new happened in the revision to the Statutory
41:03 - Construction Act to change that basic precept.
41:06 - No, but at least conceivably, Your Honor, the statutory Construction Act,
41:11 - should change how this court approaches those questions
41:14 - rather than looking to the intent, the purpose or whether or not
41:18 - something could be dismissed as a minor technicality.
41:22 - Even when the constitutional overlay,
41:26 - is intended to protect
41:28 - the franchise for the citizens of Pennsylvania,
41:32 - correct, your honor, because that constitutional overlay,
41:35 - if you go back to its origins and the way that it's been treated,
41:38 - has been about access and proportionality, it has been about
41:43 - is the General Assembly, when carrying out
41:46 - its constitutional prerogative to protect, to regulate the franchise.
41:50 - Excuse me.
41:51 - Is it interfering with the ability of any particular group, any particular,
41:57 - subsection of society to participate, or is it counting votes?
42:01 - Is it is it not giving the same return to the same political activity?
42:05 - We do not have that, in this case, indeed, if the Commonwealth Court
42:10 - is to be believed, the the real class of people at issue
42:14 - here is just people who are capable of forgetting things,
42:18 - which is quite a large class in both Aiken and in this case,
42:23 - there have been suggestions that the burden of the date requirement
42:27 - falls on certain populations, more so than others.
42:30 - And statistically that has not been borne out.
42:34 - Indeed, any voter can, comply
42:37 - with the, the date component and, and I think it's relevant here.
42:41 - Another way in which the Commonwealth Court heard is that
42:44 - we don't generally look at statutes or instructions in isolation.
42:49 - And so I think it is erroneous here
42:52 - to look at the specific command date as if it is independent and freestanding.
42:56 - When this court's guidance involved was clear,
42:58 - there is a phrase there fill out date and sign.
43:02 - It is a comprehensive process.
43:06 - The election code instructs voters to do it in secret.
43:10 - Counsel, isn't your argument premised on the, proposition that the date
43:16 - services
43:17 - some reason that there's a purpose for it?
43:20 - If we conclude otherwise?
43:23 - How can we
43:26 - then hold that the counties must
43:31 - enforce that provision by way of that sufficiency review,
43:36 - when we also conclude it serves no purpose?
43:40 - How does that protect the franchise?
43:42 - I'll take your question in two parts, if I may, just as Donahue first,
43:46 - the date component of the declaration requirement does serve state interests.
43:51 - It signals to voters when they have completed all necessary steps.
43:56 - Assume, assume.
43:57 - Just assume for the sake of my question that we conclude otherwise.
44:01 - I have no idea if that will be the case, but assume it is okay.
44:05 - Then what?
44:06 - Fair enough.
44:06 - Your honor, assuming that the date, component serves
44:10 - no purpose, I don't believe that's the end of this case.
44:13 - Largely because the Free and Equal Elections
44:16 - clause has never been understood to immediately skip to interest balancing.
44:22 - As I mentioned at the beginning
44:24 - of my presentation, this court has taken a very robust view of this clause.
44:28 - And if you read through free and equal,
44:31 - jurisprudence, at no point has the court said,
44:35 - it's okay that elections are slightly less free
44:38 - or slightly less equal in service of some government interest.
44:42 - The tiers of scrutiny, interest balancing
44:44 - equal protection paradigm that goes back to Caroline products.
44:47 - Footnote four is really sort of out of place when you talk about the free
44:53 - and equal elections clause, which is a narrow promise,
44:58 - in terms of whether or not it serves a purpose.
45:03 - Again, I would point to the the overarching function
45:06 - of the free and equal clause, which is who decides who decides
45:11 - what is mandatory, who decides what is a technicality?
45:15 - And time and again this court has said, this is the legislature's doing
45:20 - I would point to, as I do in, in, one of the articles cited in my brief,
45:26 - James Wilson, who authored this clause, at least arguably authored the clause,
45:31 - in a long and discursive, essay on the Pennsylvania
45:35 - Constitution of 1790, where he inserted this clause,
45:39 - and on the US Constitution, he comments on the unsuspicious,
45:44 - disposition of the federal, the new federal government towards
45:47 - state legislatures,
45:48 - and says that this is a generous and wise decision, that they have given
45:52 - such extensive power to the states to regulate their own franchise,
45:56 - because in regulating their own franchise, they regulate their own sovereignty.
46:00 - Here.
46:01 - I'm not sure what lesson the General Assembly could take
46:05 - if the Commonwealth Court and its disposition is affirmed,
46:10 - because if if there is no purpose to the requirement,
46:14 - I struggle with how an election can be free.
46:17 - If the legislature can insert a trick
46:21 - that later ends
46:23 - up in a ballot not being counted.
46:26 - Your honor, I would, push back on two elements.
46:30 - Once again,
46:31 - I will remind the court of our position that the state component serves a purpose.
46:35 - And I understand that.
46:36 - And as I said, I have no idea what the consensus of the court is on that.
46:40 - I'm just asking you to pursue this
46:43 - on the assumption that there is no purpose.
46:47 - Absolutely.
46:47 - And I would also separately push back Justice Donoghue on the idea
46:51 - that it is a trick.
46:52 - It is a very simple instruction.
46:56 - It's the it's today's date, something that every voter has access to.
47:00 - And indeed, one of the interesting parts of the Third
47:04 - Circuit panel's opinion in Aiken is that littered throughout
47:09 - Judge Smith's opinion is, he says they it might be discounted,
47:12 - a ballot might be thrown out, possibly could be thrown out because as
47:19 - Chief
47:19 - Justice Todd noticed and noted in introducing the case,
47:22 - there is an outstanding question about notice and care
47:25 - from this court's, pending disposition and coalfield justice.
47:30 - There are many other questions about how the Pennsylvania protects the franchise.
47:35 - I take your point, though, about let me follow through with that.
47:40 - It's clear that, someone who's ballot,
47:44 - is, at the moment that the sufficiency decision is made
47:49 - is voided, because the failure to comply
47:52 - with selection is a different, a different, example.
47:55 - Let's say there's no secrecy envelope. Sure.
47:58 - And if that voter knows that that has occurred,
48:01 - they can cast a provisional ballot.
48:04 - Correct answer.
48:05 - So, where does Coalfield justice
48:09 - take you from there?
48:12 - Coalfield justice?
48:13 - In terms of whether or not there is a procedural due process, right?
48:16 - Or a sure system, automatic email or anything else that might provide the voter
48:22 - another opportunity to cure a defect is certainly relevant in determining
48:27 - whether or not this is really a trick, as you're on or sort of alluded to.
48:33 - The idea that this is, you know, a stray pen mark, an accidental
48:36 - slip of the hand could result in a ballot not being counted.
48:40 - That at least factors in to the analysis I would submit to this court.
48:44 - But you would say again or plus
48:48 - a decision that you've alluded to, in Coalfield Justice would indicate
48:53 - that there is no, deprivation of the franchise.
48:58 - I would argue that it, it, it colors this case, and it makes even more clear
49:03 - that the date requirement is neutral, generally applicable, and that the
49:08 - it refocuses the inquiry, as this court had it in League of Women Voters.
49:13 - On the concept of opportunity.
49:16 - I, I referenced a little earlier the introduction of the Australian ballot.
49:19 - But the it bears mention that beforehand
49:23 - elections in this Commonwealth were run very differently.
49:27 - And our view of the free elections clause is that it
49:30 - is good for all eras, it is good for all systems.
49:33 - And so pinning it to a particular
49:37 - analysis under the federal materiality provision or understandings
49:41 - of how rational basis for very strict scrutiny apply is sort of odd.
49:47 - In our view from it would be an outlier.
49:50 - Let me put it that way.
49:51 - It would be an outlier in terms of this court's jurisprudence,
49:54 - but this would be a case of first impression, would it not
49:57 - include the free and equal elections clause?
49:59 - We agree that this would be a case of first impression,
50:02 - and we do not suggest, as the RNC does, that
50:06 - this case, that this question was already, you know, on all fours answered,
50:12 - and Boockvar was a good answer. Yes.
50:14 - Thanks very much.
50:17 - Candor.
50:20 - We don't
50:21 - we don't necessarily think that the court has answered
50:24 - this question, but really the there's sort of window
50:28 - dressing and puffery around it that make it fairly easy.
50:32 - Scroggins Walsh these are cases in which the court has clarified
50:36 - the relevance of the free and equal clause to statutory interpretation cases.
50:41 - And I'd like to comment briefly, if I may, on the burden analysis.
50:45 - Let's go back.
50:46 - And I'm sorry to I don't want to get you off track on your argument, but,
50:51 - when Justice Donohue ask you some question, she asked you to presume
50:55 - for purposes of her questioning that there was no purpose to the date clause.
51:00 - You seem to indicate earlier that you thought there was some purpose.
51:03 - Now, we know that Pennsylvania has, a system
51:08 - whereby the counties, the county election offices, date stamp
51:13 - the ballot as it's received by mail.
51:16 - They they date stamp the date it's received.
51:19 - We also know we have a statewide computerized system called sure you e
51:26 - which records the date and preserves that date.
51:31 - What is the purpose
51:34 - of an individual inserting a date?
51:37 - And, you know, from looking at the examples, sometimes people make mistakes.
51:42 - They see put the date and they put their birth date,
51:47 - or they have the wrong date, or
51:50 - they forget the date.
51:53 - They don't put any date.
51:54 - I mean, there are reasons why people do forget, and it's human nature.
51:58 - People forget or people misunderstand and put the wrong date.
52:02 - And it's pretty common for someone when asked for a date beside their name,
52:07 - apparently to put the birth date instead of the date.
52:10 - So given that we have those two procedures
52:15 - to determine the actual date
52:18 - that it was received,
52:20 - what purpose can it possibly achieve
52:25 - for the voter to, insert that date?
52:29 - Thank you for that question, chief Justice Todd.
52:31 - And I'll begin where you did with the sure system.
52:35 - I could
52:35 - have worn a belt and suspenders today to sort of give the court
52:39 - a demonstration of my next point, but I elected with just the belt.
52:43 - The system is this commonwealth's, you know, electoral scheme.
52:47 - It's the first line of defense as a Third Circuit judge,
52:52 - acknowledged, when the materiality
52:54 - provision question was up there, it could fail or freeze.
52:57 - Many a lawyer prefers a belt and suspenders approach.
53:00 - And that's not the only approach that we have.
53:03 - The, date stamping by the county board of elections.
53:06 - Sure.
53:06 - Perhaps belt and suspenders and then another pair of suspenders. Yes.
53:11 - But that would that is one of the government interests,
53:15 - as I alluded to previously, signing and dating something,
53:20 - Your Honor, is a very commonly understood act of finality.
53:23 - It has sort of a ceremonial importance.
53:26 - And to the extent the election code instructs voters to comply
53:29 - with several steps, one after the other after the other, signing
53:33 - and dating is sort of an act of finality that tells them, okay,
53:36 - I have completed all necessary steps and I can put this ballot in the mail.
53:41 - It is ready to go to the county board.
53:43 - Finally, something that this court has recognized
53:46 - and the Commonwealth Court has recognized with regard to the dating.
53:49 - Correct.
53:50 - And that's the sort of legislative judgment, Your Honor, that it's
53:54 - sort of hard to attack because it's based on.
53:56 - I guess my point is, it's
53:57 - a hard question for you to answer because you didn't vote on the legislation
54:00 - and you weren't the governor that signed it.
54:02 - So it's kind of difficult to put ourselves in the minds of the General Assembly
54:06 - and why they put something in, given there is a presumption
54:10 - of constitutionality that that attaches up front.
54:13 - But I'm curious, in response to your question from the chief justice, this idea
54:18 - that somehow the date requirement relates to the timeliness of the ballot?
54:23 - I'm not sure that's true.
54:25 - I know that's a big debate that has happened in these cases
54:29 - as they wound through the federal system.
54:31 - But we're not dating the ballot.
54:33 - This is not about establishing the date of receipt of the ballot.
54:36 - This is a verification.
54:38 - It's a verification like we all sign verifications, affidavits.
54:42 - What have you where someone is attesting to certain facts right.
54:48 - That this is an outside.
54:50 - It's on the outside envelope.
54:51 - It could have easily been a separate piece of paper,
54:53 - but it's on the outside envelope and it's saying I verify ABC
54:57 - and I forget how many paragraphs there are signed,
55:00 - blank, dated this date.
55:04 - What does that have to do with whether the ballot is
55:06 - timely received or not?
55:09 - Your honor, my
55:10 - my point and bring that up to this court is twofold.
55:14 - First,
55:15 - this is not the materiality provision question,
55:18 - and we are not limited to considering government interests
55:21 - in terms of timeliness, qualification and receipt.
55:24 - That was sort of the the narrow focus of the federal statutory question involved.
55:29 - We can look beyond that to, you know, beyond the
55:32 - do we count this vote on this particular day?
55:35 - We can look to the hypothetical possibility that A doesn't occur.
55:41 - And that I guess my point is, the question is and the question
55:45 - I think is what is the purpose of dating a verification?
55:50 - That's the question.
55:51 - And it would seem to me that one, again, trying to hypothesize
55:55 - what possibly was in the governor's mind and the legislature's mind
55:58 - when they did this one purpose would be, which I think is consistent
56:03 - with how we do affidavits, is
56:06 - because I am attesting to certain facts.
56:09 - I need to put the date down to show that it's as of that date
56:13 - that I am attesting to these facts, because those facts could change.
56:16 - They could change in the future.
56:17 - Something could happen.
56:18 - But on that date, I am attesting that these facts are correct.
56:23 - Correct.
56:24 - That that is a perfectly, succinct explanation.
56:28 - Justice Robson, that I would go
56:31 - merge a little over with the fraud
56:34 - interest, the interest in protecting against and prosecuting fraud.
56:38 - And I was trying to,
56:40 - you know, cab in my answer to
56:42 - this question about timely receipt of ballots,
56:44 - but I let me take this segue and talk a little bit about fraud.
56:49 - My friends on the other side
56:51 - sort of have a refrain that the date component serves no purpose.
56:56 - But if you then read, later on in in the brief,
57:01 - what they usually mean is it serves no purpose for the timely,
57:06 - reception of ballots, the counting of ballots on Election Day.
57:10 - You have to agree to that extent.
57:13 - They're correct to the extent that the Shaw system
57:17 - is functioning properly and there are no other emergencies
57:22 - statewide emergencies that would displace county boards, etc..
57:27 - Yes, I would agree.
57:28 - I would agree with that.
57:30 - Representation from my friends on the other side.
57:32 - The point being, though, that the Commonwealth's interest
57:35 - in protecting the election scheme extends beyond election day
57:40 - and the Mahalia case demonstrates that the, the handwritten date
57:45 - could be relevant to a fraud prosecution, the fraud prosecution.
57:50 - So if we had on, voting in Pennsylvania,
57:53 - not many, Your Honor, but the United States Supreme Court
57:57 - has been very clear, in this guidance, in terms
58:00 - of this guidance in Crawford, where it upheld a voter ID,
58:04 - statute, from the state of Indiana, absent
58:07 - any evidence of any voter fraud at any time in Indiana history.
58:13 - Because what the court said was the state does not have to wait
58:17 - for there to be injury to its electoral scheme in order for it
58:20 - to act to preemptively protect its scheme.
58:23 - And so where some may
58:26 - quibble with the HollyHock example, to suggest,
58:29 - well, how helpful was it really to the prosecution?
58:32 - Could it be you?
58:34 - These are all sort of hypotheticals.
58:36 - And going back to Justice Robson's point,
58:39 - sort of beyond our purview as lawyers and judges.
58:43 - Because we're now getting into
58:45 - the judgment of what could happen and what might happen.
58:48 - And again, another theme in this courts free and equal case law is that,
58:52 - you do not dismiss the legislative judgment
58:55 - because it is unwise or of doubtful expedience.
58:59 - Is the purpose to prevent fraud or prosecute fraud.
59:04 - Prosecute is probably the better word there.
59:07 - Justice Donohue it's I would not use
59:11 - the word detect, but, prevent.
59:14 - There is sort of a deterrent nature to prevention.
59:17 - Sure. System prevented fraud.
59:20 - The system prevented, fraudulent ballot from being counted.
59:25 - It did not.
59:27 - The jury system does not have any prosecutorial authority
59:30 - to go after the person who committed the fraud that rests with the sovereign.
59:36 - And in that case, without a handwritten date
59:40 - or, you know, without any evidence whatsoever.
59:43 - For instance, if this court were to say, you know,
59:47 - you don't have to date it, those prosecutions become at least
59:50 - conceivably more difficult for the Commonwealth,
59:54 - because we're not aware, really, of any of those prosecutions
59:57 - 131 that it took to go back in recent election years.
01:00 - 05.134 I can't recall all the specific cases, but
01:00 - 10.473 we certainly have had a lot of cases where this issue was raised
01:00 - 15.511 and the potential for fraud in Pennsylvania elections was argued,
01:00 - 21.351 and I don't recall there ever being any evidence that fraud was,
01:00 - 23.386 a problem or a
01:00 - 26.389 significant issue in Pennsylvania elections.
01:00 - 28.691 Well, I would submit wasn't a question.
01:00 - 30.093 I'm sorry. That was more of a statement.
01:00 - 30.727 No, that's okay.
01:00 - 32.528 Just a quick great question, Mark.
01:00 - 34.597 You do I agree.
01:00 - 37.500 I, Chief Justice Todd, I'm
01:00 - 39.002 not aware of any cases
01:00 - 42.672 in which the government interest in fraud was presented to this court,
01:00 - 48.511 and the law at issue was a neutral, de minimis, nondiscriminatory
01:00 - 53.116 ballot casting rule, rephrased by question, though my question was, do
01:00 - 58.721 you recall there ever being any evidence presented to this court where we opine
01:00 - 03.026 that there was indeed a problem with fraud in elections in Pennsylvania?
01:01 - 06.429 Because I don't recall that I don't recall that, Your Honor.
01:01 - 10.533 But what I'm suggesting is, if this court arrives at the conclusion
01:01 - 13.636 that this case turns on whether or not fraud is
01:01 - 18.641 legitimate interest, absent evidence that that question has been answered
01:01 - 21.644 and this court has essentially answered it,
01:01 - 25.682 by repeating over and over again that the task of divine
01:01 - 29.952 devising, an electoral scheme, falls with the legislature.
01:01 - 35.458 In summation,
01:01 - 39.228 the way you sum up sure is assuming, for the sake of argument, that this court
01:01 - 43.166 finds that dating requirement to be a burden, a minor burden.
01:01 - 45.768 What standard review do you think is applicable
01:01 - 48.971 to a free people Election Clause violation or claim?
01:01 - 51.974 I mean, do you think the Commonwealth got it right when it applied
01:01 - 55.745 strict scrutiny, or it should or should it be some kind of lesser standard?
01:01 - 00.416 I don't think that the Commonwealth Court got it right in applying strict scrutiny.
01:02 - 03.152 Justice McCaffery because,
01:02 - 05.154 as this court recognized in Berg
01:02 - 10.126 and again in Banfield versus Cortez, there is always this,
01:02 - 14.230 you know, push to get every election rule subject to strict scrutiny.
01:02 - 18.701 And, courts have recognized over and over again, to do so would tie
01:02 - 22.138 the hands of the legislature, would tie the hands of the General Assembly.
01:02 - 26.542 And I think drilling down on the
01:02 - 31.114 the theory of injury in a given case is essential,
01:02 - 34.951 because in this case, what we're dealing with
01:02 - 39.055 is not really the entitlement to vote or the qualification to vote.
01:02 - 42.992 It is compliance with the election rule and the manner of voting,
01:02 - 45.995 which is another theme from this court's case law.
01:02 - 49.298 So to the extent tiers of scrutiny apply at all,
01:02 - 56.239 I think we would have to begin from the premise that 99.77% of individuals
01:02 - 02.478 regularly comply with this requirement and, that the burden on the voter,
01:03 - 05.948 the effort required of the voter is really quite minimal.
01:03 - 10.253 Again, this is a there's a series of steps going on here
01:03 - 14.090 and the the nub, as Justice Robson would say,
01:03 - 17.193 the nub of this case actually I listened yesterday.
01:03 - 18.361 I mean catch on quickly.
01:03 - 21.297 The Robson Doctrine said that once
01:03 - 24.133 it once
01:03 - 28.104 I heard nub a couple of times yesterday, respectfully, more than once.
01:03 - 31.541 We got our first prob Ionian ism. Yeah,
01:03 - 35.878 but the nub of the case is really about, the simple effort
01:03 - 38.881 required of the voter to move the pen over to the date,
01:03 - 42.652 field. And,
01:03 - 46.155 just to color a bit, your question earlier, Chief Justice Todd,
01:03 - 49.959 about putting down your birthday or anything like that again, in the record
01:03 - 53.429 here, evidence from the state that they have redesigned it
01:03 - 56.432 and now starts with a year 20,
01:03 - 59.435 you know, two, two spots for the year.
01:03 - 02.438 But to finish, my answer to you, justice McCaffrey,
01:04 - 06.075 when you're dealing with a, a nondiscriminatory,
01:04 - 11.848 regulation that poses such a small amount of effort
01:04 - 15.785 for the voter to comply, rational basis seems like
01:04 - 19.622 it would be the most appropriate, because there's no evidence or indication
01:04 - 22.592 that a particular group is being disadvantaged.
01:04 - 26.128 And thus there is no interference with our electoral process.
01:04 - 28.731 All right.
01:04 - 31.901 Unless there are any other questions, I will thank the court
01:04 - 33.903 for its time and urge you to reverse.
01:04 - 35.571 Thank you, thank you, thank you.
01:04 - 37.106 Very well done.
01:04 - 39.775 We'll now turn to the appellate argument.
01:04 - 40.943 I'm surprised that Mr.
01:04 - 42.879 Levine isn't jumping from his seat.
01:04 - 46.282 And apparently I think he wants to, apparently,
01:04 - 48.584 for for a change, we don't have Mr.
01:04 - 50.019 King or Mr. Levine.
01:04 - 53.022 So we will go with Mr. Looney.
01:04 - 54.457 Welcome.
01:04 - 57.460 Apologies for that. But.
01:05 - 02.798 Good morning, Chief Justice.
01:05 - 04.200 And may please the court.
01:05 - 06.602 Stephen Loney of the ACLU of Pennsylvania.
01:05 - 10.139 I represent the voters in this case, Susan Kennedy and Brian Baxter.
01:05 - 13.242 And if I may, just a couple of quick notes before I begin.
01:05 - 15.077 One is I would like to acknowledge Mr.
01:05 - 18.047 Henry's presence in the courtroom front and center in the gallery.
01:05 - 20.349 And also note that Mr.
01:05 - 21.851 Baxter had planned to be here today,
01:05 - 24.854 but unfortunately passed away before the hearing.
01:05 - 29.425 Another quick bit of housekeeping, just to let you know how we've split up
01:05 - 32.428 the argument on this side of the room for efficiency sake.
01:05 - 36.866 Each one of us is going to address a different part of the merits of this case.
01:05 - 40.937 And I will address the second question presented on severability.
01:05 - 46.342 So I will first focus on the nature of the fundamental right and the standard
01:05 - 49.345 to be applied where there is an infringement on the right to vote.
01:05 - 52.682 Mr.. Vocal Chuck, on behalf of the intervenor,
01:05 - 54.550 please will address the application.
01:05 - 57.720 Specifically, the question of whether the enforcement of the date requirement
01:05 - 00.723 furthers any legitimate government interest.
01:06 - 03.159 He'll also address the question of whether this case
01:06 - 06.162 is indeed on all fours with any prior case of this court.
01:06 - 09.832 And then, counsel for the Philadelphia Board of Elections, Mr.
01:06 - 10.166 Stevens.
01:06 - 13.169 Larson is going to provide the board's perspective,
01:06 - 16.205 on the process for administering elections
01:06 - 20.576 and how mail ballots are processed with envelope dating errors.
01:06 - 22.511 So I'll address my part of the merits.
01:06 - 24.947 And then severability before handing off to anybody else.
01:06 - 29.752 In this case, the
01:06 - 33.889 nub of this case is interference with voters.
01:06 - 36.325 Exercise of the right of suffrage.
01:06 - 38.260 Two of those voters, Miss Kennedy and Mr.
01:06 - 42.932 Baxter, were eligible lifelong voters whose most fundamental rights
01:06 - 46.302 as Pennsylvania citizens are at stake here.
01:06 - 48.270 Our Constitution protects those rights.
01:06 - 52.541 It provides that no power shall at any time interfere with or interfere
01:06 - 55.945 to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.
01:06 - 00.182 And however you try to slice it, a practice of disqualifying votes
01:07 - 03.786 for noncompliance with a meaningless handwritten date requirement
01:07 - 07.656 interferes with it, diminishes the right of suffrage,
01:07 - 10.426 and it's untied to any government interest.
01:07 - 11.394 As you hear from Mr.
01:07 - 15.898 Ball, chock, on that simple basis, we ask that this court affirm
01:07 - 17.566 the Commonwealth court's ruling,
01:07 - 20.403 which would not invalidate any provision of act 77
01:07 - 22.171 and therefore doesn't implicate severability,
01:07 - 25.941 as this court acknowledged in legal way in the voters,
01:07 - 28.978 which is the definitive case on free and equal elections clause, which
01:07 - 31.981 we've heard far too little about today,
01:07 - 36.218 the right of suffrage is among the article one Declaration of Rights,
01:07 - 40.122 article one, enumerating fundamental rights that are, quote,
01:07 - 43.526 specifically exempted from the powers of the government to diminish.
01:07 - 47.997 Again, we're here talking about a diminishment of the right
01:07 - 51.434 now, it's undisputed that the voters here were eligible
01:07 - 54.437 registered voters who timely submitted their ballots.
01:07 - 56.038 They signed the declaration.
01:07 - 58.240 There's no suggestion of fraud.
01:07 - 01.377 The only issue here is that they and thousands like them,
01:08 - 05.581 also did not handwrite the date next to their signature,
01:08 - 08.651 or they wrote some date that somebody deemed to be incorrect.
01:08 - 12.555 As a result, their votes were effectively screened out
01:08 - 15.991 based on what has become a disenfranchisement trap.
01:08 - 19.895 Disenfranchizing people, thousands of people in every statewide
01:08 - 21.797 election for the past five years.
01:08 - 24.667 Now, given this court's mandate in League of Women Voters,
01:08 - 28.270 that the Free and Equal Elections Clause be given the broadest interpretation,
01:08 - 32.174 of course, a rule that routinely disenfranchizes
01:08 - 35.344 people is subject to constitutional review.
01:08 - 37.046 Council.
01:08 - 37.980 How is it?
01:08 - 41.183 Oh, well, clearly all legislation is subject
01:08 - 44.253 to all government action, subject to constitutional review.
01:08 - 45.054 That's why we're here.
01:08 - 48.023 But how does,
01:08 - 51.026 how does this case
01:08 - 55.064 map on to the League of Women Voters,
01:08 - 58.100 League of Women Voters was a case
01:08 - 01.337 where a outrageously gerrymandered map
01:09 - 05.107 blatantly violated the Free and Equal Elections clause.
01:09 - 06.275 Here.
01:09 - 10.012 How can you argue that a neutral statue
01:09 - 13.916 is anything but free and equal?
01:09 - 17.286 And how, if this interferes
01:09 - 21.190 with the right to vote?
01:09 - 24.727 How can you
01:09 - 26.762 how can you say that any provision
01:09 - 30.132 of the election code can stand?
01:09 - 33.435 Because by definition,
01:09 - 35.171 under your argument, it would seem that
01:09 - 38.774 having an election code necessarily interferes
01:09 - 42.912 with this right to vote, which I take it
01:09 - 46.182 you would maintain,
01:09 - 49.585 cannot cannot be subject to any government
01:09 - 52.421 regulation whatsoever.
01:09 - 55.424 And how is that consistent with Winston
01:09 - 56.825 Turner?
01:09 - 00.229 I've heard a few questions in there, and I'll try to address them in turn.
01:10 - 03.966 So first, the first of which is that we're not arguing in any way
01:10 - 07.136 that legal women voters is on all fours with the facts of this case.
01:10 - 08.037 Certainly not.
01:10 - 11.941 But the broad pronouncement of this court is instructive and controlling
01:10 - 16.612 in that this court held the clause, the free and equal elections clause,
01:10 - 20.683 not just the equal part, but the free part shall be given the broadest
01:10 - 24.086 interpretation, one which governs all aspects of the electoral process.
01:10 - 28.490 And that's what I think the appellants are missing in their arguments that,
01:10 - 32.061 there's a suggestion here that there's no constitutional standard
01:10 - 35.097 to be applied if under Winston,
01:10 - 36.298 or at
01:10 - 39.301 least their interpretation of Winston, if the,
01:10 - 43.305 the restriction isn't so extreme as to make it
01:10 - 46.342 impossible to comply with and it's just impossible.
01:10 - 50.412 Well, it's there's less than 1% of the people who
01:10 - 54.750 who date their ballot or data correctly and their their ballots not counted.
01:10 - 57.586 Does that mean that it was impossible?
01:10 - 58.921 They just they messed up.
01:10 - 02.891 It's like somebody showing up at the polls at 801 and they blew it.
01:11 - 03.959 How is it?
01:11 - 06.195 How is it any different now, your honor?
01:11 - 08.864 My I was not suggesting that this requirement is impossible.
01:11 - 12.868 What I'm saying is that the suggestion that there be no constitutional review,
01:11 - 17.039 that the free elections clause does not apply at all unless
01:11 - 20.876 the legislature imposes an insurmountable burden,
01:11 - 22.544 cannot be squared with legal women voters.
01:11 - 24.580 It can't be squared with the text of the Free
01:11 - 28.751 and Equal Elections clause, or its intent to be radically democratic at the time,
01:11 - 31.920 suggesting League of Women Voters overruled Winston.
01:11 - 36.058 No, Your Honor, in fact, League of Women Voters, directly relied on and quoted
01:11 - 41.397 Winston, and it provided the full quote, not just the part about requirements
01:11 - 45.634 that are so difficult as to amount to, a denial of the franchise.
01:11 - 49.271 Both Winston and League of Women Voters.
01:11 - 52.741 The full quote stated that the free elections clause applies
01:11 - 56.712 to any regulations that deny the franchise itself or make it
01:11 - 02.685 so difficult to amount to a denial or subvert or deny the franchise.
01:12 - 05.587 We're dealing here, here with an outright denial
01:12 - 08.691 of the vote, disqualification of votes, which this court has never allowed
01:12 - 10.192 without compelling reasons.
01:12 - 11.493 And just Justice Week.
01:12 - 13.896 To go back to your question, I believe it was your opinion
01:12 - 17.466 and ball that for the purposes of the materiality provision, acknowledge
01:12 - 20.669 that this very rule is a denial of the right
01:12 - 23.672 to vote. Now,
01:12 - 27.009 this court's precedents.
01:12 - 29.311 Have always been clear that denial
01:12 - 32.581 of a fundamental article one right triggers strict scrutiny.
01:12 - 36.385 And I'd like to engage with that debate about strict scrutiny.
01:12 - 39.755 So before you get into that, before you get into that,
01:12 - 43.792 just as your opposing counsel's argument was based upon
01:12 - 49.064 the assumption that there was a purpose for the dating class,
01:12 - 54.770 your argument has to be based upon the, assumption that there is no purpose.
01:12 - 56.905 And, we're not here
01:12 - 00.008 arguing about secrecy envelopes, correct, Your honor.
01:13 - 03.011 Okay. I mean, the purpose is clear.
01:13 - 06.181 It's, driven.
01:13 - 10.285 There is a, you know, a reason for it that's bound
01:13 - 13.455 within various aspects of the election code.
01:13 - 15.391 That's not what we're talking about.
01:13 - 19.395 Your argument has to be based upon an underlying
01:13 - 21.930 view that there's no purpose to this.
01:13 - 24.333 It that is that is the argument in this case, your Honor.
01:13 - 27.903 And this this particular requirement, as you hear more from Mr.
01:13 - 30.639 Vol Chock is uniquely without purpose.
01:13 - 31.874 I mean, we're not here arguing
01:13 - 34.410 about the signature requirement or the envelope required.
01:13 - 38.647 Just trying to channel your argument because, there are certainly,
01:13 - 44.052 many requirements, that have a clear and important
01:13 - 47.923 and, articulable reason under the election code.
01:13 - 50.926 Your argument has to be,
01:13 - 54.062 skinny down to a situation where there is none of that.
01:13 - 55.831 Correct. There is no purpose.
01:13 - 58.867 And to put a finer point on it, because I do want to address
01:13 - 01.637 the standard to be applied in reaching that conclusion.
01:14 - 03.939 Our view is that there has to be a heightened level of scrutiny
01:14 - 06.408 under the free and equal elections clause that legal women voters.
01:14 - 08.744 And this gets back to Justice Wicks first question
01:14 - 11.313 how this maps on the League of Women Voters.
01:14 - 12.948 The court did the work in that case.
01:14 - 16.752 Did the Edmonds analysis, and concluded that in Pennsylvania,
01:14 - 18.387 the Free and Equal Elections clause provides
01:14 - 20.556 greater protection over the fundamental right to vote
01:14 - 22.291 than does the federal Constitution.
01:14 - 27.062 So the suggestion that you can somehow cut in favor of,
01:14 - 31.834 of overturning the Commonwealth Court here is a little hard to fathom.
01:14 - 35.971 The argument, as I understand it, is that because the Third Circuit
01:14 - 39.107 and you can deemed this a minimal burden,
01:14 - 43.312 then under Winston, that's not enough to say that it's impossible to meet.
01:14 - 46.048 And so there is no constitutional review.
01:14 - 49.051 League of Women Voters stands for exactly the opposite, which is
01:14 - 51.086 something that none of us are up here saying.
01:14 - 53.155 There is no constitutional review.
01:14 - 55.357 Well, there's one person here who is right with that.
01:14 - 58.460 There is one person here who is okay, I disagree with you.
01:14 - 59.995 I think what they're simply saying is
01:14 - 04.032 we have the power to conduct constitutional review of a state statute.
01:15 - 07.336 You're disagreeing as the standard we apply and whether it's been met.
01:15 - 09.738 But nobody's saying this isn't subject to constant.
01:15 - 12.574 We wouldn't be here if this was not subject to constitutional review.
01:15 - 16.011 Well, as I as I understand the appellant's argument, it's that,
01:15 - 19.648 Winston provides a sort of binary question.
01:15 - 19.915 Right.
01:15 - 22.951 Either the requirement is impossible to comply with,
01:15 - 27.289 and therefore invalid or it's not, and therefore you don't have to engage
01:15 - 28.423 in any other analysis.
01:15 - 31.560 And their point is that that is the constitutional review.
01:15 - 31.994 They're saying,
01:15 - 35.664 Winston, is the test of constitution, of passing constitutional review
01:15 - 37.366 and neutral ballot measure.
01:15 - 40.669 And that's what I'm disagreeing with, Your Honor, is that that is but I, I'm,
01:15 - 43.639 I'm I'm responding to your statement that there's somebody here
01:15 - 46.341 is taking the position that there's no constitutional review.
01:15 - 47.809 I mean, we put our best robes on.
01:15 - 48.343 I mean, we're,
01:15 - 51.947 you know, I don't think anybody on this bench has has enough of the problem.
01:15 - 53.382 I certainly.
01:15 - 54.349 Yeah. Fair enough.
01:15 - 57.252 Your Honor, I don't think anybody on this bench suggests otherwise.
01:15 - 00.255 But, in the courtroom is either we have an argument,
01:16 - 03.258 a good faith argument between the two sides.
01:16 - 05.027 Unconstitutionality.
01:16 - 07.629 I don't think anybody said it's. Well,
01:16 - 10.132 we fight about that.
01:16 - 14.636 Didn't didn't Winston set forth the court's understanding
01:16 - 18.140 of what the free and Equal Elections clause meant?
01:16 - 18.941 It did, Your Honor.
01:16 - 22.110 And it also went on to talk about the plenary authority
01:16 - 23.745 of the General Assembly in this area,
01:16 - 27.883 which we've subsequently recognized time and time again, is that correct?
01:16 - 29.251 Absolutely, Your Honor,
01:16 - 32.487 and I'm just asking the court to look at the full scope of what,
01:16 - 35.223 what the court said 100 years ago and Winston
01:16 - 37.426 and then reapplied in League of Women Voters,
01:16 - 41.163 which was it's not just a binary decision about whether a requirement
01:16 - 44.499 is so difficult to comply with as to make it impossible or not,
01:16 - 47.703 and that's period full stop, end of end of analysis.
01:16 - 48.870 That's no standard at all.
01:16 - 52.941 What is required by this court's precedents is a means ends analysis.
01:16 - 58.547 Any time a fundamental article one right is being infringed diminished.
01:16 - 59.982 I may just not to belabor it,
01:16 - 04.586 but I just on this league of women voters, this this attempt to map
01:17 - 08.390 perhaps the reason we haven't heard much about League of Women Voters is that
01:17 - 11.426 it's an imperfect mapping, because
01:17 - 15.030 League of Women Voters, with which Miss Gallagher is quite familiar.
01:17 - 20.702 Involve the opportunity,
01:17 - 25.140 the opportunity of each citizen equally to have his or her vote
01:17 - 28.377 heard, it to have the same
01:17 - 31.380 meaning, the same voting power as other citizens,
01:17 - 35.617 which was unconstitutionally diluted in that case.
01:17 - 39.655 How does that have any bearing
01:17 - 43.191 on the the application of a neutral,
01:17 - 47.095 nondiscriminatory statute such as the one at issue here?
01:17 - 49.931 It's the broad pronouncements, Your Honor.
01:17 - 52.901 Again, we're not suggesting here that the case is on all fours
01:17 - 55.737 and has already been resolved by the League of Women Voters.
01:17 - 59.474 What I'm relying on here is the broad pronouncements from legal women voters
01:17 - 03.445 about what the free and equal election clause requires,
01:18 - 07.616 and also addressing the point that Your Honor pointed me to,
01:18 - 11.486 which is the plenary power of the legislature to impose,
01:18 - 14.823 sort of
01:18 - 19.194 neutral process rules around voting, which nobody is questioning here.
01:18 - 20.495 But what we're, we're questioning
01:18 - 24.499 is when those rules result in the denial of the vote,
01:18 - 28.837 then they must be analyzed under means and test.
01:18 - 31.840 That's not talent assembly supposed to do
01:18 - 35.410 when they craft neutral ballot casting rules.
01:18 - 37.479 Are they supposed to put a footnote in there
01:18 - 41.717 that says the reason why we're putting this in is X and Y
01:18 - 46.221 and and all this other stuff, is that what they're supposed to do to do this?
01:18 - 48.724 If this is how we're going to apply this,
01:18 - 52.294 free and equal elections clause to every neutral ballot casting measure,
01:18 - 56.431 I'll take, for example, the requirement that not only the verification
01:18 - 59.534 on the outside envelope be dated, but that it also be signed.
01:18 - 03.472 This court has ruled that that there is no signature matching
01:19 - 07.476 requirement, which begs the question about why the signature is even required
01:19 - 10.946 is that the next challenge is because
01:19 - 13.148 there's no signature matching that goes on.
01:19 - 15.283 The signature serves no real purpose.
01:19 - 18.286 And people forget to sign,
01:19 - 22.390 and therefore it's a meaningless clause.
01:19 - 23.592 Is that the.
01:19 - 26.361 Is that the next step here?
01:19 - 28.830 To answer your second question first, no, Your Honor, that is not the next step.
01:19 - 31.600 I mean, we we are not here challenging.
01:19 - 34.102 What's your argument? Hold water in the same thing.
01:19 - 37.405 The court has said that you know, clearly says fill out date and sign right.
01:19 - 41.510 So we're talking about the date part of the verification.
01:19 - 44.513 This court has ruled that there is no signature
01:19 - 47.516 matching requirement when they go to do the canvass.
01:19 - 49.184 Right.
01:19 - 49.518 Correct.
01:19 - 52.621 Your honor, what purpose does a signature serve
01:19 - 56.825 if there's no signature matching requirement to ensure that the ballot
01:19 - 00.529 that is electronically connected to a particular voter matches the signature?
01:20 - 03.532 If it's and if it serves no purpose, then we should strike it
01:20 - 06.535 as unconstitutional under your means ends analysis.
01:20 - 09.738 Well, just to zoom out for a second, if I may, Your Honor, I just want to note
01:20 - 12.941 that I'm not in the position of the proponent of restriction on voting rights.
01:20 - 16.344 But to answer your question about why we're not filing cases
01:20 - 19.748 about the signature requirement is because it's meaningfully different
01:20 - 24.419 in terms of its ability to, to be tied to a government purpose.
01:20 - 26.354 And just to take one of the purposes
01:20 - 30.392 being argued here about the date requirement, solemnity, even without a,
01:20 - 33.361 just for the sake of argument,
01:20 - 36.565 I will accept that that is a valid,
01:20 - 39.267 a valid government interest.
01:20 - 43.905 But our issue here is with connection to that interest, whatever interest
01:20 - 47.108 the government has in ensuring solemnity in people and that people,
01:20 - 50.212 contemplate
01:20 - 53.014 what they're doing when they're filling out that declaration.
01:20 - 54.583 That interest is served by the signature.
01:20 - 58.353 I mean, the appellant's right to vote talk for the solemnity point.
01:20 - 00.155 And that is a signature case.
01:21 - 03.859 And so the date requirement adds nothing in that respect.
01:21 - 08.697 And no court is satisfied by any signature.
01:21 - 15.470 Asking people to sign the declaration is meaningful
01:21 - 17.439 for for the reasons that Your Honor has pointed out.
01:21 - 20.675 But again, I'm here talking about what standard is applied.
01:21 - 21.576 And when we're talking,
01:21 - 24.112 you agree that under our precedent, it could be any signature.
01:21 - 25.614 It doesn't have to be the signature because
01:21 - 26.982 because there's no way to match this.
01:21 - 27.983 This court has ruled that
01:21 - 31.653 that signature matching is not part of the sufficiency of determination
01:21 - 35.557 or solemnity of a scribble that doesn't match the signature of the voter.
01:21 - 38.560 What's the meaningful solemnity again, your honor, this is
01:21 - 40.128 I'm not the AG's office.
01:21 - 41.663 I'm not the Department of State. But.
01:21 - 45.500 But you're asking us to adopt this sort of means and test.
01:21 - 46.868 You're asking us to,
01:21 - 50.338 to, to basically,
01:21 - 55.143 if we can hypothesize some, some reason why the General Assembly might choose
01:21 - 58.980 to put this neutral ballot casting measure and why the governor might agree to it.
01:22 - 03.652 I'm asking you if we do if we do everything that you ask us to do,
01:22 - 04.286 I'm concerned
01:22 - 07.389 about what the next neutral ballot casting measure is in the election code.
01:22 - 11.192 That's going to be subject to whatever test we adopt that you're advocating for.
01:22 - 15.697 Respectfully, Your Honor, I think that that concern is present all of the time
01:22 - 19.434 when we're dealing with rules that impact a fundamental right.
01:22 - 22.470 We've never we've this court has never invalidated a neutral
01:22 - 25.440 ballot casting measure,
01:22 - 27.509 a neutral ballot.
01:22 - 30.812 First of all, there are examples of this court invalidating what the,
01:22 - 33.949 appellants have coined as ballot casting rules.
01:22 - 36.851 But before I get to those examples, what about the color of the ink?
01:22 - 38.753 Wasn't that a neutral?
01:22 - 41.222 Yes, I want the color of the ink.
01:22 - 46.328 Checkmarks instead of X is, the deadline and pa Dems, an apple white.
01:22 - 49.531 It was voter ID, and I understand that the ultimate conclusion in that case
01:22 - 50.432 came from the Commonwealth Court,
01:22 - 53.501 but they were following directions from this court to enjoin voter ID
01:22 - 56.604 unless it could be shown that there was no voter disenfranchisement.
01:22 - 57.572 These are all examples.
01:22 - 59.441 But I am compelled to point out
01:22 - 03.211 that ballot casting rules, that phrase is, is brand new.
01:23 - 03.878 It's made up.
01:23 - 06.982 It's not in the election code, it's not in the Constitution, it's
01:23 - 09.985 not in the 300 years of jurisprudence from this court.
01:23 - 14.556 So I'll also note that the appellants have, for their part,
01:23 - 18.827 not pointed to any cases involving neutral ballot casting rules.
01:23 - 23.031 So could we go back to a little bit of a different issue that appellate.
01:23 - 26.468 So pardon me appellants have raised concerning
01:23 - 31.106 the efforts on behalf of the Board of Elections
01:23 - 35.777 to make the ballots more mistake proof
01:23 - 41.616 by trying to instruct people how to to insert the dates, reminding them
01:23 - 45.387 that it's important to put the date and putting, you know,
01:23 - 48.690 the first two numbers of the date on to try to avoid them
01:23 - 53.361 putting, of the year to try to keep people from putting their birth dates on.
01:23 - 56.097 There are efforts that have been made and as,
01:23 - 59.701 pointed out by appellants,
01:23 - 05.607 those efforts in recent years have resulted in fewer mistakes.
01:24 - 10.612 Okay, maybe, you know, 5%, down to 4%
01:24 - 15.350 or down to 3%, whatever it is, it's it had been around 1%.
01:24 - 17.285 And in the last election it was under 1%.
01:24 - 21.289 To be fair, say that again, in the last election, 2024, it was under 1%.
01:24 - 25.193 It was still about 4500 votes just on the day for the date requirement alone.
01:24 - 26.227 So that's my point.
01:24 - 32.400 If you get down to, even 1% of the vote, that is still enough.
01:24 - 37.105 4500 votes, 4000 votes, 2000 votes, 1000 votes.
01:24 - 40.408 That is still enough to turn an election.
01:24 - 43.344 I know of a statewide election
01:24 - 47.816 where a candidate lost by 60 votes, not 60,000 votes.
01:24 - 49.150 60 votes.
01:24 - 53.388 So to me, it's great that there are efforts
01:24 - 57.659 being made to, you know, reduce the possibility of error.
01:24 - 03.531 But that doesn't get us to the ultimate answer here, in my view.
01:25 - 07.435 And I'd like you to, to opine on that, because what we're talking about
01:25 - 10.972 is people's votes, people's right to be heard,
01:25 - 14.242 people's right to influence the election through their vote.
01:25 - 15.877 Absolutely agree.
01:25 - 17.312 Your honor, the efforts
01:25 - 19.347 that the Department of State has made to redesign
01:25 - 21.015 the envelope has definitely limited
01:25 - 22.684 the bleeding, but it has not stopped the bleeding.
01:25 - 25.820 It was still several thousand votes in 2020 for whatever.
01:25 - 28.156 Well, could he finish answering this question?
01:25 - 30.358 If you don't mind, go ahead.
01:25 - 35.196 It's still several thousand votes in 2024, and the cases around
01:25 - 39.033 this very requirement have changed outcomes of elections.
01:25 - 42.871 And so the Toe mentioned township commissioner race that
01:25 - 47.509 that the appellants point to was separated by just a couple of votes.
01:25 - 51.246 And then after counting votes in light of the NAACP
01:25 - 55.116 decision in the district court, the candidates ended up drawing lots.
01:25 - 55.683 And the one who
01:25 - 57.418 flipped the result.
01:25 - 00.622 And so, you know, I'm reminded of Justice Wicks,
01:26 - 04.792 reference to constitutionally intolerable ratio of votes.
01:26 - 05.093 Right.
01:26 - 09.164 And in that opinion and otherwise, we haven't seen a case
01:26 - 10.932 that has really identified like what
01:26 - 13.334 the numerator denominator would be for that ratio.
01:26 - 15.303 And we we would suggest that that's,
01:26 - 18.306 that's not the relevant inquiry for what the ratio would be.
01:26 - 21.309 If anything it is sufficient number of votes
01:26 - 26.347 to impact the outcome of a race because it's really in those instances
01:26 - 30.451 where the right to vote is most pointedly at issue,
01:26 - 34.722 where somebody's ballot is, is thrown out, discarded because of the slip of a pen.
01:26 - 37.525 And in some of these cases, it is a slip of a pen.
01:26 - 39.227 It's not just that somebody wrote the wrong date.
01:26 - 41.963 They they wrote it in the wrong little block. Right.
01:26 - 46.201 And if that's the basis for disqualifying somebody's vote and the person they voted
01:26 - 51.639 for doesn't win by one vote, or because of the drawing of lots we've now
01:26 - 55.076 just directly
01:26 - 57.679 denied somebodies right to vote.
01:26 - 01.349 And this court, I mean, we're not asking for anything new.
01:27 - 05.486 Respectfully, the in Nixon, this court
01:27 - 10.792 clarified that the way to determine whether or not a legislative or government
01:27 - 14.562 action violates the Constitution is through a means and test.
01:27 - 16.931 This court has never. I'm sorry, Your Honor.
01:27 - 18.700 I see you wanting to interrupt you.
01:27 - 21.269 Go with Nixon again. Bowen. I'm.
01:27 - 24.205 Please walk right into it.
01:27 - 25.940 Sure. Well,
01:27 - 28.910 and I understand there's a debate following Nixon and Gamble
01:27 - 30.612 and in some of Your Honor's opinions, Justice Wecht,
01:27 - 34.482 about whether rational basis, is something different in Pennsylvania, but,
01:27 - 36.017 our point is
01:27 - 39.887 you don't even need to get there, because this court has already held that
01:27 - 43.458 the Pennsylvania Free and Equal Elections clause provides more protection
01:27 - 46.894 over the fundamental right to vote than does the federal Constitution.
01:27 - 48.863 Great opinion, if I recall.
01:27 - 51.933 Agreed.
01:27 - 54.936 My compliments to the author.
01:27 - 59.207 But we now have multiple examples
01:27 - 04.412 of federal courts finding that this very requirement
01:28 - 07.382 violates the federal constitution
01:28 - 10.385 under a minimal scrutiny standard.
01:28 - 12.453 That's not even the flaw in Pennsylvania.
01:28 - 15.456 Whatever the whatever the federal court is applying
01:28 - 18.459 in terms of its means and test, is the basement.
01:28 - 21.696 We can move in voter stands for the fact that under an Edmonds analysis,
01:28 - 25.800 the floor has to be higher than whatever the federal court is doing, not lower.
01:28 - 26.868 Right.
01:28 - 29.671 So whatever,
01:28 - 33.641 means ends test this court adopts in this case, and it has to be a means test.
01:28 - 36.811 It can't just be a binary is the is the requirement.
01:28 - 38.980 So it's so hard to comply with that.
01:28 - 41.115 It's essentially impossible.
01:28 - 43.685 It's an infringement. It's a diminishment.
01:28 - 47.989 Whatever synonym you want to pick from the long line of cases from this court
01:28 - 51.092 talking about when a constitutional analysis is triggered,
01:28 - 54.562 one must be triggered and it must be higher,
01:28 - 58.366 a higher level of scrutiny than what the federal court is applying.
01:28 - 00.601 That's how we square that.
01:29 - 03.604 That's sort of where the mapping is on legal women voters, Your Honor.
01:29 - 08.509 And I think I made you lose an opportunity to to ask a question.
01:29 - 09.577 I think it's very well put.
01:29 - 14.148 I by hypothesis, you're always going to have, some votes falling out.
01:29 - 17.352 I mean, I'm sure you would concede perfection is elusive
01:29 - 20.355 and and, of course, impossible.
01:29 - 24.459 There are going to be some people who are going to
01:29 - 28.563 unless it's, you know, like Katie bar the door and, and and,
01:29 - 31.532 you know, you just open, open
01:29 - 34.535 voting at some day and our
01:29 - 37.372 and then close it on some other day an hour.
01:29 - 40.308 And anybody who walked in just cast the vote,
01:29 - 43.711 assuming some system of regulation.
01:29 - 44.278 Right.
01:29 - 48.583 There are going to be some humans on the other side of that regulation.
01:29 - 51.452 Right. And therefore their votes are not counted.
01:29 - 54.422 So there's,
01:29 - 58.359 there's sort of an endless regression here where any standard
01:29 - 01.529 for which you argue is going to contain some arbitrariness.
01:30 - 04.832 So, you know, when you when you import this,
01:30 - 09.103 argument for tiered scrutiny or even a balancing test,
01:30 - 13.474 it's, it starts to look a lot like
01:30 - 17.311 you want us to tell the General Assembly,
01:30 - 21.482 start putting a statement of purpose into every one of your statutes.
01:30 - 27.088 Otherwise, you know, you're going to have a constitutional problem
01:30 - 30.091 because I think you'll agree, wouldn't you, that
01:30 - 33.961 the statute books are full of laws
01:30 - 37.999 that that put some restrictions
01:30 - 41.202 on a number of important constitutional rights?
01:30 - 42.970 Is that correct?
01:30 - 47.041 Absolutely, Your Honor, and anytime that happens, it's subject to a challenge
01:30 - 48.276 that when my rights are denied,
01:30 - 51.512 when my fundamental article one rights are denied based on a rule
01:30 - 55.450 imposed by the legislature or a practice imposed by a Board of elections,
01:30 - 57.385 I have the ability to
01:30 - 00.388 challenge that under the Constitution, and I may lose
01:31 - 03.357 if the proponent of that rule can demonstrate that there's a legitimate,
01:31 - 05.359 legitimate government interest to be served.
01:31 - 06.060 And that's why I answer
01:31 - 09.330 Justice Robson's question earlier, to say that this is always a danger
01:31 - 13.334 whenever we're dealing with article one rights, it's not even a danger.
01:31 - 15.303 It is baked into the system.
01:31 - 19.407 It is why we're all here that whenever there is a rule
01:31 - 22.443 that infringes on a fundamental article one right,
01:31 - 25.713 the person whose right has been denied has the ability
01:31 - 28.716 to challenge that and have a means and test applied.
01:31 - 30.351 It's not just a binary.
01:31 - 32.620 Is it impossible to comply with or not?
01:31 - 33.254 You know,
01:31 - 36.657 and I want to get back to one of Justice Donahue's earlier comments about,
01:31 - 39.694 a trap or a trick.
01:31 - 42.797 You know, even if this date requirement was not intended
01:31 - 48.236 as a disenfranchisement trap, we now know that that's what it has become.
01:31 - 50.071 And if we follow the road
01:31 - 53.908 that the appellants want you to go down in terms of what the standard is,
01:31 - 56.911 or I would say it's not a standard, but whatever their standard is,
01:31 - 58.613 it would not protect against
01:31 - 02.383 any other thing that is intended as a disenfranchisement trap.
01:32 - 05.786 I mean, there would be no difference in terms of what standard to apply
01:32 - 10.124 and how it applies between this rule and one that requires every mail ballot
01:32 - 14.161 voter to write the alphabet backwards with no mistakes in order for their vote
01:32 - 15.296 to be counted.
01:32 - 19.967 Under the appellant's view of constitutional analysis, free and Equal
01:32 - 23.004 elections clause has nothing to say about that kind of rule.
01:32 - 26.007 But that can't be the law under this clause in this Commonwealth.
01:32 - 27.542 In fact, it's not.
01:32 - 31.245 And this court has never allowed a vote to be discarded.
01:32 - 34.749 And in several cases, Gallagher,
01:32 - 38.419 the rest
01:32 - 39.120 in several cases.
01:32 - 42.456 This court has said that whether it's the loss of one vote or a group of votes,
01:32 - 45.826 they should not be disqualified except for compelling reasons.
01:32 - 49.597 Now, why do you call that a statutory analysis or constitutional analysis?
01:32 - 53.768 This court is well versed in looking at so-called ballot casting rules,
01:32 - 56.971 when they've been applied to deny the franchise and asking
01:32 - 59.941 the question, is there a compelling interest driving that?
01:32 - 02.977 Well, I guess the question, though, is, is is it denying the franchise
01:33 - 05.780 or is it is it? And there's going to be a debate about this.
01:33 - 07.148 Is it actually denying the franchise
01:33 - 10.418 because they exercise their franchise just as they did it imperfectly?
01:33 - 14.355 But I want to go back to my question.
01:33 - 20.461 There's another provision in on in the canvasing that discards a ballot.
01:33 - 23.397 If a secrecy envelope has a stray mark.
01:33 - 26.767 And I was taken, I was I was focusing on your slip of a pen.
01:33 - 30.438 A point that you raised
01:33 - 34.442 is, is that something is under your new test.
01:33 - 36.310 Would that fail?
01:33 - 38.379 Because it's just a slip of the pen.
01:33 - 39.513 It's a little stray mark,
01:33 - 43.050 but the statute expressly requires that that ballot not be counted.
01:33 - 45.853 Just to be clear, Your Honor, this is not my new test.
01:33 - 49.290 This is the test that this court said in nature applies any time
01:33 - 52.326 the precious freedoms such as voting is involved, a compelling state
01:33 - 53.461 interest must be demonstrated.
01:33 - 55.129 So I just want to have to push back on that.
01:33 - 57.798 Respectfully. Sorry.
01:33 - 02.303 And if if my client's vote
01:34 - 05.873 is disqualified based on a stray mark on the,
01:34 - 09.543 on the secrecy envelope,
01:34 - 12.213 I would think they have a claim.
01:34 - 15.583 And it's under an existing standard that this court has applied
01:34 - 17.184 time and time again.
01:34 - 21.188 And so, you know, we can debate whether one provision
01:34 - 26.761 or one requirement is more tied to a more compelling government interest.
01:34 - 29.063 This one, as you're hear more from Mr.
01:34 - 31.666 Ball, Chuck, just isn't.
01:34 - 34.769 And so I'm interested in hearing because as secretary I'm interested
01:34 - 39.106 in hearing must first of all, Chuck, because there is no record here
01:34 - 42.843 of testimony about that would support
01:34 - 46.213 the view of the Board of Elections
01:34 - 49.250 on what it does and how it does ballots and things like that.
01:34 - 52.687 So it'll be interesting to see if it's if it's arguing, it's going to be truly
01:34 - 55.690 a legal argument, or if he's going to be offering testimony.
01:34 - 58.059 Well, Your Honor, I'll let Mr.
01:34 - 59.026 Vole, Chuck, and Mr.
01:34 - 01.062 Fabens Larson address their parts of the argument.
01:35 - 02.063 But just very quickly.
01:35 - 06.934 I mean, I was in the courtroom with with the two voters at the 3157
01:35 - 11.806 here and hearing and their their testimony was submitted by declaration.
01:35 - 14.842 And the Philadelphia board agreed
01:35 - 18.679 that everything pled in the petition for review was correct.
01:35 - 22.183 And so that is all the record I would submit.
01:35 - 24.952 You need to make the legal determination.
01:35 - 27.588 There is no dispute here that the Philadelphia Board of Elections
01:35 - 32.426 does not use the envelope date for any reason, except for to disenfranchize.
01:35 - 35.463 And there's no other party or
01:35 - 38.933 intervener who can legitimately dispute that.
01:35 - 43.471 Especially given the record and all of the other cases were all of the same.
01:35 - 48.209 Mickey and the same Intervenors were party to that case,
01:35 - 52.680 participated in full lengthy discovery, had the opportunity to ask interrogatories
01:35 - 56.517 to participate in depositions of every board of elections.
01:35 - 00.054 Intervenors here have an opportunity to have a hearing and conduct crossover.
01:36 - 03.824 They were represented at the at the 3157 hearing.
01:36 - 05.192 In this case.
01:36 - 08.596 So there was a there was counsel for the intervenors in the room.
01:36 - 11.565 They had filed a motion to intervene. It had not been granted yet.
01:36 - 14.568 So they didn't have the opportunity to participate in evidentiary procedures.
01:36 - 18.405 Judge Crumley did turn to them and asked them if they had anything to add.
01:36 - 20.775 And we're talking about a 3157 hearing.
01:36 - 26.380 And I'm sure this court is very familiar with how cases percolate up from 3157.
01:36 - 26.947 Right.
01:36 - 30.951 They are, challenges to computation and canvasing decisions
01:36 - 33.954 that have to be filed within two days of the decision being made.
01:36 - 34.188 Right.
01:36 - 37.858 This is a rocket docket, like no other.
01:36 - 41.162 And so we're in court immediately we were in court
01:36 - 44.632 with our clients, and then the RNC counsel was there.
01:36 - 47.201 Appeared on the record, said
01:36 - 51.238 we filed a motion for intervention, and, Judge Crumley, hadn't ruled on it.
01:36 - 53.541 But he said, while we're here
01:36 - 56.143 in the context of this fast moving rocket docket case
01:36 - 58.045 while we're here, do you have anything to add?
01:36 - 01.048 After having observed the stipulations on the record made
01:37 - 06.120 and the Intervenors counsel did not add anything since then, I'll note
01:37 - 09.256 that, they've tried to make an issue of the absence of the record, but,
01:37 - 13.727 that issue was not granted as one of the questions presented today.
01:37 - 16.730 But while the matter that we could take judicial notice of,
01:37 - 21.001 given all the cases and all the evidence that we've had, to date.
01:37 - 24.471 Yes, Your Honor, especially given the fact that the parties
01:37 - 27.808 were also a party in those other cases where the evidence was developed.
01:37 - 32.146 We have decisions made based on those records by the federal courts,
01:37 - 36.050 judicial notice of a record and another proceeding as a record in this case.
01:37 - 36.617 Yes. Your honor,
01:37 - 37.651 where were the defendant
01:37 - 40.654 or the appellant was was also a party in that case and had the
01:37 - 43.724 the same issues and they had the same exact motivation to question.
01:37 - 48.095 And I'll note that in all of the argument about whether or not the,
01:37 - 50.998 intervenors should have had an opportunity to develop a record,
01:37 - 54.368 they haven't pointed to anything that would actually change the result here.
01:37 - 57.438 Right. They want to I think,
01:37 - 01.475 what they noted is as the things they wanted to explore,
01:38 - 05.579 if they had the opportunity, was the reasons why the petitioners
01:38 - 07.982 didn't put a date on their ballot. But that's that's a matter of record.
01:38 - 10.050 That's in their declaration. They thought they did.
01:38 - 12.453 They were surprised to learn that they didn't.
01:38 - 14.521 And that wouldn't change the outcome of this case anyway.
01:38 - 16.891 And then the other thing they would like to explore
01:38 - 20.895 is the thing that was the subject of multiple cases
01:38 - 24.465 over a period of years, including a fully developed discovery record,
01:38 - 28.802 which is what, if any, purpose does the date requirement serve?
01:38 - 33.841 This is a 3157 appeal of the Philadelphia Board of Elections decision.
01:38 - 36.810 The Philadelphia Board of Elections is here and is
01:38 - 41.015 told Judge Crumley and can answer questions
01:38 - 44.752 today, that it has no purpose for the date provision.
01:38 - 46.687 The interest and procedural posture of this case,
01:38 - 50.157 the Philadelphia Board of Elections, made the decision made based on our precedent
01:38 - 53.861 and then took a knee when it went in front of Judge Crum, which,
01:38 - 58.532 well, if it has no purpose, Your Honor, I don't I wouldn't say that.
01:38 - 00.301 That's that that's taking a knee.
01:39 - 01.669 It's just being truthful.
01:39 - 03.137 There was no adversary.
01:39 - 04.471 There was no adversarial party.
01:39 - 07.007 When you're in front of Judge Crum, which, again, Intervenors
01:39 - 09.810 counsel was there and declined to say anything on the record.
01:39 - 13.047 But also, you agree that there were not a party.
01:39 - 16.717 They were not a party, yet they were granted intervention after the party.
01:39 - 19.119 At the hearing in front of Judge Crumley,
01:39 - 22.456 there was an adversarial party who had not been granted intervention yet.
01:39 - 26.560 At the hearing, but the the underlying
01:39 - 31.799 thrust of your question as I hear it, Your Honor, is
01:39 - 34.969 that the, the Philadelphia Board of Elections
01:39 - 38.906 somehow took a knee by siding with us, but they confirmed what they had said
01:39 - 42.409 in full discovery with the opportunity to cross-examine
01:39 - 45.546 and impose interrogatories from the Intervenors here.
01:39 - 46.547 That's it. I'm not.
01:39 - 47.581 I want to apologize.
01:39 - 50.884 I'm not using taking a knee as some sort of a pejorative term.
01:39 - 52.219 They sided with you.
01:39 - 53.787 There was no you have to agree.
01:39 - 55.923 There was no adversarial party.
01:39 - 57.191 They were on the other side of the V,
01:39 - 59.994 and if they disagreed with anything we had to say, they could have done it.
01:39 - 03.630 But the truth of the matter was they had no they have no use for the day.
01:40 - 06.300 And that's consistent with what they've said every time
01:40 - 08.569 they've been a defendant in any one of these cases.
01:40 - 11.605 Well, and in
01:40 - 14.608 fact, no Board of elections. No.
01:40 - 18.946 Government entity has said there was a use for the date.
01:40 - 22.616 In this case. That's correct, Your Honor.
01:40 - 26.854 In NAACP and again, there were, I think, 2 or 3 boards of election
01:40 - 30.124 that, opposed the relief sought.
01:40 - 35.062 They were cross-examined, their witnesses, were deposed.
01:40 - 38.799 They submitted documentary and interrogatory evidence.
01:40 - 42.870 And the conclusion of the district court, which was upheld by the Third Circuit,
01:40 - 46.640 is that they also, despite their initial protests,
01:40 - 50.044 had no use for the envelope date recollection.
01:40 - 54.848 And now that we're here among all of the inmates and the intervenors,
01:40 - 58.052 none of them includes a Board of elections,
01:40 - 01.522 none of that is taking the side of the Intervenors here.
01:41 - 03.991 We have counsel. Are you going to,
01:41 - 05.526 have more to
01:41 - 08.529 say or your colleagues have more to say on
01:41 - 11.832 on what you think should happen
01:41 - 16.904 when you or a Board of election or some other group of people, quote,
01:41 - 20.941 have no use unquote, for something in the General Assembly
01:41 - 24.945 passed in the law and the governor signed because, I'd be interested
01:41 - 29.283 in knowing how far that stand reaches and in what circumstances.
01:41 - 33.687 I suppose you're going to,
01:41 - 37.324 tell us, that strict scrutiny
01:41 - 40.327 has to apply. And,
01:41 - 44.131 I, I want to know, I guess,
01:41 - 48.302 what the, what the basis for that is because I,
01:41 - 54.441 I'd like to know how far your have no use standard goes, because ultimately
01:41 - 57.544 it also bears on how many disputes and in
01:41 - 00.547 what context we're going to be asked to referee.
01:42 - 03.684 Disputes around voting rights or around, any,
01:42 - 07.354 rights people believe they have under our Constitution.
01:42 - 10.591 I understood, Your Honor, and I should note that
01:42 - 13.794 he's saying have no use as being a little colloquial, right?
01:42 - 15.696 That that's not this right.
01:42 - 18.866 It serves no purpose, serves no government purpose, is not narrowly
01:42 - 22.636 tailored to a compelling government interest, or is unrelated to an important
01:42 - 23.303 government interest.
01:42 - 28.442 Those are the well-heeled, familiar standards that this court said in, the,
01:42 - 33.046 William Penn School District case are familiar, identifiable and manageable.
01:42 - 33.780 Right.
01:42 - 34.882 That's all we're asking for
01:42 - 38.785 is to apply the same kind of analysis that's always applied when the denials.
01:42 - 40.320 Right. As of right is involved.
01:42 - 43.624 And I
01:42 - 45.692 intentionally said or as between
01:42 - 48.695 compelling government interest or,
01:42 - 51.965 important government interest because,
01:42 - 56.069 sensing some pushback on the notion that strict scrutiny
01:42 - 00.274 should be applied every time there is a procedural, neutral,
01:43 - 02.342 requirement.
01:43 - 04.978 And our position is
01:43 - 07.881 that's, that's what the standard is and what it's always been.
01:43 - 12.553 But if this court is inclined to adopt a standard that has more of a limiting
01:43 - 16.924 principle, again, I think that would be new law would be contrary to nature.
01:43 - 20.260 It would be contrary to all of the cases involving fundamental rights.
01:43 - 25.799 But there's a way to do this, and you can kind of more closely
01:43 - 28.702 adhere to what the court did. And we can accept, again,
01:43 - 32.039 with a floor that's higher than what he can did and what
01:43 - 34.975 and also,
01:43 - 35.342 you know,
01:43 - 38.278 would have more of a limiting principle without doing the type of violence
01:43 - 42.049 to the free elections clause that the appellant's position would do.
01:43 - 46.820 What some courts in other states that have free and equal elections
01:43 - 51.358 provisions following form to the original clause in Pennsylvania,
01:43 - 54.394 what some of those other courts have done
01:43 - 57.731 is to apply an analysis that's more balancing, more sliding scale.
01:43 - 01.835 Similar to what the third circuit just applied in Aiken.
01:44 - 04.338 But landing on more of an intermediate scrutiny
01:44 - 07.441 for the same reasons I've articulated that, however you cut
01:44 - 10.510 it, a free and equal elections clause provides more protection
01:44 - 13.680 than what is provided under the Anderson Burdick standard
01:44 - 16.283 with a James Wilson
01:44 - 17.985 choose
01:44 - 21.421 to adopt the standard that that fell on the wall back there.
01:44 - 25.926 Chief Justice Stern came up with in Gambon the, quote,
01:44 - 29.796 heightened, rational basis, unquote, standard.
01:44 - 33.300 No, Your Honor, because as this court has said, including
01:44 - 36.470 in interpreting, the Anderson verdict standard.
01:44 - 40.574 So in PA Dems, this court did describe its understanding
01:44 - 41.642 of the Anderson verdict standard.
01:44 - 45.579 And in so doing, said the rational basis is reserved for those cases
01:44 - 49.549 that do not involve a fundamental right, because we have a fundamental article
01:44 - 50.350 one right here.
01:44 - 53.720 Rational basis has no place in the court's analysis, whether it's,
01:44 - 56.623 more exacting, heightened rational basis.
01:44 - 57.124 However,
01:44 - 00.961 some of your colleagues and predecessors might have termed it.
01:45 - 03.964 I understand that that's not your favorite standard, Justice Wecht
01:45 - 06.166 but I don't even think you need to go there.
01:45 - 07.401 It's heightened scrutiny.
01:45 - 10.404 It's intermediate or better, we would say strict scrutiny,
01:45 - 13.173 under this court's precedents involving fundamental rights.
01:45 - 16.610 But again, if this if this court is troubled by sort of
01:45 - 20.147 the implications of that and the scope of that,
01:45 - 23.717 I think that that, ground has already been plowed.
01:45 - 28.655 But if the court is inclined to articulate a more limiting standard, it can do
01:45 - 32.059 so without doing the kind of violence to the free elections clause that
01:45 - 36.697 the binary standard, kind of gleaned out of a partial quote from Winston would do
01:45 - 40.701 it. Council counsel
01:45 - 43.003 two questions, one, not substantive,
01:45 - 47.641 but just for my information, when we talk about the,
01:45 - 53.780 percentage of votes, that are, not counted as a result of this failure,
01:45 - 57.184 has anyone taken into account
01:45 - 00.420 the number of, votes that have been
01:46 - 04.624 cured, as a result of the noticing cure process,
01:46 - 08.795 when the defect is the date or lack thereof?
01:46 - 12.132 Has any but there's definitely been analysis of,
01:46 - 15.502 the effectiveness of curing, and there's a, there's a cure.
01:46 - 19.473 And this sign is determined if we know what the actual scope of the problem
01:46 - 22.476 is with the missed data on dating.
01:46 - 23.810 We do.
01:46 - 26.646 It's knowable in every election, although we can't know it ahead of time.
01:46 - 26.913 Right.
01:46 - 31.084 So the trend is that there are fewer, fewer votes lost to this rule.
01:46 - 34.020 Talking about lost because some of them are cured.
01:46 - 35.389 Right. And the final.
01:46 - 36.990 Okay, I know I understand your question, Your Honor.
01:46 - 39.993 So the final count that, that I quoted for,
01:46 - 43.063 the 2024 general election, 4500, that's post curing.
01:46 - 45.031 Okay. And that accounts,
01:46 - 48.135 or that's after accounting
01:46 - 51.138 for the fact that different counties have different cure procedures.
01:46 - 54.841 Philadelphia does make a very, big effort to allow people to
01:46 - 58.612 counties have no cure for some counties have no cure procedures in some counties.
01:46 - 00.547 And that's a post cure number.
01:47 - 03.550 That is the post cure number.
01:47 - 05.986 That is,
01:47 - 09.122 I believe also the post provisional ballot number.
01:47 - 12.125 So for those that brings me to my next question.
01:47 - 14.761 Does the ability a voter,
01:47 - 17.731 a a voter to use a provisional ballot,
01:47 - 21.568 in a situation where they know
01:47 - 27.274 that their, vote has been set aside, does that change your argument at all?
01:47 - 30.811 Keeping in mind, we look at the election code as a whole.
01:47 - 33.780 So as the election close quote.
01:47 - 36.716 I take it away, but then give us,
01:47 - 39.719 what does
01:47 - 42.289 how does that impact your argument?
01:47 - 45.358 It doesn't really impact the argument, Your Honor, because we're still left with
01:47 - 50.363 the question of whether it's a single vote or a group of votes being disqualified.
01:47 - 52.566 Oh, well, without a compelling reason.
01:47 - 53.266 And there
01:47 - 57.871 there's no amount of curing the franchise is not lost in that circumstance.
01:47 - 00.841 If they can cast a provisional ballot.
01:48 - 03.243 Well, it's diminished, Your Honor.
01:48 - 05.111 And that's that's what this court held
01:48 - 08.315 shall not happen in League of Women Voters Institute of Management of the right.
01:48 - 11.852 How is it diminished by requiring additional steps?
01:48 - 12.118 Right.
01:48 - 12.752 So for Mr.
01:48 - 16.056 Baxter, who was in his 80s at the time, to have gone through the effort of
01:48 - 19.359 requesting the Mail-In ballot,
01:48 - 21.528 which well,
01:48 - 24.631 I won't it conveniently I won't assume.
01:48 - 24.931 Right.
01:48 - 28.068 I can only assume it was more convenient for him, but requesting the mail
01:48 - 31.171 in ballot, verifying his eligibility to vote by mail,
01:48 - 34.574 filling it out, signing the declaration, sending it in on time.
01:48 - 40.413 He's done all of these things, to exercise his right of franchise, and then,
01:48 - 44.918 to have to save the constitutionality of the date provision
01:48 - 48.221 by going down to the elections office in either curing
01:48 - 51.591 or voting a provisional on Election day is just adding these.
01:48 - 51.825 Whoops.
01:48 - 53.693 Adding this amount of friction
01:48 - 57.330 for no government purpose is the is the nub of this case.
01:48 - 00.600 The other part, the other reason why the availability.
01:49 - 03.436 You're saying a voter can't be inconvenienced?
01:49 - 06.773 No, Your Honor, we're we're saying that, a rule can't be used
01:49 - 10.143 to disenfranchize voters unless it's tied to a compelling government interest.
01:49 - 13.146 The other reason that, curing
01:49 - 16.082 and or provisional ballot options
01:49 - 19.286 do not change our argument is because no amount of curing or provisional
01:49 - 23.490 ballot options are the two different things, understood by the,
01:49 - 25.592 sort of net
01:49 - 28.595 result of the CCG case in Glanzer.
01:49 - 33.300 In some counties may mean that people at least get notice
01:49 - 36.636 that there's been an error and that their ballot has been set aside
01:49 - 39.472 so that they can either cure or go vote.
01:49 - 42.475 The provisional ballot on Election day.
01:49 - 45.512 No amount of rules along those lines is going to eliminate the issue
01:49 - 50.884 here, Your Honor, and bring that 4500 number down to something approaching
01:49 - 55.822 zero or something that's tolerable given the closeness of races in Pennsylvania.
01:49 - 00.827 And the reason for that is the deadline for receipt of the mail
01:50 - 03.830 ballot package is still on election day.
01:50 - 06.032 There will always be people who mail in their ballot
01:50 - 07.367 thinking they've done everything right.
01:50 - 09.069 They've missed the day. Or maybe they put,
01:50 - 11.004 the date in one
01:50 - 14.007 box instead of separating it into two, as we saw in some of these examples.
01:50 - 17.677 And the Election Office receives it on Election Day
01:50 - 21.047 and isn't even able to notify them.
01:50 - 23.750 And the method of notification is email, by the way.
01:50 - 26.953 So the email doesn't even get sent until late
01:50 - 30.523 in the day on Election Day, when it's too late to cure the problem.
01:50 - 32.292 And so in those circumstances,
01:50 - 35.161 you're still left with voters who are being disenfranchized
01:50 - 38.531 solely by application of a rule that has no government interest driving it.
01:50 - 41.635 You want to wrap up, Mr. Lunney?
01:50 - 45.038 I think we understand, Chief, I just oh, one brief.
01:50 - 45.772 Sure.
01:50 - 48.608 Council, you just refer to something that's come up repeatedly
01:50 - 51.945 and that's the historical or the reason perhaps
01:50 - 56.016 closeness of of many of some statewide elections.
01:50 - 57.717 I think clearly the case.
01:50 - 03.590 Can a constitutional analysis turn on,
01:51 - 09.195 anecdotal closeness of elections in a, in a particular period, given
01:51 - 13.933 how ephemeral that can be and unchangeable it can be trends can evolve.
01:51 - 17.303 And I mean, can it constitutional adjudication by this court
01:51 - 20.707 be premised even in part on, on,
01:51 - 24.110 you know,
01:51 - 27.747 either anecdote or evidence of, of of election margins?
01:51 - 28.381 Yeah.
01:51 - 31.384 It would never be anecdotal, but if we'd always have evidence.
01:51 - 34.587 Well, if it's in the record, we have evidence or we can find it.
01:51 - 37.190 That's it. That's immaterial. But you see my point. Yeah.
01:51 - 40.393 And the direct answer to your question, your honors, that is immaterial
01:51 - 44.064 to the constitutional analysis, material or immaterial.
01:51 - 47.400 And I'll note that this case, this is case in point.
01:51 - 50.503 We representing two voters who are among 69 who,
01:51 - 55.875 lost their vote in a September 2024 special election.
01:51 - 57.243 Those
01:51 - 01.081 69 ballots did not, could not have changed the outcome of the election,
01:52 - 04.884 but the right to vote must be vindicated nonetheless.
01:52 - 07.887 And so the relief that that we're asking for here, which the Commonwealth Court,
01:52 - 14.227 granted, is that those 69 voters votes be counted and added to the final count.
01:52 - 16.696 But the results of that that election have been certified.
01:52 - 21.301 But that doesn't make, the, the fundamental right
01:52 - 24.871 to exercise the franchise any less weighty under our Constitution.
01:52 - 28.141 It may be irrelevant, fact to consider,
01:52 - 31.578 in thinking about whether or not
01:52 - 35.782 a particular rule not this one, but a whether or not a particular
01:52 - 40.687 rule is indeed a burden on the franchise is indeed infringing on the franchise.
01:52 - 43.990 So if if you have a rule that only caught
01:52 - 47.894 one person in a ten year period, I could imagine that is an argument
01:52 - 51.331 that one could use to say that, well, this this really isn't denying the franchise.
01:52 - 55.902 We know that this rule is denying the franchise to thousands of people
01:52 - 57.036 in every statewide election.
01:52 - 00.874 I, I know I've been asked to conclude,
01:53 - 03.877 but I'm also assigned to the severability piece.
01:53 - 07.380 So you'll here, let's begin anew.
01:53 - 09.816 Yeah.
01:53 - 10.483 You'll hear from Mr..
01:53 - 14.988 Of Chuck more about the purported purposes of the date rule.
01:53 - 18.558 But I'll say just one thing about legislative purpose that that does
01:53 - 23.663 tie in with the RNC severability analysis, which is all indications
01:53 - 27.700 here are that the General Assembly didn't give much,
01:53 - 33.006 if any, credence to the importance of the word date
01:53 - 36.709 when it carried that language over from an old version of the election code
01:53 - 41.514 into the act 77 from the, absentee ballot.
01:53 - 42.348 Correct?
01:53 - 45.852 Your honor, this phrase shall fill out date and sign is a relic
01:53 - 49.322 from a 1963 absentee ballot provision.
01:53 - 51.224 And the
01:53 - 53.626 legislative leaders who submitted an amicus brief here
01:53 - 58.364 and in every other case, in their amicus brief and B pep actually acknowledge
01:53 - 02.335 that that that language is ported over, was copied and pasted.
01:54 - 03.136 Quote.
01:54 - 07.140 For the simplicity of legislative drafting that that's a 71 B of our record.
01:54 - 10.143 So not because anybody in the legislature made it, it's
01:54 - 13.146 considered decision that the handwritten date is needed. But,
01:54 - 16.983 it was for the simplicity of legislative drafting.
01:54 - 20.987 So from the perspective of a severability
01:54 - 24.924 analysis, I think it's safe to say that the word date is not integral
01:54 - 29.229 to is not inseparable from that grand compromise that was reached in acts 77.
01:54 - 32.298 That's a I mean, I didn't know we're going to severability already, but
01:54 - 35.768 isn't that that's a real thin read, isn't it?
01:54 - 40.473 Because now we're going an extra step and being asked to
01:54 - 44.911 parse and interpolate which words
01:54 - 49.082 in a provision the General Assembly enacted
01:54 - 51.851 which are sufficiently integral
01:54 - 54.854 or meaningful?
01:54 - 58.391 How is that a standard, upon which this court
01:54 - 01.527 can adjudicate severability questions?
01:55 - 05.365 I think that is the standard or part of it under,
01:55 - 07.734 the Statutory Construction Act, section 1925.
01:55 - 11.671 And under this court's opinion and still I do pick apart
01:55 - 17.944 the pick apart the the act 77 and determined that the
01:55 - 22.215 the sign part is integral, but the date part is not.
01:55 - 24.284 No, Your
01:55 - 28.121 Honor, that I mean, the analysis that this court engages in, whether or not
01:55 - 31.524 there's a severability or non severability clause in the statute
01:55 - 36.863 is whether the valid provisions are so essentially inseparably
01:55 - 40.800 connected with and depend upon the invalidated provisions.
01:55 - 41.801 Get that right.
01:55 - 45.872 That is a quote from section 1925 of the Statutory Construction Act.
01:55 - 47.240 It was also applied in still
01:55 - 50.143 but you out of you that you that you added a different qualifier.
01:55 - 53.713 Your qualifier was whether or not there's a severability clause.
01:55 - 55.982 We apply the Statutory Construction Act.
01:55 - 57.583 Why is that true?
01:55 - 58.918 That's true under this court's precedent.
01:55 - 01.921 And still and the reason is, you know, I think,
01:56 - 04.657 and I do want to get to our primary argument that this doesn't
01:56 - 06.626 actually invalidate any provision of the code.
01:56 - 09.929 But since we're here, you agree that you don't go to the statutory
01:56 - 12.932 construct an act unless the act is ambiguous?
01:56 - 15.601 No, Your Honor, this
01:56 - 19.138 when it comes to severability and the separation of powers, concerns
01:56 - 22.608 that are necessarily implicated when there's a severability provision.
01:56 - 24.510 What, again, you're throwing this out.
01:56 - 28.014 What separation of concerns are necessarily implicated by any
01:56 - 31.250 non severability I'm drawing this directly from this court's opinion
01:56 - 32.051 and still up Your Honor.
01:56 - 32.218 Okay.
01:56 - 35.455 So still was still up again was a different animal.
01:56 - 41.094 Still still it was a situation involving a pay statute applicable to judges
01:56 - 46.466 that they put a separate non severability clause in because in this court's view,
01:56 - 49.535 they were trying to tie the court's hands or influence
01:56 - 51.971 how the court would decide the constitutional question.
01:56 - 55.041 Meaning we had the judges had a stake in the outcome.
01:56 - 58.177 We have no stake in the outcome of this case.
01:56 - 02.682 There's nothing about the act 77 that is particular to the judiciary.
01:57 - 05.952 How we do our jobs, anything like that, this.
01:57 - 09.555 That's why stop is kind of on its own.
01:57 - 13.092 But still it doesn't say as a general rule.
01:57 - 15.128 In fact, I think it says the opposite,
01:57 - 18.765 that when the General Assembly expressly provides a
01:57 - 24.470 non severability clause in the statute, it's just like any other provision
01:57 - 27.740 of an unambiguous statute, we apply it with effect.
01:57 - 30.743 The intent of the General Assembly up.
01:57 - 33.880 Respectfully a disagree, Your Honor.
01:57 - 34.914 I do recognize that.
01:57 - 38.084 Still, it was a unique set of circumstances.
01:57 - 42.789 As justice McCaffery pointed out earlier, however, the voting rules do impact
01:57 - 44.791 elected officials on the bench.
01:57 - 46.426 But that's not the crux of our argument.
01:57 - 48.594 Still did actually
01:57 - 51.898 say, if there's any ambiguity, I want to just let's agree with this.
01:57 - 55.501 Is there any ambiguity in the General Assembly's non severability language here?
01:57 - 00.573 No, there isn't and there wasn't in stop either intended it to be non-separable.
01:58 - 02.008 There wasn't and still be there.
01:58 - 03.943 It's the exact same language that this court.
01:58 - 06.579 I understand yourself but you agree that it is.
01:58 - 08.714 It is clear that the General Assembly intended
01:58 - 11.451 the statute to be not the act to be non severable.
01:58 - 14.587 They wrote language that is unambiguous on its face.
01:58 - 17.590 Okay, so how do we then apply statutory construction principles.
01:58 - 20.660 So I'll quote from still up here, Your Honor the issue of enforceability
01:58 - 24.797 of non severability provision is not a question of legislative intent.
01:58 - 28.568 The provision itself makes clear the legislative desire
01:58 - 31.737 that no court invalidate a single provision of the act,
01:58 - 34.640 that that is the reasoning this court applied to stop that
01:58 - 38.311 reasoning was not dependent on the unique factual situations in fact.
01:58 - 42.048 And still this court went through a historical examination
01:58 - 45.218 of the common law around severability provisions
01:58 - 49.889 and articulated the separation of powers issues.
01:58 - 53.626 That may be I'm doing less of a good job articulating today, but
01:58 - 57.630 the separation of powers issues being that a severability provision, ambiguously
01:58 - 02.468 ambiguous or not, purports to limit the court's role
01:59 - 06.239 in determining the constitutionality of a statute.
01:59 - 09.442 And so that's the crux or the nub,
01:59 - 13.212 if you will, of the separation of powers analysis here.
01:59 - 15.281 It's not tied to stilts.
01:59 - 18.651 Focus on, the facts involving a,
01:59 - 22.722 pay raise to legislators and judges.
01:59 - 28.861 It's about the duty of the court, our bailiwick, to construe the constitution.
01:59 - 31.531 That's the separation of powers problem.
01:59 - 32.698 But it.
01:59 - 34.400 Let me let me get an answer if I could.
01:59 - 36.369 Is that is that correct?
01:59 - 37.336 That is correct, Your Honor.
01:59 - 40.339 I mean, you could do a control f within the scope,
01:59 - 44.010 within the scope opinion for the phrase separation of powers.
01:59 - 45.244 It's there.
01:59 - 48.714 But the separation of powers concern that's articulated by the appellants
01:59 - 51.284 is not the reason the case came out the way it did.
01:59 - 54.754 The separation of powers concern that drove the result in the case
01:59 - 58.024 was that the legislature,
01:59 - 02.195 can't usurp this court's ability to call balls and strikes on constitutionality.
02:00 - 03.362 Can I just follow up that?
02:00 - 04.830 How isn't that a red herring?
02:00 - 08.701 I mean, how are how does the General Assembly usurp
02:00 - 10.503 our authority by passing a law?
02:00 - 13.506 Basically, they tell you in this context, look,
02:00 - 16.209 we made this this side of the aisle, on this side of the aisle, we
02:00 - 20.846 we we for once came to an agreement, we made a deal and we've got this package.
02:00 - 24.317 And so we're going to give up slate voting and we'll give up our opposition
02:00 - 26.652 to mail in voting. And here you got act 77.
02:00 - 30.990 So because we got we made this deal and it's a quid pro quo.
02:00 - 33.993 We're having non severability now.
02:00 - 36.128 How does that
02:00 - 40.199 tie this court's hands when, when the General Assembly
02:00 - 44.570 could come back tomorrow and and strike out at 77.
02:00 - 47.573 It could be gone to today.
02:00 - 50.843 And, and we can come in and,
02:00 - 54.347 find a part of it unconstitutional today or not.
02:00 - 58.784 Or we can find more than one part, unconstitutional or not.
02:00 - 04.357 And the consequences of our action can be for the General Assembly.
02:01 - 06.993 How do how did they usurp our authority?
02:01 - 13.299 By saying, as a matter of law, what a consequence of their to their statute.
02:01 - 16.902 Our adjudication might have it?
02:01 - 18.771 Is that unclear? Do you want me to rephrase it?
02:01 - 20.239 I think I get it, Your Honor.
02:01 - 23.242 And and if I don't, that's on me, not you.
02:01 - 27.513 The issue is putting in this kind of poison
02:01 - 32.652 pill provision that discourages meaningful judicial review.
02:01 - 37.323 And actually, the, petition for Ambank review in Aiken filed yesterday
02:01 - 41.661 kind of demonstrates the point in the petition filed yesterday,
02:01 - 45.965 which I think, has been, sent to the court as supplemental authority.
02:01 - 48.167 They make the point
02:01 - 51.904 to the third Circuit that if you uphold this result, it's
02:01 - 55.741 going to have catastrophic implications because of severability.
02:01 - 57.877 It's it's tying this court's hand.
02:01 - 59.912 And that's my understanding of the of the opinion still.
02:01 - 03.215 But it's not just so I don't know how that I'm not discouraged.
02:02 - 06.819 I mean, I don't know, my job is to determine
02:02 - 10.289 whether a statute is constitutional or a statute is unconstitutional.
02:02 - 14.860 If if there's plenty of times where we rule statutes
02:02 - 17.863 unconstitutional, the entire statute falls.
02:02 - 18.331 Absolutely.
02:02 - 21.100 The consequence doesn't really matter to me what matters.
02:02 - 23.369 That's not going to drive my constitutional assessment.
02:02 - 25.438 The reason why I was so different
02:02 - 29.075 was because the general because because the non severability clause,
02:02 - 33.512 at least as this court in scope felt, was dealt with pay for judges
02:02 - 39.585 and that somehow some way that was going to implicate the inability
02:02 - 42.221 to reduce the salary of judges during their term
02:02 - 43.856 and things like that, there were a lot of other things,
02:02 - 47.159 particularly tied to judges that that was impacting.
02:02 - 51.564 And, and the idea that that would influence or somehow prevent us from,
02:02 - 55.134 from giving a fair view of the constitutional question,
02:02 - 58.938 how is this non severability clause prevent us from providing a fair
02:02 - 01.207 review of the constitutional question in front of us?
02:03 - 03.476 Yeah, I think you're absolutely right. Your Honor.
02:03 - 04.110 This court,
02:03 - 09.181 is very familiar with the task of calling balls and strikes
02:03 - 12.818 on constitutionality and then figuring out whether that has an impact,
02:03 - 16.989 whether the thing that's been invalidated is severable from the greater act.
02:03 - 21.260 But what still stands for, and I think it's not just still it's other.
02:03 - 24.063 It's it's, Commonwealth versus Hopkins. Right?
02:03 - 28.501 It's the premise being that in conducting that review,
02:03 - 33.005 this court will do an analysis of whether the thing being invalidated
02:03 - 35.307 is so inextricably intertwined
02:03 - 38.878 with the rest of the act that the whole act has to go away.
02:03 - 41.947 And what I've said is that the, the,
02:03 - 44.483 presence of a boilerplate non
02:03 - 48.754 severability clause, which tracks word for word to the non severability
02:03 - 52.324 clause here is not conclusive as to that analysis.
02:03 - 54.026 And that's our only point.
02:03 - 59.031 But I think before we even get there, I might have led you down this road
02:03 - 02.168 of debating still and application
02:04 - 05.504 where there's an invalidated provision,
02:04 - 09.241 but in this case, there is no invalidated provision for max 77.
02:04 - 14.680 This case boils down to a canvasing decision made about the sufficiency
02:04 - 19.285 of the declaration under section 3140 6.8 3140
02:04 - 23.155 6.8 predates act 77 by decades.
02:04 - 28.794 And just for context, I'll go back again to where we started
02:04 - 33.032 as a 3157 appeal under section 3157.
02:04 - 34.133 By definition,
02:04 - 38.370 the petitioner can challenge an order or decision
02:04 - 41.841 of any county board regarding computation or canvasing of returns.
02:04 - 44.944 That's what this case is by the very nature of this proceeding,
02:04 - 49.081 the relief granted, the relief sought, and the relief granted below
02:04 - 52.585 was for the Philadelphia Board of Elections to make a different
02:04 - 56.889 sufficiency, determination than the one it felt compelled to make in the moment.
02:04 - 00.426 But that is belied by your in
02:05 - 03.429 everything that's come before up to this point
02:05 - 06.599 in which you've made this grand constitutional argument,
02:05 - 10.402 and you want to you want to make that or and you make it.
02:05 - 14.173 Well, and if you convince a majority of this court
02:05 - 19.178 that that this dating required in the statute violates
02:05 - 22.948 the free elections clause, and you win that round,
02:05 - 27.086 then you want to turn around and say, for purposes of the severability
02:05 - 30.789 analysis, no, it's really not a grand constitutional adjudication.
02:05 - 34.994 It's just sort of a sufficiency housekeeping thing by the Philadelphia
02:05 - 35.794 Board of Elections.
02:05 - 40.499 So we're not really implicating the severability question entirely.
02:05 - 42.668 Is it that a disconnect?
02:05 - 44.537 No, Your Honor, and my apologies for smirking.
02:05 - 46.472 It was just you were doing a really good impression of me.
02:05 - 49.441 No, no, I
02:05 - 52.444 if if my wife does the same impression,
02:05 - 59.552 No, Your honor, these aren't inconsistent at all.
02:05 - 04.590 Our grand constitutional argument is not about trying to take the word date
02:06 - 09.662 out of act 77, or trying to take the word date out of section 31 50.16.
02:06 - 14.233 This is all about when the rubber meets the road, what decision
02:06 - 18.037 a county board of election makes as to whether or not to count a vote,
02:06 - 21.507 and not counting the votes
02:06 - 25.110 because of the reading of the word date as mandatory.
02:06 - 28.847 That consequence is the thing that's unconstitutional, right?
02:06 - 34.286 That's what require removing that provision from act 77.
02:06 - 37.389 Correct. And in fact, it hasn't. The.
02:06 - 39.925 I'm sorry. Thank you, Your Honor.
02:06 - 42.494 I'll correct we totally agree.
02:06 - 48.000 And it hasn't required invalidating the word date from section 31 50.16.
02:06 - 49.034 In fact,
02:06 - 51.870 the econ decision we've been talking about as a very recent development,
02:06 - 53.372 that's the Third Circuit development.
02:06 - 56.141 The district court decision happened before the primary.
02:06 - 59.645 And in the primary, everybody who voted by mail got an envelope
02:06 - 00.946 that had a date line in it.
02:07 - 03.315 They were instructed to fill in that date line.
02:07 - 05.484 They were required to fill in that date line.
02:07 - 08.988 And then when they didn't, because of the result in econ
02:07 - 10.422 pick,
02:07 - 13.492 because of the direction to county boards to count the votes,
02:07 - 15.461 not a direction to the Secretary of State
02:07 - 17.997 to change the envelope and take the date requirement out of it.
02:07 - 21.000 But a direction to the county boards.
02:07 - 24.136 Those votes counted
02:07 - 27.072 and did not require overturning of acts 77
02:07 - 31.744 did not require even invalidation of the rest of section eight of act 77.
02:07 - 35.247 So section eight is what is now 31 50.16.
02:07 - 38.851 Section eight is the provision that includes shall fill out date
02:07 - 44.056 and sign as applied to mail in ballots by the way, that section also includes
02:07 - 47.960 the blue or black ink language that hasn't been enforced since 1972.
02:07 - 52.765 And if we accept your analysis there, then severability is not even an issue.
02:07 - 55.267 It's not even a question you have to engage with, which is why I.
02:07 - 57.636 I apologize for taking us down the road in the beginning,
02:07 - 03.308 but I think we went under either analysis right at the primarily, what's happening
02:08 - 06.445 here is a new application of old language,
02:08 - 10.382 not new language, that came with act 77.
02:08 - 15.120 And because of that, there's nothing that needs to be severed out of act 77.
02:08 - 18.057 The instructions to the Board of Election can stand
02:08 - 20.592 to inquire on
02:08 - 24.430 that, because, I'm finding it I find it incomprehensible.
02:08 - 29.101 The the legislature wrote in act 77
02:08 - 33.305 that you'd get wholesale
02:08 - 36.308 invalidation in the event that, quote,
02:08 - 40.512 any provision of this act or its application
02:08 - 44.750 to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
02:08 - 48.420 unquote.
02:08 - 51.690 And I don't know how we can,
02:08 - 55.694 in some hyper lawyerly fashion, avoid that,
02:08 - 01.533 in a way that does not do violence to what the legislature told us it wanted.
02:09 - 03.268 And they make the laws. We don't.
02:09 - 06.872 And as opposed to the nub of it, they're in lies the rub of it.
02:09 - 10.008 That's that's a
02:09 - 13.011 that's an improvement on the Sony and formulation.
02:09 - 15.848 You'll never
02:09 - 18.851 I haven't been on this court long enough to take this abuse.
02:09 - 22.321 Yes. You have
02:09 - 22.955 nor have I.
02:09 - 28.093 Your honor,
02:09 - 31.263 one thing I'll point out is that that boilerplate provision
02:09 - 33.665 again, same provision that that was not followed
02:09 - 37.236 and still, would actually require invalidation
02:09 - 41.507 of that boilerplate provision if it were applied literally.
02:09 - 46.478 And so I hate to be hyper lawyerly here, but again, I think that's our job.
02:09 - 49.948 It's certainly my job as an advocate, to point out
02:09 - 53.318 when the statutory construction being advanced,
02:09 - 58.090 it both creates separation of powers problems
02:09 - 01.093 and doesn't make sense by its own terms.
02:10 - 02.895 And by the way, we don't even have to get there
02:10 - 07.599 because the application is not happening under section eight of act 77.
02:10 - 12.371 It's not happening in the invalidation of, the date provision.
02:10 - 16.475 It is happening at the canvasing stage, at the computation stage under
02:10 - 21.113 3140 6.8, which again predates act 77.
02:10 - 23.615 So, Council, could you,
02:10 - 26.585 how how are the how is the
02:10 - 30.422 discretion of the board directed?
02:10 - 34.459 Under 3146 eight?
02:10 - 39.131 I mean, doesn't it, doesn't that that provision,
02:10 - 42.067 enumerate,
02:10 - 47.206 the issues that would render a ballot insufficient?
02:10 - 52.277 It does, Your Honor, and it says this is under subsection G3,
02:10 - 56.849 that if the county board has verified the proof of identification as required
02:10 - 00.052 under this act and is satisfied that the declaration is sufficient
02:11 - 03.088 and the information contained
02:11 - 05.691 in the voter file
02:11 - 07.693 matches the list, right, that that's the
02:11 - 12.464 task at hand and following after ball something, I add it to that task,
02:11 - 15.467 which is checking for compliance with the date requirement.
02:11 - 20.439 That's the part that creates the constitutional problem.
02:11 - 24.076 And it's at that canvasing stage where the application happens
02:11 - 26.078 not in the requirement that,
02:11 - 30.649 that the Secretary of State ask for a date on the envelope.
02:11 - 34.753 And I do think it's instructive here how things played out a year ago.
02:11 - 40.025 A year ago, this court denied or vacated the result, in part
02:11 - 43.428 on the theory that the Secretary had
02:11 - 45.297 vacated the.
02:11 - 48.533 Sorry, Your honor, a little parched, vacated.
02:11 - 52.037 And you've been arguing for hours.
02:11 - 54.840 So I have,
02:11 - 56.575 and we're not in any hurry.
02:11 - 59.578 We're here all day.
02:12 - 04.449 I appreciate that, Your Honor.
02:12 - 07.786 A year ago, this court vacated the result in the BPA
02:12 - 10.389 case, the Black Political Empowerment Project case
02:12 - 13.392 on the theory that the secretary was not a necessary party.
02:12 - 16.528 But all 67 county boards were.
02:12 - 22.467 So if this were about what is required under 31, 50.16
02:12 - 27.606 for the Secretary to ask voters to do the Secretary would be a necessary party.
02:12 - 30.575 The natural outgrowth of how
02:12 - 34.046 BPA played out is that where the rubber meets the road,
02:12 - 37.482 where the constitutional violation is
02:12 - 40.485 happening, is at the board level.
02:12 - 44.389 So too, this matches with how the case arose.
02:12 - 45.791 Again, we,
02:12 - 48.994 as representatives of the voters whose votes were being discarded
02:12 - 53.865 at the board level under 3157, had to sue the board within two days.
02:12 - 55.267 That's what we did.
02:12 - 57.536 That's whose decision is being challenged here.
02:12 - 00.539 And that is not an act 77 decision,
02:13 - 06.078 by the way, this is something not just the provisions of 3140
02:13 - 09.081 6.8 pre-dates act 77.
02:13 - 12.351 The entire kind of structure and process
02:13 - 15.354 that we're advocating for predates the act 77.
02:13 - 19.124 The the exist.
02:13 - 24.663 67. Language.
02:13 - 33.105 It was.
02:13 - 34.272 Required.
02:13 - 37.275 It's up the passing of act 77
02:13 - 41.880 that that in 3146 we need to account for the canvasing that will give us.
02:13 - 45.317 That was the one and only amendment to 31,
02:13 - 49.721 46.8 in act 77 was to add the words mail in ballots.
02:13 - 54.693 But the phrase that I read into this issue will be that ability to go to the last
02:13 - 57.696 77 included in section seven
02:13 - 00.866 and amended section 31, 46
02:14 - 04.369 as one of this.
02:14 - 05.837 But the amendments
02:14 - 09.708 contained in section seven are not among those that were challenging here, right.
02:14 - 14.246 That the language that that, obligates the county boards
02:14 - 18.116 to make a sufficiency, determination, that language pre-dates act 77.
02:14 - 21.353 That is not part of section seven from act 77.
02:14 - 26.391 And by the way, this parsing of what is and is not part of act
02:14 - 32.097 77 gets to another problem with the RNC's non severability argument, which is that
02:14 - 37.502 what happened in act 77, as Chief Justice Todd pointed out, after 180 days,
02:14 - 40.539 the mandatory provisions became baked
02:14 - 43.542 into the broader election code.
02:14 - 47.913 Then in 2020, there's act 12, which further amend some of those provisions.
02:14 - 51.149 So now this thing's got tentacles all throughout the election code.
02:14 - 53.785 But aren't we to assume that the legislature,
02:14 - 56.521 since they wrote it, is aware of these tentacles?
02:14 - 59.791 In other words, they were aware, of the deal they made.
02:15 - 01.593 And at any point
02:15 - 04.496 by majority they could
02:15 - 07.132 undo the whole kit and caboodle.
02:15 - 10.836 So this idea, I guess this is the dead hand argument you're making now.
02:15 - 15.974 You know, the the subsequent enactments and you don't want it to carry forward,
02:15 - 19.945 doesn't that doesn't that ignore the fact
02:15 - 23.315 that it's always a creature of the legislative will?
02:15 - 24.182 Right.
02:15 - 27.786 But what the appellants are asking this court to do is to do the work
02:15 - 31.923 of the legislature in repealing words and bits and pieces
02:15 - 36.628 of what are now baked into the election code, leaving, kind of orphan
02:15 - 39.664 and mandatory provisions from 2020 in there.
02:15 - 44.669 Even though the word date does not seem to have been part of the grander deal
02:15 - 45.570 that's been reached, like
02:15 - 48.573 we'd be having a different conversation if Malenko came out a different way.
02:15 - 49.274 Right?
02:15 - 54.312 If if the challenge to all of mail ballot voting had been successful,
02:15 - 55.914 now we're talking about something
02:15 - 59.918 that is inextricably intertwined with the the whole act and
02:16 - 03.421 yeah, it's inextricably intertwined.
02:16 - 08.293 And yet tomorrow or today, the General Assembly could change the whole thing.
02:16 - 10.896 Assuming the governor concurs.
02:16 - 13.932 So this inextricable and entwined
02:16 - 17.235 tentacle argument, I think,
02:16 - 19.738 do you agree, fails
02:16 - 22.741 to fully account for the legislative,
02:16 - 26.211 will factor here?
02:16 - 27.812 I don't agree with that, Your Honor.
02:16 - 30.982 And in large part it's because the result of,
02:16 - 35.620 enforcing the non severability provision
02:16 - 39.524 in this case without any kind of evidence
02:16 - 42.794 that the legislature saw the word date
02:16 - 45.797 as critical to the deal,
02:16 - 48.867 would leave, would actually put more work on the legislature.
02:16 - 50.302 It would be the judiciary
02:16 - 53.905 putting more work in the legislature, because we'd only be invalidating act 77.
02:16 - 57.642 We'd only be pulling out those tentacles or trying to find them and pull them out
02:16 - 01.713 from the election code as to act 77, leaving later amended
02:17 - 03.915 and mandatory provisions
02:17 - 07.552 that don't make any sense, and requiring the legislature to fix the mess,
02:17 - 11.489 pulling out an act that is no longer out there as a separate act.
02:17 - 14.492 It is now baked into the election code.
02:17 - 17.495 Correct, your honor, it's I mean, it's baked into what was before
02:17 - 19.464 and what's come after. So what was before?
02:17 - 23.868 It was a code that starts off in article one of the election code,
02:17 - 29.474 with a severability provision, which was not amended at all by act 77.
02:17 - 32.310 The legislature is presumably aware of that provision.
02:17 - 35.880 The legislature was presumably aware of still been its progeny
02:17 - 41.052 and still inserted a boilerplate non severability
02:17 - 45.056 provision of the type that this court has already declined to enforce.
02:17 - 49.361 By the way, this court has also declined to enforce it in the case
02:17 - 51.363 when it at least temporarily invalidated it.
02:17 - 54.866 An application of something in act 77, the mail ballot deadline.
02:17 - 56.701 But that didn't result in severability.
02:17 - 00.972 And I think three justices on this court specifically noted in concurrence
02:18 - 04.142 that following still
02:18 - 06.945 this very non severability provision should not apply.
02:18 - 10.015 Are you are you telling this court that that
02:18 - 14.252 either the court or the General Assembly
02:18 - 18.223 is incapable of identifying what was enacted?
02:18 - 20.959 77 at this point in time?
02:18 - 24.462 No, Your Honor, what I'm saying is that once you identify those things
02:18 - 28.800 and extract them, then it leaves the code that doesn't make as much sense anymore.
02:18 - 31.870 And then it does put the work back on the legislature
02:18 - 36.541 to fix what it had subsequently amended to make it make sense.
02:18 - 39.811 It's not a bad thing if they do some work, is it?
02:18 - 42.647 An overhaul to the election code is something that I think
02:18 - 45.884 many people in this room would be okay with, depending on how it comes out.
02:18 - 51.656 Counsel, in a Democratic Party, the naked ballot case,
02:18 - 57.062 we actually applied, 3146 eight, correct?
02:18 - 57.796 Correct. Your honor.
02:18 - 02.400 And I mean, we didn't consider it as part of act 77.
02:19 - 05.870 We said it had to be read in Perry materia with.
02:19 - 07.672 Correct, your honor.
02:19 - 11.242 So it was not part of 77, just like the result that the Commonwealth Court,
02:19 - 13.378 issued here.
02:19 - 16.381 And the footnote conclusion,
02:19 - 20.552 from the concurrence is in PA Dems,
02:19 - 24.389 noting that severability was not this same severability
02:19 - 26.224 provision was not triggered.
02:19 - 27.325 Should carry over here.
02:19 - 30.328 And again, we don't think you even need to get there.
02:19 - 33.398 But what we said in the Democratic Party case
02:19 - 38.136 is that the county boards had to reject naked ballots.
02:19 - 40.705 They could not count them.
02:19 - 44.342 That was a direction to the county boards, correct, Your Honor.
02:19 - 47.612 And that was something they carried out at the canvasing phase.
02:19 - 48.179 Right.
02:19 - 50.448 So I'm sorry, I was kind of conflating that result
02:19 - 53.451 and the result on the deadline. Yes.
02:19 - 00.291 We've covered a lot of ground.
02:20 - 03.495 So I'm just going to wrap up going back to the first question presented
02:20 - 07.332 before handing off to me to issue CLE credits to the attorney.
02:20 - 13.538 Does that mean I get preparation credits for presenting
02:20 - 14.272 the numbers?
02:20 - 16.141 You have to have some new system.
02:20 - 18.510 You're being done this before.
02:20 - 20.812 Fair enough, Your Honor.
02:20 - 22.313 So before handing back to Mr.
02:20 - 23.415 Volokh to talk again
02:20 - 26.751 about the first question presented, I just want to return to the touchstone
02:20 - 30.755 of this court's analysis confirming that the protections
02:20 - 35.059 under the Free and Equal Elections clause are over and above
02:20 - 38.830 what is provided in federal courts under the federal Constitution.
02:20 - 42.634 And on that basis alone, we ask that you affirm
02:20 - 45.637 the Commonwealth Court's decision
02:20 - 47.972 and vindicate the voting rights of our clients.
02:20 - 49.374 Thank you.
02:20 - 50.775 Thank you, Mr. Loney.
02:20 - 52.710 Well said.
02:20 - 54.212 Let's hear from Mr.
02:20 - 55.880 Vole. Check.
02:20 - 00.285 Now if you want to say simply what he said.
02:21 - 01.953 We're okay with that.
02:21 - 04.989 I certainly endorse everything that Mr.
02:21 - 07.792 Modi said. But Chief Justice Todd and may it please the court.
02:21 - 10.795 Daniel Falchuk for the Pennsylvania Democratic Party,
02:21 - 13.832 joined by co-counsel Clifford Levine here in the courtroom.
02:21 - 15.867 Your honors, as Mr.
02:21 - 19.137 Loney indicated, I plan to principally address two issues.
02:21 - 23.041 That is our argument that it violates the free and equal Elections clause
02:21 - 27.111 to disqualify ballots for noncompliance with the date requirement,
02:21 - 31.015 because such disqualifications further no legitimate government interest.
02:21 - 35.420 And second, addressing appellant's argument that this court in Ames fall
02:21 - 39.190 versus Chapman has already rejected our constitutional challenge.
02:21 - 43.428 But if I could first quickly, close the loop, as it were, on,
02:21 - 47.365 what was discussed earlier with counsel, the so-called Winston Standard.
02:21 - 50.768 And the point I want to make there simply is that what appellants are referring to
02:21 - 56.007 as the Winston Standard is one of five requirements that this court in Winston
02:21 - 00.044 articulated in a single sentence for free and equal elections.
02:22 - 03.147 And appellants are saying implicitly, they don't come right out and say it,
02:22 - 06.918 but they are saying that only one of those five by itself
02:22 - 10.355 sets the constitutional standard for facially neutral
02:22 - 13.892 election regulations, and that the rest should be discarded.
02:22 - 16.160 And the reason I submit they are doing that
02:22 - 20.164 is that two of the other four are inconsistent with their position.
02:22 - 22.267 So this court in the same sentence in Winston,
02:22 - 24.602 which was quoted in full in League of Women Voters,
02:22 - 27.972 said that for free and equal elections, it also has to be the case
02:22 - 32.010 that every voter has the right to cast a ballot and have it honestly counted,
02:22 - 36.714 and that no constitutional right of a qualified elector shall be subverted.
02:22 - 39.951 So whereas they are saying that facially neutral election
02:22 - 42.954 regulations are valid under the clause, unless
02:22 - 46.624 they essentially deny the franchise, that's a so difficult standard.
02:22 - 50.461 This court made clear, I submit, that lesser infringements,
02:22 - 55.333 such as mere subversions, will also violate the clause version.
02:22 - 57.135 Because you read it faithfully.
02:22 - 02.273 Is is it suggestive
02:23 - 06.811 that over 99% of the people are are clearing this?
02:23 - 09.047 And so I heard
02:23 - 12.050 and then fewer than 1% are below that,
02:23 - 15.987 that this is perhaps not a subversion of the right,
02:23 - 19.691 but simply the human error which we all can pay for.
02:23 - 22.260 Might of this version.
02:23 - 25.663 So justice work by submission is that in determining whether this is
02:23 - 29.267 sufficiently serious to constitute a subversion.
02:23 - 30.735 And of course, that's a capacious term
02:23 - 33.137 that could be subject to all manner of interpretation.
02:23 - 34.806 And I'll get to why in just a moment.
02:23 - 37.909 I think League of Women Voters gave a very useful gloss on it.
02:23 - 39.844 But to answer your question, it was discussed
02:23 - 41.112 with some of the earlier council.
02:23 - 45.083 What we know is that in the 2022 election, 10,000
02:23 - 48.486 Pennsylvanians lost their right to vote, 4520 24.
02:23 - 49.687 You heard the numbers.
02:23 - 54.592 And as you pointed out in footnote 29, so the Third Circuit two weeks ago,
02:23 - 59.130 the RNC told the Third Circuit earlier this year
02:23 - 04.669 that three Republican candidates have lost their election since just 2020
02:24 - 08.506 solely because undated ballots were counted.
02:24 - 12.010 So we are talking about a requirement for enforcement of a requirement
02:24 - 16.381 that actually affects has actually affected numerous elections.
02:24 - 18.016 And that would I would,
02:24 - 21.819 just as I submit, yes, is a subversion of the right to vote.
02:24 - 24.756 Now, I mentioned the gloss that League of Women Voters put on it.
02:24 - 27.525 This is language that's in our brief, and I think it's very important.
02:24 - 32.730 The court said the text of the Free and Equal Elections clause indicates
02:24 - 37.135 the framers intent that all aspects of the electoral process
02:24 - 42.840 will to the greatest degree possible, remain open and unrestricted to the voter.
02:24 - 46.310 Now that, in our view, is entirely inconsistent
02:24 - 49.814 with, first of all, the notion that somehow the free and Equal elections
02:24 - 54.285 clause is only limited to neutral ballot regulations, but also the notion that,
02:24 - 57.555 there's any level of minimal judicial scrutiny here.
02:24 - 01.159 Because if you're saying that all aspects of the electoral process
02:25 - 04.195 have to be unrestricted, I read that to mean that
02:25 - 07.932 restrictions are permissible only when they are necessary.
02:25 - 11.469 And that is certainly not the language of rational basis review.
02:25 - 14.505 We heard some suggestion that if there is judicial scrutiny
02:25 - 17.709 at all under the Free and Equal Elections clause of what they call
02:25 - 21.579 a neutral ballot casting regulation, it would have to be rational basis review.
02:25 - 24.082 I submit that's inconsistent with League of Women Voters.
02:25 - 28.352 I'm also not aware of any case in which this court has applied
02:25 - 32.490 rational basis review to a fundamental article one right.
02:25 - 34.692 And if we were even looking to,
02:25 - 38.763 federal case law, I submit Crawford itself, the Crawford versus Marion County
02:25 - 43.534 that the appellants rely on repeatedly is inconsistent with the notion of rational
02:25 - 47.338 basis review, even for infringements of the federal right to vote, as Mr.
02:25 - 51.209 Loney articulated, that is not as robust as the Pennsylvania right to vote.
02:25 - 56.080 But Crawford said, however minimal the burdens on the right to vote,
02:25 - 59.717 they must be justified by sufficient state interest.
02:25 - 01.185 That is not rational. Basis review.
02:26 - 04.222 If you're talking about rational basis review, is there a state interest
02:26 - 07.325 is, you know, it just there's a disconnect between saying,
02:26 - 10.795 however minimal the burdens they have to be justified by sufficiently
02:26 - 14.966 weighty state interest and the extremely forgiving rational basis review.
02:26 - 18.402 So I submit rational basis could not possibly be the correct level of review
02:26 - 18.636 here.
02:26 - 21.506 But with that, I just jump for a second.
02:26 - 24.509 So I think people who look at this
02:26 - 27.545 can reasonably say,
02:26 - 29.814 really, we're dating something.
02:26 - 32.817 How hard is it to date something?
02:26 - 35.620 And we'd look at it and say, because dating
02:26 - 39.257 something is ubiquitous to common society.
02:26 - 41.626 We have verifications.
02:26 - 45.496 We sign all the time licensing applications, banks, bank thing,
02:26 - 47.431 application we date, everything
02:26 - 53.404 that by that nature, there's no burden here.
02:26 - 56.407 There's zero burden here.
02:26 - 02.246 What do you how do you respond to that that, that that asking for it.
02:27 - 04.849 If this is not like,
02:27 - 06.517 voter ID,
02:27 - 09.320 where people would have to literally go out,
02:27 - 12.957 get something new they'd have to get if they didn't have a driver's license,
02:27 - 15.526 they'd have to get an ID, and that was that would impose.
02:27 - 18.529 They'd have to apply for something and and that would impose a burden.
02:27 - 22.500 The voter is not required to take anything with them
02:27 - 25.503 where anything, purchase anything.
02:27 - 29.073 They simply have to as they have a pen in their hand
02:27 - 32.810 or date something that they presumably have already signed.
02:27 - 37.648 How does that even rise to a burden at all?
02:27 - 39.450 So a couple of responses.
02:27 - 43.855 Justice Robson, first of all, just let's bear in mind it has to be a correct date.
02:27 - 45.189 It has to be a date that is,
02:27 - 48.526 could potentially be when you actually filled out the ballot.
02:27 - 50.928 So we know, for example, as was alluded to earlier,
02:27 - 53.998 a significant number of people write down their birthday by mistake.
02:27 - 55.466 We also know the figures
02:27 - 59.337 that I've already alluded to, suggesting that thousands of people get this wrong.
02:27 - 02.073 So those are those are mistakes.
02:28 - 04.742 And people make mistakes as I think justice Work said.
02:28 - 06.844 I'm asking you, what did
02:28 - 09.680 what is the election code have to be written
02:28 - 13.618 in such a way to ameliorate the possibility of human mistake? No.
02:28 - 14.452 Okay.
02:28 - 17.488 So at what point in time is there accountability
02:28 - 21.792 for the mistake on the voter versus telling the legislature,
02:28 - 25.830 this is just a burden because these voters are making mistakes.
02:28 - 27.431 So the relevant burden is not simply
02:28 - 30.635 writing down a date, in our view, the proper analysis of the burden.
02:28 - 31.702 And he can agreed with us.
02:28 - 35.573 Two weeks ago, said that part of the burden is analyzing the consequence.
02:28 - 36.240 And here, of course,
02:28 - 40.044 the consequence is losing your article one fundamental right to vote.
02:28 - 43.047 That, to our mind, is a key part of the analysis.
02:28 - 45.182 Really. It's not really it's not really a burden issue.
02:28 - 47.351 Then the question is, if you make a mistake
02:28 - 51.455 in the consequence means
02:28 - 54.325 of that mistake is the statute says
02:28 - 57.628 your vote is going to get, not counted in the canvass.
02:28 - 02.533 That in your mind is something that triggers a constitutional infirmity
02:29 - 05.536 with the structure of the election that the General Assembly has put forth.
02:29 - 09.273 We are to be clear, essentially, yes, Justice Robson is the short answer.
02:29 - 10.775 But we are the longer answer.
02:29 - 13.744 We are talking about a burden on the right to vote.
02:29 - 17.515 And so the burden here, it is manifested in the requirement
02:29 - 20.184 to write down a date now, just a month in a year.
02:29 - 21.185 But the consequence,
02:29 - 25.623 which should be part of the analysis, is losing your, right to vote.
02:29 - 27.091 And if there is a sufficient reason.
02:29 - 29.727 So it's not a, it's not a loss of the right to vote.
02:29 - 31.796 It's a loss of the right to have your vote counted.
02:29 - 35.666 And that arises from this court's decision, if I may, because I didn't
02:29 - 38.669 sit here at the time and the ball versus Chapman case,
02:29 - 41.839 because we've talked about this before and this is a disqualification issue,
02:29 - 42.940 not a denial,
02:29 - 45.910 because we keep coming back to when we're we're dancing around the issue.
02:29 - 47.445 You keep using the word burden.
02:29 - 49.480 Justice Robson and other justices are going to say,
02:29 - 51.949 well, it's really not a burden to date something.
02:29 - 55.119 The constitutional infirmity arises because this court determined
02:29 - 56.520 involved was Chapman.
02:29 - 00.057 That shall mean shall it's mandatory and therefore if you don't date it,
02:30 - 01.892 it's disqualified.
02:30 - 03.060 I agree with you, justice McCaffrey.
02:30 - 04.895 We are using burden on the right,
02:30 - 06.831 you know, the right to vote as something of a shorthand.
02:30 - 09.000 But I agree to the right in question and justice.
02:30 - 09.867 Why have you made this clear?
02:30 - 12.803 One of your concurring opinions, the Supreme Court has repeatedly made it
02:30 - 16.841 clear, Westbury versus Sanders and elsewhere and more versus, excuse me,
02:30 - 19.777 Winston versus Moore made the same point I quoted a few minutes ago.
02:30 - 22.680 But the right to vote includes the right to have your vote counted.
02:30 - 26.283 We are talking about having a role in our participatory democracy.
02:30 - 29.387 Nobody fills out a ballot just because they like filling out a ballot.
02:30 - 33.624 They want to have a role in selecting those who will represent him,
02:30 - 36.861 or the process of choosing to elect those who will represent him.
02:30 - 40.965 Similarly, we use the shorthand for does the date requirement serve any purpose?
02:30 - 43.401 That's not actually, I submit the proper question.
02:30 - 47.338 Question is, does the disqualification of your ballot for failure
02:30 - 51.542 to comply with the date requirement actually serve any purpose?
02:30 - 55.846 And it's a very important distinction, because all of the purposes
02:30 - 00.284 that appellants have put forward so far as justifying the date requirement
02:31 - 02.453 or the disqualification of ballots for noncompliance
02:31 - 05.790 with our date requirement, to whatever extent the date
02:31 - 08.826 requirement and the handwritten date furthers those purposes.
02:31 - 09.527 And I can go through them.
02:31 - 11.862 I will go through them one by one with the courts indulgence.
02:31 - 15.032 They will likewise and can likewise be furthered,
02:31 - 18.002 even if this court were to affirm and say you cannot
02:31 - 21.739 disqualify ballots for failure to fill out the date requirement.
02:31 - 23.741 Now that leads directly into the question of, well,
02:31 - 24.341 how many people
02:31 - 27.478 are still going to write down the date if this court were to affirm
02:31 - 28.846 to which I have two answers,
02:31 - 32.283 can you can you disqualify about for failing to complete the verification,
02:31 - 37.154 if disqualifying those
02:31 - 40.191 ballots furthers a legitimate government interest?
02:31 - 41.926 And that is not an argument that we have brief.
02:31 - 44.195 So I'm not sure the PDP as well.
02:31 - 46.030 But we keep talking about dating, dating.
02:31 - 48.099 And it's we're talking about a verification.
02:31 - 49.700 We're not talking about dating the ballot.
02:31 - 53.270 We're talking about a verification that is to certain facts, requires
02:31 - 56.273 a signature, requires a date.
02:31 - 58.876 And the question is,
02:31 - 02.246 well, I guess I guess that that's my point is,
02:32 - 06.717 does that serve a particular purpose, requiring people
02:32 - 09.720 to verify those facts when they send their ballot? It?
02:32 - 14.859 I'm not aware of the government interest that is furthered by disqualifying
02:32 - 19.196 a ballot for failure to put a date alongside that verification.
02:32 - 20.764 Now what appellants have argued.
02:32 - 23.067 Of course, there are three different state interests.
02:32 - 23.734 The signature.
02:32 - 26.303 Justice Robson, against you.
02:32 - 29.773 The PDP has not taken a position in this litigation on the validity
02:32 - 30.774 of the signature requirement.
02:32 - 32.910 If that were to be challenged
02:32 - 36.013 under the standards that we are proposing, the framework that we are advancing,
02:32 - 39.250 the question would be the same one here, and I don't have the answer to it
02:32 - 40.351 because we have not briefed it.
02:32 - 42.319 But the question we've taken a position on that.
02:32 - 43.921 Have I justice?
02:32 - 44.889 What if
02:32 - 47.791 I hate to put questions to the court, but are we talking about the Walsh case?
02:32 - 48.692 We're talking about the court.
02:32 - 50.995 This court has taken a position on signature.
02:32 - 54.098 So in the Walsh case, this court, this court rejected
02:32 - 57.668 a challenge to the signature requirement for provisional ballots.
02:32 - 02.273 Now, I want to be very clear about that, because the vast majority of that opinion
02:33 - 05.743 was about statutory interpretation, the continuation of the discussion
02:33 - 09.413 the court has had within itself and about directory and shall mean, etc., etc.
02:33 - 12.650 but there was one paragraph at the end of the court's analysis
02:33 - 15.319 in which the court noted, that it did not agree
02:33 - 17.521 with the constitutional challenge that was presented there.
02:33 - 21.492 Now, it made clear the constitutional challenge that was presented.
02:33 - 24.361 There was only the so difficult standard.
02:33 - 28.032 Essentially, the board said Winston held that it is,
02:33 - 32.770 it is it violates a free and equal election clause to make a requirement
02:33 - 36.574 that is so difficult in this court, said the challenger has pointed to that
02:33 - 38.776 standard, but has not shown how that standard is met.
02:33 - 39.510 So the challenger
02:33 - 43.547 there was not remotely making the same argument that we are making here now.
02:33 - 45.115 Justice walk by saying all of that.
02:33 - 48.452 I am certainly not in any way asking this court to revisit its decision.
02:33 - 49.987 In Walsh, that issue was not presented here.
02:33 - 51.722 It's not implicated by this case.
02:33 - 56.961 All I am suggesting is in terms of the concern about a floodgate of challenges,
02:33 - 01.198 our submission is about disqualifying ballots
02:34 - 04.835 for failure to comply with a requirement that does not advance
02:34 - 08.439 a government interest violates the Free and Equal Elections clause.
02:34 - 11.742 We think that comes from League of Women Voters as well as Winston and well,
02:34 - 14.745 I and I'll go back to my question about the verification.
02:34 - 17.848 Does having an executed verification
02:34 - 21.418 on the outside of an envelope, purportedly by the voter
02:34 - 25.556 to whom that ballot was sent, serve a a governmental interest?
02:34 - 27.124 I don't know, Justice Robson.
02:34 - 29.827 I'm not here to defend the verification requirement.
02:34 - 33.163 You're taking the date part and you're extracting it from the verification.
02:34 - 36.367 The verification is that multiple paragraphs with signature and date.
02:34 - 39.236 But so the issue for us is the date.
02:34 - 41.739 So but the date is part of a verification.
02:34 - 42.940 It's not it's not.
02:34 - 45.843 In other words, I think it's interesting how a lot of the other cases
02:34 - 49.413 that have looked at this have talked about a dated or undated mail in ballot.
02:34 - 51.482 The ballots are not being dated.
02:34 - 55.886 What is being dated is a verification attesting to facts, an affidavit
02:34 - 57.121 under penalty of perjury.
02:34 - 59.890 That's what we're talking about.
02:34 - 03.394 And so I'm trying to figure out you're just you're saying
02:35 - 06.430 that it's the date component of that verification
02:35 - 11.268 that is unconstitutional, but the verification otherwise is okay.
02:35 - 15.205 I am taking this case just as props and as it was litigated
02:35 - 18.942 from the court of Common Pleas with the petition initially filed by the voters.
02:35 - 22.413 And I am taking that the the arguments that the appellants have put forward
02:35 - 27.451 in challenging the Commonwealth Court's decision as to why, the,
02:35 - 30.954 disqualifying ballots for noncompliance with the date requirement.
02:35 - 31.955 You say date requirement?
02:35 - 33.824 It's a verification requirement.
02:35 - 36.660 I don't mean to get hung up on, terminology.
02:35 - 39.797 The parties have brief the case using the term date requirement.
02:35 - 43.200 I'm happy to get more specific and say we are talking about the language
02:35 - 47.938 in the election code that says a mail or absentee ballot voter, after completing
02:35 - 51.475 all of the preceding steps, shall sign and date the verification absolute.
02:35 - 53.377 That is the requirement that we are talking about.
02:35 - 58.082 But what we are specifically challenging in this litigation is the requirement
02:35 - 01.485 to add a date, not to sign the ballot, not to do anything
02:36 - 04.521 else, include the secrecy envelope or anything along those lines.
02:36 - 06.290 Now, if you check, I'm sorry to interrupt you,
02:36 - 10.060 but you don't breathe between sentences, so it's hard to get in there.
02:36 - 12.529 My apologies. Just. No, no, you're just saying a lot.
02:36 - 13.630 It's it's good.
02:36 - 18.302 But, since you answer justice McCaffrey's question, you have said a great deal.
02:36 - 22.539 But you confused me with one thing you said in response to his question.
02:36 - 26.076 And I'm asking, are you conflating
02:36 - 29.480 burden with consequence
02:36 - 33.417 when you were defining what what is a burden in this context?
02:36 - 36.854 So I would not use the word conflating to define my own argument.
02:36 - 41.425 I would say that we view the consequence of not complying
02:36 - 45.462 with the date requirement as part of the proper burden analysis.
02:36 - 47.364 So a court there, how do you think?
02:36 - 51.769 Well, the Third Circuit did the same thing two weeks ago and said, look at prior,
02:36 - 53.937 Supreme Court decisions. Of course it was not.
02:36 - 55.406 It was looking at it through federal law.
02:36 - 58.442 But the Supreme Court, for example, in Anderson itself, the case from which
02:36 - 01.578 the Anderson part of Anderson verdict takes its name, the court
02:37 - 04.715 there was looking at a requirement that independent presidential candidates
02:37 - 07.885 had to declare sufficiently early in the season.
02:37 - 09.319 And the court, the Supreme Court,
02:37 - 13.290 in analyzing the constitutionality of that requirement, looked in part
02:37 - 17.194 to the consequence for independent voters and the fact that they might not make
02:37 - 17.795 their decision
02:37 - 21.098 early enough and would lose the right to vote for the candidate of their choice.
02:37 - 23.700 So the Third Circuit was suggesting, and I think it's certainly correct
02:37 - 27.871 under federal law, it is certainly proper to look at the consequence it also used.
02:37 - 29.873 I know it's proper to look at the consequence,
02:37 - 32.876 but what you're confusing me with is that you're
02:37 - 35.879 including that in the analysis of the burden.
02:37 - 38.382 And I'm not sure I looked at it that way.
02:37 - 42.186 Well, our overall submission is that any work,
02:37 - 46.390 a requirement or disqualification of of cast ballots
02:37 - 50.761 because of the failure to comply with the requirement is all part
02:37 - 51.695 and parcel of the burden,
02:37 - 56.800 and that is what needs to be justified by sufficiently strong state interest.
02:37 - 58.402 And what the appellants here have pointed to.
02:37 - 01.038 They pointed to three different possible state interests.
02:38 - 05.075 They started with the timeliness of ballots preventing voter fraud and,
02:38 - 08.445 promoting solemnity in voting.
02:38 - 12.516 Now, none of those three is an interest that is actually or adequately furthered
02:38 - 16.920 by disqualifying ballots for failure to comply with the date requirement.
02:38 - 19.623 Let me let me go through them quickly with the court's permission,
02:38 - 21.391 starting with timeliness.
02:38 - 23.694 As a matter of Pennsylvania law,
02:38 - 27.097 it is not permissible to the handwritten date on the outer
02:38 - 32.135 envelope of a mail ballot cannot be used to determine a ballots timeliness.
02:38 - 35.372 And that's because under the election code, a ballot mail ballots
02:38 - 38.375 timely if and only if it is received by 8 p.m.
02:38 - 41.411 on Election Day, and the handwritten date cannot tell you
02:38 - 43.680 when the ballot was received.
02:38 - 45.082 And that's because
02:38 - 48.519 two steps have to follow with the correct handwritten date tells you assuming.
02:38 - 49.653 Assuming it's correct,
02:38 - 52.422 it tells you the date on which the voter wrote down the handwritten date.
02:38 - 54.691 Two more things have to happen after that.
02:38 - 56.460 In order for the ballot to be received, the ballot
02:38 - 00.230 voter has to put the ballot in the mail, and the Postal service has to transport it
02:39 - 01.365 to the Board of Elections.
02:39 - 04.167 Handwritten date doesn't tell you how long it took for
02:39 - 07.538 either of those two steps to be completed, let alone both of them.
02:39 - 12.142 So it simply does not give any insight into when a ballot was received,
02:39 - 14.578 which is all that matters for timeliness.
02:39 - 17.548 Now, what appellants have said, and the AG addressed it again earlier
02:39 - 21.618 this morning, the scenario in which the Shaw system breaks down
02:39 - 25.889 and in which election officials violate their statutory obligation
02:39 - 30.093 to keep a record of when every mail or absentee ballot is received.
02:39 - 33.430 And they say in that circumstance, if both of those things occurred,
02:39 - 36.767 the handwritten day could be used to help evaluate timeliness.
02:39 - 39.903 Well, number one, I do want to underscore how implausible
02:39 - 43.507 I view that scenario as being, in part because, as I just said, it
02:39 - 47.544 requires assuming that election officials will violate, ignore, disregard
02:39 - 51.181 whatever verb you want to use their statutory obligation
02:39 - 55.252 to keep a record of when every mail ballot is received.
02:39 - 59.723 But even putting that aside, the argument just ignores everything that I said about
02:39 - 02.025 how under the code, it simply is not permissible
02:40 - 04.094 to use the handwritten date because it doesn't
02:40 - 07.965 give you information on the only thing that matters in terms of timeliness.
02:40 - 08.432 And I
02:40 - 10.601 you have the briefing from the Philadelphia
02:40 - 13.704 County Board of Elections here confirming that it does not use
02:40 - 16.807 and it does not believe it can use the handwritten date
02:40 - 20.544 in order to determine timeliness and to the extent this court deems
02:40 - 22.112 it appropriate to look beyond the record.
02:40 - 24.214 In this case, there are similar representations
02:40 - 27.918 from the other county Board of Elections in the two recent federal lawsuits,
02:40 - 31.054 and NAACP and Eakin similarly saying that
02:40 - 34.725 the handwritten date simply is not used to determine a ballots timeliness.
02:40 - 36.193 Now, my last point on timeliness.
02:40 - 39.029 I submit it's a little respect.
02:40 - 42.799 Hard to credit appellant's assertion that they would have no concerns,
02:40 - 45.802 no objections if, after a certain election,
02:40 - 49.006 a number of boards of elections took the position.
02:40 - 51.541 We've got this room full of mail and absentee ballots.
02:40 - 53.543 We don't know when they were received.
02:40 - 54.745 Our system broke down.
02:40 - 56.413 We didn't record when they came in.
02:40 - 57.881 We just don't know.
02:40 - 01.518 But we're going to take a look at the handwritten date on those ballots
02:41 - 02.519 and if they're early enough
02:41 - 04.688 before the election, far enough before the election,
02:41 - 06.957 we're just going to go ahead and count that room full of ballots.
02:41 - 08.492 I submit it's difficult to credit
02:41 - 10.861 that the appellants would have no concerns with that.
02:41 - 13.830 But the basic point, again, under the election code,
02:41 - 18.135 handwritten date simply plays no role in determining the timeliness of ballots.
02:41 - 19.836 There's been some
02:41 - 22.839 discussion about burdens and,
02:41 - 26.043 and also purpose as you just were marking,
02:41 - 29.112 one of one of the at least one of the,
02:41 - 33.083 a Mickey, referenced are quite onerous
02:41 - 36.086 petition requirements.
02:41 - 40.390 Both with respect to burden,
02:41 - 42.859 at least petition requirements or something
02:41 - 46.596 we're all familiar with, of course, since we're an elected judiciary,
02:41 - 51.334 both with respect to burden and purpose.
02:41 - 55.338 Assuming that that your side prevails
02:41 - 58.408 in this case, couldn't one foresee that the entire,
02:42 - 03.246 onerous petition rubric has to come crashing down?
02:42 - 06.383 And justice worked again, with apologies for directing a question
02:42 - 07.217 back at the court.
02:42 - 10.987 Are we talking about requirements to petition this court for review of a.
02:42 - 14.391 Sorry, I meant a petition to be a candidate on the ballot.
02:42 - 17.294 Yes. So there have been a number of cases about that.
02:42 - 18.261 And often the,
02:42 - 21.631 there was the, well, it doesn't matter.
02:42 - 23.200 There have been a number of cases about that.
02:42 - 24.534 And the court has been clear,
02:42 - 27.537 I think, in a number of cases in distinguishing between,
02:42 - 29.940 infringements of the right to cast a ballot
02:42 - 33.276 that will be counted and infringements of the right of candidates.
02:42 - 36.480 I mean, this was a this was the case in Winston versus more having
02:42 - 39.683 just the top two vote getters from the primary up here on the ballot.
02:42 - 43.687 And the, result in the analysis was that those are different
02:42 - 47.791 than restrictions on actually counting a ballot and casting a ballot.
02:42 - 50.861 So the analysis, I submit would likely be different, although, well,
02:42 - 54.264 it would be different in the sense of the standard of scrutiny applied.
02:42 - 55.966 But of course, I think the analysis would be
02:42 - 58.201 the same in terms of is there any legitimate burden
02:42 - 02.072 because this is typically how it works with all constitutional analysis.
02:43 - 03.540 I think that's a good, very good response.
02:43 - 05.909 The upshot of that, of that,
02:43 - 09.212 perspective or that
02:43 - 13.150 holding, I suppose, would would be that, in the,
02:43 - 16.153 in the it would have,
02:43 - 19.122 article one writes, the associate
02:43 - 24.928 of writing ought to be very colloquial, the right to stand as a candidate
02:43 - 28.398 to participate in government, is a beautiful,
02:43 - 31.401 artificial, inferior,
02:43 - 35.272 in the constellation of rights to the right to cast a vote.
02:43 - 37.374 So just as I was asking your last question,
02:43 - 39.409 perhaps I apologize for any confusion.
02:43 - 43.480 I was thinking of a challenge brought by a voter, not by the candidate,
02:43 - 44.247 him or herself.
02:43 - 47.250 The answer may well be that in terms of the associational
02:43 - 50.220 rights extent, that's a similar fundamental article one right.
02:43 - 53.123 The level of scrutiny would not be significantly lower because, again,
02:43 - 57.093 this court, to my knowledge, has never applied rational basis review.
02:43 - 57.727 And we can
02:43 - 01.231 I don't mean to be just ignoring the distinctions between various forms
02:44 - 03.900 of heightened scrutiny, but this court has never applied
02:44 - 07.103 a rational basis review to an article one fundamental right,
02:44 - 08.738 and I certainly don't think it should do so here
02:44 - 12.142 with what this court has called the most preservative of all rights.
02:44 - 16.079 I do want to if I can, turn to the second interest that the appellants
02:44 - 19.883 have put forward, which is voter fraud, they say the state's interest in detecting
02:44 - 23.720 prosecuting voter fraud suffices to justify disqualifying ballots.
02:44 - 27.524 Now, as you heard, the argument rests largely on the Mahalia case, the one case
02:44 - 30.093 they have been able to find in which the date requirement
02:44 - 33.196 of the handwritten date, rather, was used in connection with voter fraud.
02:44 - 36.533 I want to address why Mahalia doesn't provide as much support
02:44 - 40.203 as appellants submit, but but our fundamental submission
02:44 - 43.506 is that a single case
02:44 - 46.476 across the entire Commonwealth and through all the years
02:44 - 49.479 in which the date requirement has been on the ballot, on the books
02:44 - 53.183 and force a single case in which the handwritten date played
02:44 - 56.553 some role in furthering the state's interest in preventing voting fraud
02:44 - 00.924 is not remotely sufficient to justify disqualifying
02:45 - 04.728 thousands of ballots, denying thousands of Pennsylvanians in every election
02:45 - 08.298 their article one Fundamental right to vote, and that the can.
02:45 - 10.901 The in court made the same point two weeks ago.
02:45 - 13.970 Commonwealth court has made it previous in Burke County decision,
02:45 - 16.873 and even made the further point that it is particularly true.
02:45 - 20.610 What I just said, given that even if this court were to affirm
02:45 - 23.580 and I alluded to this point earlier, even if this court to affirm or to agree
02:45 - 26.283 with us, whatever role the date requirement,
02:45 - 29.619 the handwritten date plays in furthering combating voting fraud
02:45 - 33.657 and the other interests we've discussed, it could continue to play that role.
02:45 - 34.224 Now, let me that
02:45 - 38.395 gets into why I submit the Mahalia case does not provide as much support.
02:45 - 40.563 So let me give the details there.
02:45 - 42.933 Appellants agree in their reply brief. Mr.
02:45 - 46.403 Gore said it again this morning that even in that one case,
02:45 - 50.674 the handwritten handwritten date did not play a role
02:45 - 54.210 in preventing the ballot in question from being counted.
02:45 - 57.847 So, it is conceded, never been the case.
02:45 - 59.883 Or at least no one has found a case
02:45 - 02.852 that the date requirement has actually prevented.
02:46 - 06.790 Anyone from affecting the outcome of an election
02:46 - 09.793 or even the count of an election.
02:46 - 12.963 And that goes to my fundamental point that I made just a minute ago, about one case
02:46 - 16.399 not being enough to disenfranchize thousands of voters every election.
02:46 - 18.969 It's also consistent with the,
02:46 - 21.771 representations of the boards of elections in the federal cases
02:46 - 24.474 and of the Philadelphia County Board of Elections here, that it doesn't
02:46 - 28.411 use the date requirement to detect, prevent, etc., voter fraud. Now,
02:46 - 30.146 they made the point
02:46 - 33.717 in the one case in Byhalia it was used to prosecute the defendant.
02:46 - 36.953 And they say at the bottom of page 21 of their reply brief, appellant's
02:46 - 37.821 reply brief. And Mr.
02:46 - 41.057 Gore said it again this morning that in Mahalia act, the handwritten date
02:46 - 44.060 was the only evidence of voter fraud.
02:46 - 45.929 Okay, that is not correct.
02:46 - 48.098 What they call the charging document and they reply brief.
02:46 - 51.868 It's the affidavit of probable cause and it's page are 220
02:46 - 54.904 in the reproduced appendix in the affidavit.
02:46 - 00.210 The detective, in fact, points to five other pieces of evidence of voter fraud.
02:47 - 01.344 So the the,
02:47 - 06.182 the ballot arrived, the ballot of the deceased voter.
02:47 - 09.185 So the voter whose ballot was miscast,
02:47 - 13.023 that their ballot arrived two weeks after the voter had died.
02:47 - 15.492 So that gap in time is number one.
02:47 - 20.897 The ballot was received on the same day as, the defendant's ballot.
02:47 - 23.833 So that coincidence also noted in the affidavit of probable cause,
02:47 - 27.637 the defendant requested the ballot for the other voter who was her mother.
02:47 - 29.372 That's number three.
02:47 - 33.176 The two ballots, the defendants and the mothers were requested on the same day.
02:47 - 36.780 Number four, this is all on R 220, all in the affidavit of probable cause.
02:47 - 40.083 And number five, also on our 220, the defendant confessed.
02:47 - 45.121 So at most what we have is a single case across the Commonwealth, across the years
02:47 - 48.391 in which the handwritten date was at best, one of six pieces of evidence
02:47 - 50.827 that could have been used to prosecute the defendant.
02:47 - 53.063 Again, that is simply insufficient
02:47 - 56.633 to justify denying people their article one fundamental
02:47 - 59.002 right to vote, particularly given that it could still do that.
02:47 - 00.804 As I said earlier,
02:48 - 04.074 if this court were to affirm, people would still have to write down
02:48 - 05.775 the handwritten date as a matter of statute.
02:48 - 09.245 Under ball, and I submit they would continue to do so.
02:48 - 11.281 And it's not just my submission
02:48 - 14.250 in the Bonner case that we cited from the Commonwealth Court.
02:48 - 18.421 Commonwealth court noted that after migliori had invalidated
02:48 - 20.657 the requirement temporarily, as it turned out,
02:48 - 23.993 and after the Commonwealth Court itself had invalidated the date requirement
02:48 - 26.596 in Berks County temporarily.
02:48 - 29.232 As it turned out, Bonner said that after both of those,
02:48 - 32.235 a majority of voters continued to write down the handwritten date.
02:48 - 33.770 And I submit that makes perfect sense
02:48 - 38.074 because it is still going to say on the envelope required date and
02:48 - 39.843 perhaps they should.
02:48 - 41.010 But people may not keep up
02:48 - 44.013 with all of the constitutional decisions of this court may not understand
02:48 - 45.682 everything that this court has said.
02:48 - 47.584 What they will understand is what they see in front of them
02:48 - 50.753 on the mail ballot date required, but it's not required.
02:48 - 54.190 If you win, it would be required as a statutory matter.
02:48 - 57.961 What would not be permitted would be not to count their ballots.
02:48 - 59.729 So it may be something of an existential debate.
02:48 - 01.998 Is something required if there is no consequence. Right.
02:49 - 03.566 But it's meaningful here
02:49 - 05.568 because what we know is the question would be,
02:49 - 06.769 I mean, this part of my argument
02:49 - 08.905 is that the date requirement would continue
02:49 - 11.908 to serve its purpose, to whatever extent it does serve those purposes.
02:49 - 14.210 That's not even an essential part of my argument,
02:49 - 17.780 but that part of the argument, the existential difference does matter
02:49 - 20.583 because people will still see required.
02:49 - 22.752 I doubt very much that the Secretary of State
02:49 - 26.523 will start to write required, except under Baxter, your ballot.
02:49 - 30.527 Arguably it's a it's I mean arguably it's a misrepresentation of question
02:49 - 32.462 of whether it's required if you're notifying voters
02:49 - 34.831 that something is required when something isn't.
02:49 - 36.166 I don't think the fact that this goes back
02:49 - 39.669 to discussion, Chief Justice Todd was having several hours ago with Mr.
02:49 - 40.203 Gore.
02:49 - 43.173 But I don't think the fact that there's not a particular consequence
02:49 - 45.909 permissible means the requirement does not exist.
02:49 - 47.977 The language would still be in the election code,
02:49 - 51.781 and it would still, as a matter of statute under ball versus Chapman, be required.
02:49 - 55.285 It is true that the particular consequence could not be enforced.
02:49 - 57.153 Could the legislature put other consequences in?
02:49 - 00.423 Could it say if you don't date it next time you have to vote in person?
02:50 - 02.425 You know, I don't know. Those are all sorts of hypotheticals.
02:50 - 06.896 You agree that something's either required or not required to to use Mr.
02:50 - 09.399 Lowndes term, isn't that binary?
02:50 - 13.069 Either something is required or it's not required.
02:50 - 15.605 Are you going to try to back into the whole directory thing?
02:50 - 18.208 No, I'm certainly not going to do that with you. Justice work.
02:50 - 21.377 But I am going to agree that something is either required or not required.
02:50 - 25.682 But that is a different question from whether particular consequences
02:50 - 29.852 are permissible, whether there's a penalty to violating the requirement.
02:50 - 30.720 Exactly.
02:50 - 32.889 The question is just is the question here?
02:50 - 35.525 Certainly that is the entire way we have framed the case
02:50 - 39.429 is, is the particular consequence permissible in our submission?
02:50 - 40.496 Is the answer is no.
02:50 - 43.266 I want to touch very quickly unless there are further questions on fraud.
02:50 - 45.068 Oh, just one just one thing on that.
02:50 - 48.004 Would you agree that,
02:50 - 51.808 I mean, speaking of solemnity, would you, would you agree that at some point,
02:50 - 55.912 approaching something that is required by law as,
02:50 - 00.750 inconsequential, makes a mockery of the law?
02:51 - 06.623 I'm sorry, justice, could I ask you to, with apologies, could I ask you to repeat
02:51 - 10.126 if we're all required to obey the crosswalk sign?
02:51 - 15.265 But we all blow it off, and there are no consequences for anybody.
02:51 - 18.468 Eventually, it becomes a mockery. Right?
02:51 - 20.169 I don't know if that's true or not.
02:51 - 21.271 Justice work, but I would say
02:51 - 25.541 that is not the solemnity argument that appellants have put forward.
02:51 - 26.943 I mean, the solemnity argument,
02:51 - 31.714 of course, that they are putting forward, is that writing down the date now, it's
02:51 - 35.885 just a month in a year makes people take the act of voting more seriously.
02:51 - 38.921 Now, there is no case that has embraced that argument.
02:51 - 40.590 The Fifth Circuit case that they point to was,
02:51 - 42.225 number one about a signature requirement.
02:51 - 46.029 Number two didn't even endorse solemnity in its federal constitution.
02:51 - 49.432 That celebrity for a moment happy to forget some people talk and,
02:51 - 52.602 do you have a problem?
02:51 - 57.373 Do you have any do you see any problem, that we should note as the Supreme Court
02:51 - 02.345 of Pennsylvania with, some ruling which would,
02:52 - 06.215 tell people, that,
02:52 - 09.285 something is required, but but,
02:52 - 12.288 you know, it's not really required.
02:52 - 15.958 I would not urged the court to rule in those terms.
02:52 - 19.729 And those are certainly not the terms that we are presenting this case.
02:52 - 21.731 What we are saying is the court
02:52 - 25.301 could, should say we have previously held that it is required
02:52 - 27.370 as a statutory matter under the election code.
02:52 - 31.741 And that remains true, however, disqualifying a ballot for failure
02:52 - 34.911 to comply with that requirement is not a permissible consequence
02:52 - 37.814 because it violates the Free and Equal Elections clause.
02:52 - 41.250 That's basically a constitutional invalidation.
02:52 - 44.120 I, I, I would think that it would be,
02:52 - 45.855 it would be
02:52 - 49.792 less absurd to just strike it as unconstitutional rather
02:52 - 53.963 than to say it's required, but, never mind.
02:52 - 57.066 So that, I want to stick to
02:52 - 01.237 I want to stay with the arguments that we have presented to this court.
02:53 - 04.440 We have not presented to this court the argument that the date requirement
02:53 - 06.142 itself is invalid.
02:53 - 09.912 And this court, it's brought up only the question of whether
02:53 - 13.383 enforcing the date requirement violates the free and equal elections clause.
02:53 - 15.084 Our answer is no.
02:53 - 17.353 And again, it goes back to the somewhat existential
02:53 - 19.622 what I call the existential debate or difference
02:53 - 23.126 that I was discussing with Justice Robson about can something be required
02:53 - 24.293 if there's no consequence for it?
02:53 - 27.930 Again, in theory, the legislature could impose other consequences.
02:53 - 32.468 To me, it is not correct to say that it is not required at all,
02:53 - 35.805 because one particular consequence that the legislature has put in place,
02:53 - 39.041 even if for now, that is the only consequence,
02:53 - 41.544 cannot be enforced because of constitutional justice.
02:53 - 42.445 One follow up on that.
02:53 - 45.848 You're saying then that if I, if I take your point that the General
02:53 - 49.619 Assembly could impose consequences,
02:53 - 53.022 including something of a penalty nature.
02:53 - 59.462 For failing to comply with the statutory requirement.
02:53 - 02.932 But, the one thing they can't do
02:54 - 06.736 by reason of the free and equal elections clause is not count the vote.
02:54 - 08.404 Correct.
02:54 - 10.239 Now, other penalties that the legislature
02:54 - 13.476 might put in place would, in theory, be subject to constitutional challenge.
02:54 - 14.310 I don't know what they are.
02:54 - 17.046 So I'm not in a yeah I don't know what they are either.
02:54 - 22.118 Well you argue in in the alternative
02:54 - 28.024 asking us to overrule our prior case law, holding this to be mandatory.
02:54 - 31.194 So Chief Justice Todd, the Pennsylvania Democratic Party
02:54 - 35.131 included that in its request that this court take up the case.
02:54 - 36.599 This court declined to take that up.
02:54 - 40.436 There was a dissent from that part of it by two justices.
02:54 - 42.472 Obviously, it will not surprise anyone to here.
02:54 - 43.973 We agree the court should have taken up
02:54 - 45.341 the question that we put in front of the court.
02:54 - 49.679 But no, we are not given the questions of two limited questions
02:54 - 51.681 on which this court for review.
02:54 - 55.017 That is our understanding of how this court has brought the case to it
02:54 - 55.685 for decision.
02:54 - 57.720 Another way, the court has brought the case to it
02:54 - 00.790 for decision was after rejecting appellant's request
02:55 - 04.961 to reverse solely on the ground that factual development had not been required.
02:55 - 08.965 So back to the earlier we about what the record shows and doesn't show.
02:55 - 12.301 Our understanding is that this court has brought it the case to itself
02:55 - 15.271 based on the record that exists and again, to the extent
02:55 - 17.807 the court deems it appropriate to look beyond the case
02:55 - 21.177 to in light of the two federal cases, unless there are further questions,
02:55 - 24.213 I would turn very quickly to my second overarching issue,
02:55 - 27.850 which is this point about whether the court has already decided,
02:55 - 31.287 rejected our constitutional challenge in either
02:55 - 34.423 Pennsylvania Democratic Party versus Boockvar or Ball versus Chapman.
02:55 - 37.293 Our answer, of course, is no. The appellants have cited
02:55 - 40.129 no case suggesting that either either case ever did.
02:55 - 41.364 So either case did.
02:55 - 47.103 So the case which was, actually the the attorney general's petition
02:55 - 50.940 for rehearing to the Third Circuit yesterday quoted the language from Gensler
02:55 - 56.078 that rejected a similar overreaching of PDP, by appellants.
02:55 - 59.081 And it's very difficult to understand,
02:55 - 03.252 given that no one in PDP made the argument that we are making here, Mr.
02:56 - 04.887 Gore suggested it's the same argument.
02:56 - 06.322 It is not the same argument.
02:56 - 09.258 The argument that was made in PDP was that the government has to affirmatively help
02:56 - 13.029 you comply with the date requirement, not that the date requirement is invalid.
02:56 - 14.564 There is a meaningful difference.
02:56 - 16.866 If relief have been given in PDP,
02:56 - 19.135 people's ballots could have still not been counted
02:56 - 21.103 for failing to comply with the date requirement
02:56 - 23.205 if they were given notice and an opportunity to cure
02:56 - 24.540 and didn't take advantage of it.
02:56 - 26.676 So Mr. Gore said, we're seeking the same relief here.
02:56 - 27.577 We are not.
02:56 - 30.212 No case is held that either PDP or ball
02:56 - 32.381 previously rejected our constitutional challenge.
02:56 - 35.384 Asked this court to affirm, okay, thank you very much, Mr..
02:56 - 36.786 Baldrick. Let's hear from,
02:56 - 40.923 Mr. Fab INS Larsen.
02:56 - 48.898 Good afternoon, Your Honor.
02:56 - 51.834 It may please the court. Please.
02:56 - 54.337 Good afternoon, Your Honor, and may it please the court.
02:56 - 57.006 I'm Ben Fabian's last lasting here on behalf of the Philadelphia
02:56 - 00.443 County Board of Elections, which is the only election administrator
02:57 - 01.644 that's a party to this case.
02:57 - 04.113 You're going to have to pull the mic up further, please. Thank you.
02:57 - 05.581 It's better if you speak into the mic.
02:57 - 05.848 Thank you.
02:57 - 07.550 Chief Justice Todd,
02:57 - 12.188 the Philadelphia County Board is the only election administrator in this case.
02:57 - 15.992 The board does not rely on the handwritten date
02:57 - 19.095 on a mail ballot declaration period.
02:57 - 22.398 It does not and cannot use the date
02:57 - 25.334 for purposes of verifying the voters eligibility,
02:57 - 29.538 assessing the timeliness of a ballot, or detecting fraud in the electoral process.
02:57 - 32.608 And that's because the date on a declaration
02:57 - 35.978 simply reflects the date on which the declaration was signed.
02:57 - 38.014 That date
02:57 - 41.984 is not relevant to the question of timeliness or eligibility.
02:57 - 47.189 Eligibility is determined before a voter ever receives a mail ballot,
02:57 - 51.794 and timeliness is based on when the board receives the ballot,
02:57 - 55.064 not when it's filled out by the voter.
02:57 - 58.634 Instead of using the date on a declaration,
02:57 - 03.272 the board relies on time stamping of mail ballots
02:58 - 07.443 and separation of untimely ballots from timely ballots
02:58 - 10.646 to ensure that only timely ballots are counted.
02:58 - 13.783 Even though the completion date of a ballot
02:58 - 18.254 declaration is not relevant to the process, the board can know
02:58 - 22.091 with certainty that all ballots received by 8 p.m.
02:58 - 26.295 on Election Day have been completed during the proper time frame.
02:58 - 28.330 Council. I'm.
02:58 - 32.401 I'm curious, though, why is there any dispute in this case
02:58 - 34.570 that the the Board of election doesn't use the date
02:58 - 37.740 on the verification?
02:58 - 39.575 I, I don't think so, Your Honor.
02:58 - 43.279 Although there does seem to be a view that it serves some functional purpose.
02:58 - 44.747 Different question.
02:58 - 45.915 I mean, I think I,
02:58 - 49.885 I don't think anybody's arguing that the board does anything with the day.
02:58 - 51.320 The question is
02:58 - 55.057 whether the General Assembly intended that the date serve some purpose.
02:58 - 58.260 Now, that purpose could exclude any use by the board.
02:58 - 00.229 That's certainly true, Your Honor.
02:59 - 03.933 And our position is that the board does not use it for any purpose,
02:59 - 06.802 the governmental interest. I'm not sure it's in dispute.
02:59 - 09.672 It may not be in your dispute, your honor, but I do think it's an important
02:59 - 11.941 factual component of this case,
02:59 - 15.044 and it's important for the court to understand insofar as it affects
02:59 - 18.714 the government's interest analysis and even the severability argument,
02:59 - 22.885 insofar as that's important, to also don't use the signature for anything right.
02:59 - 26.088 You don't have a signature expert, right?
02:59 - 27.323 We we do not, Your Honor.
02:59 - 30.326 So you you use the,
02:59 - 32.828 you use the secrecy envelope for anything?
02:59 - 34.830 Well, Your Honor,
02:59 - 38.100 the board complies with the election code, so it does.
02:59 - 40.503 Do you just open.
02:59 - 43.372 We open it, and we ensure that the secrecy code is not or.
02:59 - 45.508 Sorry, the secrecy envelope has not been marked
02:59 - 48.778 and has, you know, any of the things that are required in the election code
02:59 - 51.781 as part of the canvasing process?
02:59 - 55.484 If if a ballot doesn't have a signature,
02:59 - 58.487 if verification doesn't have a signature at all, what do you do
02:59 - 02.191 if the ballot declaration did not have a signature?
03:00 - 03.959 We will set that aside and not count it.
03:00 - 06.328 And that's consistent with the law.
03:00 - 09.732 And that ties back to a broader point of this case that the the
03:00 - 12.868 the board's interest here is complying
03:00 - 16.005 with the law and understanding the certainty of its obligations.
03:00 - 19.408 Isn't it also consistent with the very same law and the very same provision
03:00 - 22.411 that if it's missing a date, you should set it aside?
03:00 - 23.345 That's correct, Your Honor.
03:00 - 25.981 So we do set it aside for a lack of a signature,
03:00 - 29.018 but you won't set it aside and you don't want to set it aside for lack of a date.
03:00 - 30.119 You just don't use it.
03:00 - 31.187 You don't use the signature.
03:00 - 33.989 You know, you date. But I will follow the law.
03:00 - 38.661 Set aside something like the signature will be what I was talking about.
03:00 - 42.665 I would respectfully push back on the idea that the board does or doesn't
03:00 - 46.001 want to do anything in this case, with the board wants to do is comply
03:00 - 49.004 with its statutory and constitutional obligations here.
03:00 - 52.608 And so with respect to the signature, with respect to the date,
03:00 - 56.312 if this court orders as a constitutional or statutory
03:00 - 59.515 matter for us to count those ballots, we're not looking count those ballots.
03:01 - 01.550 That's what we're going to do.
03:01 - 04.153 The point is that on the constitutional question,
03:01 - 06.722 both the state and federal constitutional question,
03:01 - 09.959 there has been a tremendous amount of uncertainty and change in law
03:01 - 11.927 over the course of the last four years.
03:01 - 16.198 And so I don't mean to be disrespectful to push back on the premise,
03:01 - 20.736 but it's not that we are asking this court not to enforce the date requirement
03:01 - 22.304 or to impose a particular remedy.
03:01 - 25.474 There's a reason we didn't take a position on the constitutional question,
03:01 - 27.843 balancing the governmental interests
03:01 - 31.413 and understanding how to take the fundamental vote
03:01 - 35.384 right to vote, and the inherent necessity in voting regulations,
03:01 - 38.454 and how those interplay in the context of the Constitution
03:01 - 40.890 is a challenging question that's left for this court.
03:01 - 44.460 We will comply with the court's guidance on those questions.
03:01 - 47.363 The point here is that we think that it is important
03:01 - 51.367 for the court to understand, however, that from a functional matter,
03:01 - 55.471 the state serves no purpose and it imposes significant
03:01 - 59.341 administrative burdens on the board to comply with or serve any purpose.
03:01 - 03.913 The signature does serve as an attestation of whether the voter
03:02 - 07.149 is qualified to vote, and whether they've kindly voted or sorry,
03:02 - 09.818 whether they previously voted in the election.
03:02 - 13.022 So by signing that, they're verifying that the person who signed it
03:02 - 15.991 is the person to whom the ballot was set.
03:02 - 16.492 Well.
03:02 - 20.462 So we do make sure that there is a signature on each of the ballots.
03:02 - 22.798 So so it does serve that functional purpose.
03:02 - 25.801 Once you know there is a signature on the ballot, you know, the
03:02 - 29.271 the voter has declared
03:02 - 32.875 that they are, you know, somewhat somewhat different.
03:02 - 35.077 You don't know if the voter will break.
03:02 - 37.980 And that's the the challenge with respect to all of this, your Honor.
03:02 - 42.651 For example, with respect to the dates, the board has no way of verifying
03:02 - 46.622 whether the date that's listed on a declaration is actually the date
03:02 - 48.390 on which it was completed.
03:02 - 51.160 It's part of why it doesn't have a third point.
03:02 - 53.429 I think from a factual perspective, your point makes sense.
03:02 - 56.131 You don't use the date, you don't use the signature.
03:02 - 57.299 I think that's true, Your Honor.
03:02 - 00.602 And insofar as it is part of the constitutional analysis,
03:03 - 03.872 we do think that is a important perspective for this board to understand.
03:03 - 07.176 Again, we don't take a position on how you balance that interest.
03:03 - 11.947 But certainly the fact that the board has set aside thousands of votes
03:03 - 15.417 based on a requirement of this court,
03:03 - 20.055 that we don't use for any functional, administrative or security purpose
03:03 - 21.991 is something that the board has
03:03 - 25.194 an interest in understanding, whether that is constitutional
03:03 - 27.730 and consistent with its constitutional obligations.
03:03 - 28.564 And then
03:03 - 32.101 we should focus not only on
03:03 - 35.604 burdens on the voter, but burdens on the Philadelphia Board of elections.
03:03 - 36.972 No, Your Honor,
03:03 - 39.241 we don't believe that that's part of the Constitution for analysis,
03:03 - 41.910 or at least we don't understand the parties who are taking a position
03:03 - 44.246 on that constitutional claim to be doing that.
03:03 - 47.816 And again, regardless of how this court rules,
03:03 - 51.153 we will comply with the election code full stop.
03:03 - 54.423 But we do think it is helpful for this court to understand
03:03 - 57.926 that the process, particularly in a county like Philadelphia
03:03 - 00.929 that receives hundreds of thousands of mail ballots,
03:04 - 04.666 is at times an onerous one of reviewing manually each ballot
03:04 - 07.803 to check a correct handwritten date on it, and again,
03:04 - 10.839 whether that has any bearing on the constitutional analysis
03:04 - 13.108 is for this court, in this court alone, to decide.
03:04 - 16.345 But we say that you don't want our job and we don't want yours.
03:04 - 18.480 I think that's fair to say.
03:04 - 24.019 Very fair to say, but but it is a it is a process of manually reviewing.
03:04 - 27.556 And so since ball was decided after ball was decided, at least up
03:04 - 30.692 until the injunction was issued in March of this year,
03:04 - 34.496 the board has implemented procedures to manually review
03:04 - 37.699 every ballot and ensure they have the correct handwritten date.
03:04 - 43.806 That is a time consuming process, but it is one where when we see an undated
03:04 - 46.809 ballot declaration or one that doesn't have the correct date,
03:04 - 49.945 we set that aside and deem it insufficient.
03:04 - 52.948 Under section 3140 6.8 of the code.
03:04 - 56.251 That is law under at least until
03:04 - 59.521 you can declared that that was a federal constitutional problem.
03:04 - 02.858 That's what we did, and that's what we will continue to do if the law changes.
03:05 - 07.162 I do want to point out, two things about,
03:05 - 11.033 oh, do you want to come back to the point that as a purely
03:05 - 16.271 factual matter that stems from the code, the board can be certain
03:05 - 19.374 that even undated ballots were completed
03:05 - 23.445 during the proper time period under the election code.
03:05 - 27.382 The board knows when it sends every ballot out to voters,
03:05 - 30.752 and it knows when it receives each ballot from voters.
03:05 - 34.656 Those are essentially the bookends of the mail voting process.
03:05 - 38.594 And so regardless of whether a ballot is in fact dated,
03:05 - 43.999 it's not possible for a timely ballot that comes in for 8 p.m.
03:05 - 47.903 on Election Day to have been filled out outside of that time frame,
03:05 - 51.840 I do want to briefly turn to two points that came up earlier
03:05 - 56.078 to Chief Justice Todd's point about stamping in the sure system there.
03:05 - 57.246 Certainly correct.
03:05 - 58.780 But I do want to flag one other part
03:05 - 01.783 that sometimes gets lost in the briefing and discussion on this issue,
03:06 - 06.355 and that's separation of timely and untimely ballots.
03:06 - 09.458 That is a part of our process that is, in some ways,
03:06 - 14.796 the best way of ensuring that no untimely ballot gets inadvertently counted.
03:06 - 18.500 We ensure that all of them are segregated.
03:06 - 21.069 Any ballot that comes in after 8 p.m.
03:06 - 25.040 is separated from those that are otherwise.
03:06 - 27.643 And we lock all the lock boxes at 8 p.m..
03:06 - 31.113 And so part of why that that's relevant is to understand the process.
03:06 - 32.881 But it also goes back to my friend
03:06 - 35.884 from the attorney General's office backdating point.
03:06 - 40.822 What's interesting is the share system actually is the backstop.
03:06 - 44.493 We're framing this as if the sure system fails the date is the backstop.
03:06 - 49.164 No, the share system is the backstop for what is an actual separate process
03:06 - 53.101 of stamping and segregating all ballots.
03:06 - 56.939 And if the system were to fail.
03:06 - 00.776 We would still do what we're doing.
03:07 - 02.377 We would be able to
03:07 - 06.315 look at whether the stamp reflects the timely ballot was received.
03:07 - 09.218 We could look at the barcode to match the date.
03:07 - 11.520 I would show the voters name.
03:07 - 12.721 And the barcode at least,
03:07 - 15.691 is based on information that gets uploaded to the share system.
03:07 - 20.462 And then what we couldn't do is look at the date on the handwritten ballot
03:07 - 24.166 or the declaration, and make any determination of timeliness.
03:07 - 28.637 The election code simply does not allow the board to use the date
03:07 - 32.174 a ballot was completed as a proxy for when it was received.
03:07 - 35.844 So in that unlikely instance of a sure system failure,
03:07 - 39.548 there simply is no way that the date would be used.
03:07 - 40.682 We would still use
03:07 - 44.686 what we always use in the first instance segregation and time stamping.
03:07 - 45.754 And I think that
03:07 - 49.324 kind of ties back to the metaphor that was used about Belton suspenders.
03:07 - 52.728 The idea is that the Belton suspenders would hold up the pants,
03:07 - 55.597 but the handwritten date doesn't do that.
03:07 - 57.633 In some ways, it's more like this tie.
03:07 - 00.902 It has no functional purpose, and it serves no purpose
03:08 - 02.204 in holding up my pants at all.
03:08 - 04.106 It does nothing.
03:08 - 06.541 And so I don't think the concern
03:08 - 10.879 about backstops or double voting, all of that comes back
03:08 - 14.082 to the fact that when you look at a date on a mail ballot,
03:08 - 18.720 it simply is the date that a voter represented when they completed that.
03:08 - 23.091 And there was really no factual scenario in which that date is
03:08 - 26.094 used or serves any purpose in the election code
03:08 - 31.099 used for a certain purpose or understood.
03:08 - 33.101 And I understand that there's a separate question of whether
03:08 - 36.838 the legislature wants to use that or has some other interest.
03:08 - 40.208 I do think that there's the arguments that
03:08 - 44.413 if it's not being used by the actual administrators of the election code,
03:08 - 48.450 that it's not fulfilling any other governmental interest
03:08 - 50.352 is a question for this court to decide.
03:08 - 54.523 But as a factual and procedural matter, in terms of how we comply
03:08 - 58.694 with the election code, it certainly does not include any aspect of that.
03:09 - 03.632 And so I do want to come back to the fact that from our perspective
03:09 - 05.167 and from the board's perspective,
03:09 - 08.637 at least based on the record in other cases, from all county boards perspective,
03:09 - 13.975 the date on a ballot declaration does not serve any purpose,
03:09 - 18.213 and it doesn't solve any hypothetical or actual problem.
03:09 - 20.982 In Pennsylvania's mail voting system.
03:09 - 24.553 That system has worked with resounding success since act 77.
03:09 - 26.621 Work. It works very well.
03:09 - 28.123 It's secure system.
03:09 - 31.259 It's an effective system, and it's one that's been carried out with
03:09 - 34.262 integrity and has led to accurate vote tallies.
03:09 - 37.933 Since act 77 was enacted, the board has worked in good faith
03:09 - 41.837 to implement those process to ensure that universal
03:09 - 45.307 mail ballots are available to hundreds of thousands of Philadelphians,
03:09 - 49.111 and to carry out the election code and elections with integrity.
03:09 - 50.946 What I'd say is that
03:09 - 55.050 although we believe that enforcing that date requirement
03:09 - 58.353 creates burdens on that process,
03:09 - 01.223 we will certainly continue to carry out
03:10 - 05.494 our statutory obligations in good faith, no matter how this court rules.
03:10 - 06.862 In this case.
03:10 - 10.599 But we would respectfully urge this court to resolve this case
03:10 - 13.802 in a way that protects universal mail voting in the Commonwealth.
03:10 - 15.003 Well said.
03:10 - 17.739 Thank you very much. And I would point out, Mr.
03:10 - 22.043 Fabens Larson, that in our three hour plus,
03:10 - 25.747 arguments here, you're the only counsel who made us laugh.
03:10 - 27.816 No, that's not true.
03:10 - 29.151 And yet you referred to his wife.
03:10 - 30.852 That was okay.
03:10 - 33.789 All right. That's that's quite the distinction.
03:10 - 35.524 Thank you, Chief Justice.
03:10 - 37.859 Tremendous arguments on all sides.
03:10 - 39.394 On all sides here.
03:10 - 42.330 And, sorry we didn't get to hear from Mr.
03:10 - 48.136 Levine or Attorney Gallagher, but, I want to compliment all of you.
03:10 - 50.605 You can tell your clients that,
03:10 - 54.042 you did the very best job possible and tremendous arguments.
03:10 - 55.110 And we thank you.
03:10 - 58.980 Mr. Miller, would you adjourn for lunch?
03:10 - 03.752 We will resume at, 145.
03:11 - 06.121 The court will be hearing
03:11 - 09.124 argument in the case of the Commonwealth versus Philip Shivers.
03:11 - 13.361 Mr. shivers was hanging out at a gas station in Philadelphia
03:11 - 17.666 that the police believed was a was an area of high crime activity.
03:11 - 18.700 They, in fact, believe
03:11 - 22.504 that this particular gas station was a hangout of the ozone gang.
03:11 - 25.540 So the police approached the scene.
03:11 - 26.741 They see, Mr.
03:11 - 30.312 Shivers sees the police, gets up, starts sprinting away.
03:11 - 32.481 The police chase him.
03:11 - 34.282 They pat him down.
03:11 - 37.285 They say that while he's running, he's pulling up his pants,
03:11 - 40.689 which the police say is often a sign that someone is carrying a firearm.
03:11 - 44.626 And in fact, when they pat him down in search him, they find a firearm that Mr.
03:11 - 47.629 Shivers is not, lawfully allowed to have.
03:11 - 51.533 Mr. shivers, seeks to suppress the evidence of that
03:11 - 55.270 firearm taken from him as being the product of an illegal search.
03:11 - 59.708 Now, under federal constitutional law, it's clear
03:12 - 04.179 that being in a high crime area is something that
03:12 - 07.816 that can qualify for providing reasonable suspicion
03:12 - 12.354 for the police officers to perform, you know, to perform this kind of risk.
03:12 - 17.058 You know, if if you sprint away like that, the argument that Mr.
03:12 - 19.961 Shivers is making is that the Pennsylvania Constitution,
03:12 - 20.795 which is separate
03:12 - 24.232 from the federal Constitution and often provides more robust protections
03:12 - 27.903 for, individual liberty and personal privacy,
03:12 - 32.474 that that under the Pennsylvania Constitution, it shouldn't be enough
03:12 - 37.546 to merely be in a high crime area to cause reasonable suspicion when you run.
03:12 - 40.715 One of the arguments that he makes is essentially
03:12 - 44.252 that the quality of your Fourth Amendment rights, the quality of an individual's
03:12 - 45.020 rights to be free
03:12 - 49.157 from unlawful searches and seizures, shouldn't depend on where you live.
03:12 - 51.026 It shouldn't depend on,
03:12 - 54.796 you know, living a, you know, in areas that that crimes occur.
03:12 - 58.166 That that has nothing to do with you and your personal rights.
03:12 - 01.469 So as happens with many of the cases before the court,
03:13 - 04.673 we know that the federal Constitution sets a floor for something.
03:13 - 07.776 But the question here is going to be whether the Pennsylvania Constitution
03:13 - 12.113 grants even more expanded individual rights to the defendant in this case.
03:13 - 14.082 Good afternoon.
03:13 - 15.016 Good afternoon.
03:13 - 15.550 Well, please.
03:13 - 17.852 The court, Leonard Song, is not for Mr.
03:13 - 19.120 Shivers.
03:13 - 22.357 So this argument, like the one this morning,
03:13 - 27.228 also involves a fundamental right under article one, under the Pennsylvania
03:13 - 30.432 does not have to take 3.5 hours like the one this morning.
03:13 - 33.101 I was going to say that's the first distinction.
03:13 - 35.337 There's
03:13 - 39.074 there are there are two more that I think actually have some importance.
03:13 - 42.544 As I sat there listening for three hours,
03:13 - 46.615 one was there is no statute here.
03:13 - 49.784 There's no deference of any kind.
03:13 - 52.787 There's no presumption of constitutionality.
03:13 - 55.957 So no separation of powers concerns.
03:13 - 59.060 This is just involves a core function of this court
03:13 - 02.197 interpreting article one, section eight of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
03:14 - 05.667 The other important distinction I heard over and over again this morning,
03:14 - 07.535 putting the date on the envelope.
03:14 - 09.904 That requirement is neutral.
03:14 - 13.408 Nondiscriminatory
03:14 - 16.411 doesn't hurt any subsection of society.
03:14 - 19.414 This case is the polar opposite.
03:14 - 21.716 The issue here is whether article
03:14 - 26.554 one, section eight, permits people to have less rights
03:14 - 29.524 than other people based solely on where they live.
03:14 - 32.394 Because this case,
03:14 - 36.831 this court, recognized way before the United States Supreme Court
03:14 - 41.169 that flight is not enough to to
03:14 - 44.406 establish reasonable suspicion
03:14 - 48.376 falls far short by itself because there's so many innocent explanations.
03:14 - 51.379 This court did it in 1973, and Jeffrey's
03:14 - 54.282 1979, and Barak
03:14 - 57.385 nine state Supreme Court didn't get to this issue until 2000.
03:14 - 00.555 In the Wardlow case, the Wardlow case
03:15 - 04.693 came to the same conclusion as this court that Jeffreys and Barrett,
03:15 - 09.230 that Barnett that flight
03:15 - 14.736 and a high crime area not knowing that fight night flight in general
03:15 - 19.374 is susceptible of so many possible innocent explanations.
03:15 - 22.143 It doesn't it doesn't establish reasonable suspicion.
03:15 - 25.380 It means if you live in a low crime area,
03:15 - 29.184 you live in a middle crime area, you live in a middle high crime area.
03:15 - 33.488 You can run away from the police and they cannot stop you.
03:15 - 35.390 They can't talk to you like Mr. Shivers.
03:15 - 37.459 They can't stop you at all.
03:15 - 41.629 Except they carved out a constitutional exception under the Fourth Amendment.
03:15 - 44.132 People that are in high crime areas.
03:15 - 46.568 Oh, that's reasonable suspicion.
03:15 - 49.571 And there are a couple things
03:15 - 52.307 before I get to general problems with high crime.
03:15 - 54.242 There are a couple of things about
03:15 - 57.946 the United States Supreme Court relying on high crime area
03:15 - 02.083 in this context, with flight that are unique and different,
03:16 - 06.121 and the other cases where high crime area is involved.
03:16 - 10.925 So sometimes courts consider a high crime area as a factor among many
03:16 - 12.660 here.
03:16 - 17.766 Only in this context where the person who lives where he flees
03:16 - 21.569 is defining all defining as to the rights,
03:16 - 25.206 if not in a high crime area.
03:16 - 26.508 No reasonable suspicion.
03:16 - 28.409 Police can't do anything.
03:16 - 31.412 If you are in a high crime area per se,
03:16 - 34.048 per se, it is reasonable suspicion
03:16 - 37.051 and you can stop somebody so that that's unique.
03:16 - 39.821 And it is. If they see my opponent argue.
03:16 - 42.824 So to tell you the circumstances, there is no totality.
03:16 - 44.859 It's high crime area.
03:16 - 45.894 It's all defining.
03:16 - 49.497 In fact, the judge a couple of years ago, a lower court judge
03:16 - 54.269 hearing testimony from the officer who stopped the individual
03:16 - 59.974 said, okay, I heard he ran away a high crime area.
03:17 - 03.478 I didn't hear anything else was suspicious about what he did.
03:17 - 05.013 There was no radio call.
03:17 - 09.017 There was there was no report of the of a disturbance.
03:17 - 10.084 There was nothing.
03:17 - 12.253 And you didn't know who the defendant was.
03:17 - 16.024 And he granted a motion to suppress the Commonwealth's appeal in that
03:17 - 20.395 in the Barnes case, which is on page 12, in my brief in the Barnes case,
03:17 - 23.097 the Superior Court reversed.
03:17 - 25.967 This has been well established ever since Jefferson
03:17 - 28.970 and his Superior Court in 2004.
03:17 - 32.507 If there's flight in a high crime area,
03:17 - 35.376 any reasonable suspicion.
03:17 - 38.379 Judge Katz, could I ask you if
03:17 - 44.786 if you found agreement in this court about the general,
03:17 - 49.324 the fallacy of the general presumption on a high crime area?
03:17 - 53.494 How would you feel about a more narrow, observation?
03:17 - 57.532 How about a building that was known for high crime
03:17 - 01.035 or a particular gas station parking
03:18 - 04.138 lot that was known for high crime?
03:18 - 07.175 So instead of an area or community,
03:18 - 10.111 you're talking about a particular high crime location.
03:18 - 12.080 Would you have any problem with that?
03:18 - 12.747 Yes I would.
03:18 - 15.683 I think high crime areas shouldn't be considered at all. It's not
03:18 - 17.318 exactly the
03:18 - 20.321 same thing is on the street, and it's certainly different from this issue.
03:18 - 22.190 I know, but I'm trying to narrow it.
03:18 - 25.493 I'm trying to understand is there some degree
03:18 - 29.230 that we could go to that you would be comfortable with? No.
03:18 - 30.064 What about it?
03:18 - 32.567 What about the court does not have to reach that issue, though,
03:18 - 33.801 whether I'm comfortable or not.
03:18 - 38.773 The narrow question here is high crime area with flight.
03:18 - 40.275 Well, what if the court.
03:18 - 42.310 What about that violated?
03:18 - 46.681 Whether you pardon me, what I meant was how do you feel about that argument?
03:18 - 47.315 Is that a
03:18 - 52.387 do you think that's a legitimate narrowing of the high crime exception? No.
03:18 - 55.857 And I'll answer that first rather than get back to why
03:18 - 59.928 high crime area plus flight shouldn't what is not a high crime area?
03:18 - 00.561 What if, for instance,
03:19 - 02.597 Rittenhouse Square in Center City Philadelphia
03:19 - 06.301 and you see a bunch of known gang members who are a violent gang,
03:19 - 08.136 and there's a person standing with them
03:19 - 09.938 who may or may not be part of the individual,
03:19 - 12.340 he sees a uniformed police officer approach.
03:19 - 13.975 He starts backing away, and then he starts
03:19 - 16.544 running down the street, holding onto something in front of them,
03:19 - 19.447 consistent with holding a heavy object which police have seen before.
03:19 - 24.052 Is that reasonable to assume that maybe this guy has some?
03:19 - 28.656 Give the reasons why high crime areas shouldn't be at a high crime area?
03:19 - 30.458 Pardon me, I didn't say high crime area.
03:19 - 32.160 I'm not at least officer.
03:19 - 33.461 And I'm in Rittenhouse Square.
03:19 - 35.196 Not a high crime area. It's beautiful.
03:19 - 37.865 Or Chestnut Hill. How about toney Chestnut Hill? Leafy.
03:19 - 39.100 Different question though.
03:19 - 43.805 Could I get an answer to my question first about can you narrow it down?
03:19 - 46.574 I know,
03:19 - 48.609 I thought you said no.
03:19 - 50.878 Did you say no? Yes, I said no.
03:19 - 51.980 It should never be a factor.
03:19 - 54.983 But the narrowest use case
03:19 - 57.218 is flight height primary bit.
03:19 - 57.885 So I'll answer.
03:19 - 00.455 Now explain why I think it should never be a factor.
03:20 - 01.889 All right. But then I do need
03:20 - 03.458 justice.
03:20 - 04.859 McCaffrey's question.
03:20 - 07.829 There are a lot of deficiencies in considering high crime areas.
03:20 - 09.497 They're pretty serious.
03:20 - 14.002 And one is that has nothing to do with the defendant.
03:20 - 17.772 The standard is well established.
03:20 - 20.375 Pardon me. Another.
03:20 - 24.946 That was another fix which I'm going to talk about this court's decision in Hicks.
03:20 - 29.317 It has nothing to do with the individual with some other people in the past.
03:20 - 31.753 It has nothing to do with the present.
03:20 - 35.223 This defendant, if you would buy that, pardon me.
03:20 - 38.493 Whether you're talking about the community
03:20 - 41.629 or whether you're talking about a building or a street corner
03:20 - 45.033 or a gas station parking lot, you think the arguments the same
03:20 - 49.103 as far as high crime area not to be considered as a factor.
03:20 - 53.508 There might be specific things from the officer's experience, possibly
03:20 - 57.078 that could be taken to account, but not the high crime area.
03:20 - 00.848 We'd have to talk this question then, if the
03:21 - 04.952 I kind of forget what it was at this point,
03:21 - 07.989 some real suspicious conduct in Rittenhouse Square.
03:21 - 10.058 Well, if you have enough suspicious conduct,
03:21 - 11.959 it can add up to reasonable suspicion.
03:21 - 13.594 Yeah. I was thinking to the facts of this case.
03:21 - 14.996 I mean, we're talking about a high crime area,
03:21 - 20.034 but the defendant was also seen standing with a known gang members, the ozone gang,
03:21 - 22.203 police officers. Uniform approach.
03:21 - 23.771 He starts backing away,
03:21 - 25.173 and then he starts running down the street,
03:21 - 27.442 holding something in front of him like he's holding the gun.
03:21 - 30.144 The police officer sees that and chases him.
03:21 - 31.546 The facts are a little different, though.
03:21 - 34.549 In our case, the facts are
03:21 - 37.919 that he was definitely not a member of the ozone gang.
03:21 - 38.886 You didn't say that.
03:21 - 40.388 They said he didn't recognize that he wasn't.
03:21 - 42.657 One of the individuals recognized as a member of the gang.
03:21 - 44.826 Backed away, starts running down the street,
03:21 - 46.928 and he's holding on to something in front of them
03:21 - 49.864 as if he's holding onto a heavy object, not.
03:21 - 50.898 Not exactly.
03:21 - 53.034 I have to disagree about the facts.
03:21 - 55.436 So first of all, there were no facts establishing
03:21 - 57.271 that he was a member of the ozone gang.
03:21 - 00.908 In fact the opposite, because the officer saw five guys to me.
03:22 - 03.578 Let me break it down because I'm a simple guy.
03:22 - 06.681 What facts
03:22 - 09.117 do you think would prove
03:22 - 12.353 or show he is a known member of the Ozone Gang?
03:22 - 16.691 Member well, one could be that he was recognized, but
03:22 - 20.828 you can't assume that every single person, somebody sitting near
03:22 - 24.098 somebody who's a member of the gang, is a member of the gang.
03:22 - 26.567 I mean, you have a right to go where you want in your neighborhood.
03:22 - 28.402 There are gangs to testify, testified.
03:22 - 31.672 You remember gangs in the area just because you're sitting
03:22 - 36.344 near somebody, because the officer said there were five guys sitting there.
03:22 - 39.680 I recognize two of them as members of the ozone gang.
03:22 - 43.818 Mr. shivers was sitting with Mr.
03:22 - 46.487 Berry, not with those guys.
03:22 - 48.489 And he said, I don't know, Mr.
03:22 - 49.991 Shivers from anywhere.
03:22 - 52.627 I never saw him before. I don't know anything about him.
03:22 - 56.764 So you can't infer that he's a member of the Ozone gang.
03:22 - 58.499 And in fact, the lower court did not,
03:22 - 01.602 nor did the Superior Court
03:23 - 04.005 and the business about his hands in front of him.
03:23 - 07.008 I'll just say the testimony was twice
03:23 - 10.178 his hands were in front of him,
03:23 - 13.181 which, and I could not see
03:23 - 16.184 anything other than his hands were in front of.
03:23 - 19.554 And that indicates to me my experience.
03:23 - 22.657 Either he had a firearm
03:23 - 25.660 or was trying to hold up his pants.
03:23 - 28.930 A lot of young men were baggy pants, and that's his experience.
03:23 - 33.201 So he didn't say, I guess from my experience or anything else.
03:23 - 36.971 So just an the lower court
03:23 - 40.274 did not rely on that testimony at all.
03:23 - 43.411 Now is the D.A. let's back up a little bit.
03:23 - 46.581 At the end of the suppression hearing, the Da argued
03:23 - 49.650 Judge. The defense
03:23 - 53.054 counsel argued they didn't establish reasonable suspicion, but not the
03:23 - 54.989 district attorney.
03:23 - 55.957 Very short argument.
03:23 - 59.160 Judge unprovoked flight in a high crime area.
03:23 - 01.729 Reasonable suspicion.
03:24 - 04.865 The judge's ruling and in her opinion
03:24 - 08.736 said you lose
03:24 - 11.272 unprovoked flight and a high crime area number.
03:24 - 14.275 She didn't find any suspicious facts about him
03:24 - 17.311 possibly being a member of the ozone gang,
03:24 - 20.314 or possibly, you know, holding a weapon.
03:24 - 23.584 Aren't all these factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis?
03:24 - 27.154 I mean, you're trying to isolate all of these particular issues, saying
03:24 - 30.458 he could have been holding his pants up, or he could have been holding the gun,
03:24 - 32.960 he could have been a gang member, or he could have been
03:24 - 35.429 just hanging out on the corner near the gang members.
03:24 - 37.732 It may or may not have been a high crime area,
03:24 - 41.135 but I mean, aren't what we're looking at here in the law
03:24 - 42.737 a totality of circumstances
03:24 - 45.940 that leads to a reasonable conclusion of reasonable suspicion?
03:24 - 46.707 I mean,
03:24 - 48.342 you're
03:24 - 51.345 you're prominent Philadelphia defense attorney.
03:24 - 55.082 If you're driving at 52nd Market Street and you see a guy look in your direction
03:24 - 59.620 standing there and he's standing with a bunch of your former clients
03:24 - 03.791 who were gang members, is it reasonable to assume maybe he's a gang member?
03:25 - 05.059 Maybe. Maybe not.
03:25 - 08.996 But if you parked your car and then he started backing away
03:25 - 11.532 and started running down the street, holding on to something,
03:25 - 12.900 what would you think?
03:25 - 14.869 So if it's a high crime area, you're right.
03:25 - 18.306 You're giving a hypo where it's a high, high crime area because people say
03:25 - 21.309 the ozone gang is committing a lot of crimes in this area,
03:25 - 24.211 and he's a member of the Ozone gang.
03:25 - 26.113 Okay, well, it's a violent area.
03:25 - 27.081 It's a violent gang.
03:25 - 28.749 West Philadelphia. Right.
03:25 - 31.752 So is it completely irrelevant?
03:25 - 33.688 High crime area in that context?
03:25 - 38.292 No, but it is a minimal, relevant high crime area.
03:25 - 42.530 And this is analyzing whether that should be used by this court.
03:25 - 44.332 In general, there are.
03:25 - 49.337 Sorry.
03:25 - 52.006 Why would it even have minimal significance?
03:25 - 54.909 What's the difference if he's in Rittenhouse Square
03:25 - 57.912 with three known gang members and then he runs?
03:25 - 02.483 What does being in a high crime area had to add to that equation?
03:26 - 06.587 It has a very minimal relevance statistically.
03:26 - 10.057 In other words, if you're if you're in an area
03:26 - 11.759 where there's a whole lot of crime
03:26 - 14.762 and I'm gonna explain why statistically it's pretty meaningless.
03:26 - 19.467 But if there's ten times more in general likelihood
03:26 - 23.270 of crime in that area, statistically it's not completely irrelevant.
03:26 - 24.538 That's my only concession.
03:26 - 27.074 It's not like, why would it be irrelevant?
03:26 - 32.613 We just say it's highly relevant for patrol, for police staffing decisions,
03:26 - 36.450 for for, all manner of command,
03:26 - 39.520 priorities and decisions by the police department.
03:26 - 42.390 Certainly very important for that.
03:26 - 45.192 But for purposes of building individualized suspicion
03:26 - 48.629 in court, it's not why don't wreck it that way.
03:26 - 49.563 That's exactly.
03:26 - 51.165 Well, that's exactly my position.
03:26 - 54.201 And I think Hit is the most relevant case
03:26 - 57.905 in Hicks the Superior Court had found before.
03:26 - 00.875 If police have information that's reliable, that a person
03:27 - 03.677 may have a gun,
03:27 - 05.579 they can stop the person.
03:27 - 08.582 That was a superior court holding for a number of years.
03:27 - 12.853 This court overturned Superior Court and said there are some
03:27 - 16.524 major problems with that
03:27 - 21.295 because many people carry guns lawfully.
03:27 - 24.331 A man that
03:27 - 27.334 the incident is at Kensington and Allegheny
03:27 - 32.940 Commonwealth asked me as a trial judge to take judicial notice
03:27 - 35.976 that Kensington and Allegheny is a known
03:27 - 40.114 Philadelphia drug location.
03:27 - 41.682 Do you agree?
03:27 - 45.786 And I accept judicial notice, an uncontested fact.
03:27 - 50.424 You can take judicial notice of a fact that should not be considered
03:27 - 54.595 in your evaluation, whether there's a reasonable suspicion why you're well,
03:27 - 59.633 okay, I'm about to give two more reasons besides the fact it's not conduct.
03:27 - 03.504 So, Hicks, the main thing was that Hicks over and over again,
03:28 - 07.374 the court said the standard is individualized ever since Terry.
03:28 - 11.612 So individual let's say court comes in and they allocate,
03:28 - 13.514 a white
03:28 - 17.017 male in a Lexus, parked in Allegheny.
03:28 - 20.254 And I see an individual leaning in.
03:28 - 24.158 I'm the officer, I see an individual leaning in my car window,
03:28 - 28.062 and there's allegations of a free exchange
03:28 - 31.065 of some green object for some something,
03:28 - 33.634 and then he rolls.
03:28 - 37.037 Okay, so the difference between that and what we're dealing with here
03:28 - 41.976 and and with Hicks is that you have two instances of conduct.
03:28 - 47.281 You have the flight and you have the hand-to-hand transaction
03:28 - 51.519 with the officer from knowing the area and knowing the location
03:28 - 55.456 knows that there's a good chance that you'll.
03:28 - 56.590 Let's use that.
03:28 - 59.593 I'm a white, middle aged male
03:28 - 02.897 and you see me there.
03:29 - 08.802 The offender will put people through your body.
03:29 - 13.040 The other four or Jeff can walk around.
03:29 - 17.011 There's obviously there's needles on the ground.
03:29 - 18.579 I turn
03:29 - 22.416 around, I'm wearing a tracksuit, I see a police officer,
03:29 - 26.420 and I run up right into my Mercedes and I drive away.
03:29 - 28.956 What's your possession?
03:29 - 31.825 My position is there's no reasonable suspicion,
03:29 - 35.296 but no reasonable suspicion based upon
03:29 - 38.899 the fact it's a high crime area where it's notorious that individuals
03:29 - 42.336 out in Philadelphia, purchased drugs from drug addicts.
03:29 - 46.707 I'm not arguing, actually, we know it's slight.
03:29 - 49.710 Let's start from the starting point. Slight.
03:29 - 52.212 And it's not evidence of.
03:29 - 53.914 It's far short of at this court.
03:29 - 55.015 It's far short.
03:29 - 58.018 So you're starting with the only conduct.
03:29 - 01.622 In my case, the only conduct is far
03:30 - 04.625 short of reasonable suspicion,
03:30 - 07.494 high crime area and a situation
03:30 - 12.333 where the conduct, the only conduct is far short of reasonable suspicion,
03:30 - 16.971 high crime area cannot bolster it to the point of reasonable suspicion.
03:30 - 19.006 Hicks, if I can get back to Hicks
03:30 - 21.108 and Hicks,
03:30 - 24.745 this court said you can't make individualized determinations
03:30 - 27.748 of reasonable suspicion as the Constitution requires,
03:30 - 32.353 based on generalities, and a lot of people
03:30 - 36.724 can't have them legally with a license.
03:30 - 40.628 And therefore, at this not add up
03:30 - 44.264 to reasonable suspicion, even though
03:30 - 50.037 even though the Commonwealth's argued this was 3 a.m.
03:30 - 51.138 in a high crime area.
03:30 - 53.340 Undisputed facts 3 a.m.
03:30 - 55.209 in a high crime area.
03:30 - 57.478 This court held high crime here.
03:30 - 01.115 It doesn't matter if you think that one instance of conduct
03:31 - 06.553 like flight high crime area can't bolster it to a reasonable suspicion.
03:31 - 10.024 And I'll cite bar, which also ended up
03:31 - 13.594 following the rationale of Hicks in bar.
03:31 - 16.597 They smelled marijuana and in a car.
03:31 - 19.433 Maybe the driver was smoking marijuana or whatever.
03:31 - 21.101 After that lawful traffic stop.
03:31 - 24.672 And the issue was whether they had probable cause,
03:31 - 28.142 reasonable suspicion to do anything with the driver,
03:31 - 31.779 because this is from our second decision in the.
03:31 - 35.983 Well, term.
03:31 - 38.185 I first of all, it's very distinguishable
03:31 - 41.188 because high crime area was not a factor in the.
03:31 - 43.057 No it wasn't.
03:31 - 45.793 Sorry I disagree.
03:31 - 48.395 We had to follow the word load right.
03:31 - 51.365 Well I that's
03:31 - 54.535 we have a whole pile of workloads that they bring you up here.
03:31 - 57.738 But the real concern was I tried to
03:31 - 01.375 I you couldn't tell me that wasn't in essence or low. No.
03:32 - 04.378 I'm asking this court under article once the third question.
03:32 - 07.047 So yeah it looks like our marriage issue award.
03:32 - 07.681 Yeah.
03:32 - 08.315 Where
03:32 - 12.853 why does work required to review the facts from the right to fix a problem for.
03:32 - 13.954 Yeah.
03:32 - 16.290 With the consideration of my time. Yes.
03:32 - 21.328 No matter if I'm honest enough facts of the high primary state.
03:32 - 24.631 Your your your credibility or your your position,
03:32 - 28.502 I'm just factually telling, your honor.
03:32 - 31.338 I'm factually correct. Version of the facts, but that's
03:32 - 33.140 okay.
03:32 - 35.776 I invite the court to look at that.
03:32 - 39.980 But if in fact held that it should be overruled,
03:32 - 45.719 the question as presented was if somebody flees and there was a report,
03:32 - 50.357 an anonymous report of that person being engaged in criminal activity,
03:32 - 53.360 does that add up to reasonable suspicion?
03:32 - 56.663 That was a question considered by the court and decided by the court.
03:32 - 58.832 Justice Robson has a question for you.
03:32 - 02.970 So I, I, I, I think I fully grasp your argument.
03:33 - 03.737 You were definitely
03:33 - 05.873 you are definitely advocating for a departure claim
03:33 - 08.342 under our Pennsylvania Constitution from the word load decision.
03:33 - 10.043 Correct? Yes.
03:33 - 13.947 We should not for words like but if we applied Wardlow game over.
03:33 - 15.449 Correct. Okay.
03:33 - 17.251 The holding of the word low is high.
03:33 - 20.387 Crown the prime area plus flight equals reasonable suspicion.
03:33 - 22.689 So on your departure claim,
03:33 - 25.893 what I'm trying to understand is
03:33 - 30.697 I know that we have historically or we have departed historically or not.
03:33 - 35.402 On sort of the idea of what areas
03:33 - 40.340 are given greater privacy interests than, other areas.
03:33 - 43.477 Alexander comes to mind with the vehicle and, and that's not
03:33 - 46.480 recognizing a vehicle exception.
03:33 - 48.682 Have we ever used
03:33 - 52.719 a departure claim or ruled on a departure claim under an Edmunds
03:33 - 56.390 analysis, with regard to what constitutes probable cause?
03:33 - 59.193 What constitutes reasonable suspicion?
03:33 - 03.030 Sort of the standard to avoid an unreasonable search,
03:34 - 06.099 not whether something it's a piece of property is protected.
03:34 - 10.370 And this is my concern on very long question
03:34 - 14.741 law enforcement already have to be pseudo
03:34 - 19.847 lawyers to understand what meets reasonable suspicion and what doesn't.
03:34 - 23.584 And I'm a little concerned about the idea that there are going to be two types
03:34 - 24.785 of reasonable suspicion.
03:34 - 27.754 Two levels, two types of probable cause.
03:34 - 30.023 If we sort of go down this path, I may be wrong.
03:34 - 32.526 We may have already done this, but if you have an example,
03:34 - 33.727 I'd love to hear it.
03:34 - 35.596 So a couple of things.
03:34 - 38.599 I mean, one is standard has always been the same,
03:34 - 42.469 the standard that this court uses for reasonable suspicion of probable cause.
03:34 - 45.606 The same standard, same as the federal standard? Yes.
03:34 - 48.575 The standard is how you evaluate it.
03:34 - 50.510 But then when you have a set of facts
03:34 - 51.845 and you're
03:34 - 55.082 applying the standard and it might be a common set of facts,
03:34 - 59.853 this court may come to the conclusion that's not probable.
03:34 - 02.689 So that's not reasonable suspicion.
03:35 - 05.559 This court did that yet.
03:35 - 08.562 But the court sorry.
03:35 - 11.965 The Commonwealth versus Fisher, can you share with us
03:35 - 15.802 where the administrators were afraid
03:35 - 20.207 to discuss in the trial court such that there is appears
03:35 - 26.113 a perpetual list of Archer cases arrived here in violation of that,
03:35 - 31.685 which would mean this case may the IP for the issues have before us.
03:35 - 33.854 A bishop is an opposite
03:35 - 38.292 the the, case that's controlling here and it was preserved.
03:35 - 40.494 It was no Edmonds argument in the lower court.
03:35 - 43.297 Explain that Alexander was decided
03:35 - 47.134 after Edmonds and Alexander was filed.
03:35 - 50.604 Decided after Bishop and an Alexander.
03:35 - 53.073 What the lawyer did was identified.
03:35 - 57.244 The issue involved in the case filed a form
03:35 - 01.048 form that said article one section.
03:36 - 04.384 It was violated because there was a search without a warrant of the car.
03:36 - 08.488 So the lawyer
03:36 - 10.824 party represented
03:36 - 14.194 no, I discussed this very issue. I'm
03:36 - 18.765 here, but you have to preserve it
03:36 - 22.102 on the court is to permit the transport
03:36 - 24.771 some other to
03:36 - 29.476 the distinguished are heard decide that is common purpose with the US.
03:36 - 31.078 I'm well aware of that.
03:36 - 34.815 This is not a situation where you can argue to a lower court.
03:36 - 36.883 It's unlike Bishop.
03:36 - 40.654 And like Alexander, the preference is that. Yes.
03:36 - 42.489 Why would you not argue in motion?
03:36 - 44.624 Because you been wasting the judge's time.
03:36 - 46.226 And I'll explain why.
03:36 - 48.395 It's a total waste of time.
03:36 - 52.199 And, Bishop, it was an issue of first impression.
03:36 - 55.769 Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, therefore
03:36 - 58.772 a common pleas court, judge,
03:36 - 01.775 superior court, they could rule.
03:37 - 05.946 I think it was a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
03:37 - 10.183 Article one, section nine and Bishop issue a first impression
03:37 - 14.121 of court has an obligation to decide issues, and Alexander
03:37 - 16.023 the lower court.
03:37 - 16.990 The reason?
03:37 - 20.627 One of the main reasons there's no way for Alexander is
03:37 - 24.531 because Gary was directly on point at the time.
03:37 - 28.502 The lawyer can do Edmunds, he can do
03:37 - 31.405 law review articles to lawyer, could do whatever he wants.
03:37 - 35.375 A defense lawyer in the lower court, and at the end
03:37 - 38.045 and I've had this experience.
03:37 - 41.581 Maybe you heard judge says, denied.
03:37 - 43.316 I'm down by Gary.
03:37 - 46.386 I have no power to overrule the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
03:37 - 50.257 This case, it's like Alexander.
03:37 - 53.760 For 20 years, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has held
03:37 - 57.898 if you flee in a high crime area,
03:37 - 01.168 reasonable suspicion under the Fourth
03:38 - 04.171 Amendment and under article one, section eight.
03:38 - 07.107 Yes. Rule 302 is knit the judge
03:38 - 11.078 to correct errors and to and to make decisions.
03:38 - 15.849 There is no error by the judge to correct.
03:38 - 19.786 There is no open issue that the judge can decide
03:38 - 23.790 in this case, like Alexander, you would only be,
03:38 - 27.260 as has happened to be sometimes the lower courts aggravating the judge.
03:38 - 30.797 If you start arguing something that you can't possibly win,
03:38 - 33.533 you couldn't win it.
03:38 - 36.470 And Common Pleas Court, the court was bound
03:38 - 39.840 by 20 years of Jefferson and other progeny.
03:38 - 45.045 So that's the key difference, I think like Alexander, but not like Bishop.
03:38 - 48.081 And there was a case earlier this year, foster.
03:38 - 51.618 Yes. So foster early this year,
03:38 - 55.689 the defense raising novel issue a first impression
03:38 - 59.559 under again article one, section nine
03:39 - 04.498 that under the Pennsylvania Constitution I like the federal Constitution.
03:39 - 08.068 If police lie to an individual during interrogation,
03:39 - 10.637 that should be held to be involuntary.
03:39 - 13.473 Okay, that's a novel issue, a first impression.
03:39 - 16.042 If that issue had been raised in the lower court
03:39 - 19.212 and the Superior Court, they could have ruled in the defense favor.
03:39 - 22.249 There was no contrary binding authority
03:39 - 25.619 from the higher court, and the lawyer and bishop.
03:39 - 29.656 I'm he's a lawyer in foster like in Bishop didn't
03:39 - 33.593 develop any argument in the lower court, not even in Superior Court.
03:39 - 39.332 And this court said, significantly, not even in the allocated petition here.
03:39 - 43.236 The argument has been squarely raised and decided on the merits.
03:39 - 46.139 Superior court decide squarely in the merits.
03:39 - 49.609 The lower Common Pleas court decided squarely on the merits
03:39 - 51.444 and statement of errors.
03:39 - 54.447 So it's very different than Bishop and Foster.
03:39 - 00.020 And there's more done in this case and Alexander, much more counsel in this case.
03:40 - 02.222 The superior you actually made your Edmonds
03:40 - 05.458 argument in the Superior Court and they said, we can't help you.
03:40 - 07.260 We can't, we can't.
03:40 - 08.962 We're bound, we're bound, we're bound.
03:40 - 10.864 Mr.. And
03:40 - 13.867 not tell me that I, I said my brief.
03:40 - 17.704 I said, I know you're bound and less and bunk
03:40 - 22.175 where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court changes the panel
03:40 - 25.145 ruling and and Jefferson and the other panel rulings
03:40 - 29.382 which require you to one panel has to file for another one.
03:40 - 31.952 They also said they were bound by DM.
03:40 - 34.955 The Superior Court also believe they were bound by DM.
03:40 - 38.124 I know, but they wait to they could not.
03:40 - 41.228 They were bound because that's what they believe that we did in DM.
03:40 - 45.232 They believe they're bound by DM indefinitely to stick them in DM.
03:40 - 46.666 I'm not saying it's not victim.
03:40 - 48.668 And what's in the primary case.
03:40 - 53.006 And also one reason if this court's going to going to decide whether to overrule
03:40 - 56.509 DM, the Pennsylvania constitutional
03:40 - 59.512 issue was squarely raised to them
03:41 - 04.584 and it was dismissed in footnote two with no analysis at all.
03:41 - 08.021 Mr. Samson, I can I go back to my question.
03:41 - 10.490 Because I'm not sure you answered it.
03:41 - 12.559 I think you did answer you referred to Hicks.
03:41 - 17.163 I was asking for, a case where we have departed
03:41 - 22.636 under the Pennsylvania Constitution from, the federal,
03:41 - 25.238 cases on
03:41 - 29.109 what is sufficient, reasonable suspicion and what is sufficient probable cause.
03:41 - 32.012 You remember that I asked that, yes. Okay.
03:41 - 33.913 And you cited Hicks.
03:41 - 35.615 Hicks was not a departure case.
03:41 - 37.450 Hicks was a Fourth Amendment case.
03:41 - 39.586 So I'm saying here, you're here.
03:41 - 43.290 You concede that for fourth Amendment purposes,
03:41 - 46.293 at least according to the United States Supreme Court.
03:41 - 51.398 The police officers had reasonable suspicion here and can seize the person.
03:41 - 52.999 Yeah. Right. Right.
03:41 - 56.002 And. Yeah, now I'm asking you,
03:41 - 00.073 have we ever recognized a departure claim that says,
03:42 - 03.810 oh, yes, that's reasonable suspicion under the Pennsylvania
03:42 - 07.047 United States Constitution, but it's not reasonable suspicion
03:42 - 10.250 under the Pennsylvania Constitution, because Hicks didn't do that.
03:42 - 13.253 So is there a case where where we have done that?
03:42 - 16.956 The closest case is not to us, where this court didn't
03:42 - 20.360 change the seizure standard to court?
03:42 - 21.695 The United States Supreme Court.
03:42 - 25.465 And Heydari said police can chase people without any suspicion at all.
03:42 - 28.201 Chase is not a seizure, but chase him.
03:42 - 32.305 This court had already said,
03:42 - 36.142 under the Pennsylvania Constitution, chasing somebody is a seizure
03:42 - 40.246 and we because our Constitution
03:42 - 44.484 protects privacy and being free of coercive activity
03:42 - 47.787 by the police more then the fourth Amendment.
03:42 - 50.123 Inferential.
03:42 - 53.927 So which cases that matters and they toss
03:42 - 58.832 but that that is the difference between what is a seizure and what is a search.
03:42 - 59.766 Correct.
03:42 - 01.468 So the question, though, is
03:43 - 05.405 there's no question that this would be a seizure under under the this
03:43 - 08.808 what happened to your client was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
03:43 - 11.644 and the Pennsylvania Constitution. Nobody's disputing that. Right.
03:43 - 13.913 But except that the Chase part first
03:43 - 16.616 would be analyzed differently under our Constitution,
03:43 - 18.985 because the chase itself has a reasonable suspicion.
03:43 - 22.088 So is it fair to say that this is a case of first impression,
03:43 - 25.525 where we would be setting a different test
03:43 - 29.529 for reasonable suspicion than the feds have?
03:43 - 31.197 It's not a different test.
03:43 - 32.832 It's the same test.
03:43 - 36.136 Reasonable suspicion, particularly as to protect the same test
03:43 - 38.171 because it would be reaching two different results.
03:43 - 41.741 One, yes, I'm the same fact, same facts, same fine
03:43 - 44.778 title, different result is not same test.
03:43 - 46.513 I mean, I was really bad at alcohol.
03:43 - 50.216 Whether it's a matter of words, it's the same test
03:43 - 54.287 as to a reasonable suspicion, but they are applying it to a set of facts,
03:43 - 58.925 fleeing in a high crime area and this court should not apply it.
03:43 - 01.995 That's when instead of fact, presumably if you're applying the same test
03:44 - 04.564 to the same facts, one would reach the same conclusion.
03:44 - 07.066 Presumably.
03:44 - 10.937 Except that except that this case has come, this court has countless cases.
03:44 - 12.205 Not so like this.
03:44 - 14.374 Real off a whole lot of cases.
03:44 - 17.877 The Pennsylvania Constitution is independent of federal constitution.
03:44 - 19.479 I'm not I'm not arguing with you about that.
03:44 - 21.848 I'm I'm making a more nuanced point.
03:44 - 24.751 And I think you're I think you're conceding without conceding
03:44 - 29.355 is no, we've never done a departure claim in the context of these facts
03:44 - 33.426 would be reasonable suspicion, suspicion under the national constitution.
03:44 - 36.896 But they wouldn't be reasonable suspicion under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
03:44 - 38.565 You can't say the case where we've ever done that.
03:44 - 39.699 So this is the case, the first impression.
03:44 - 43.770 There's nothing wrong with that offhand, but I'd say like, no, I can't
03:44 - 45.138 I cannot cite a case.
03:44 - 48.274 But the general principles this court has applied over and over again
03:44 - 51.845 as to what's a search when you need a warrant,
03:44 - 56.316 probably, you know, instances of probable cause.
03:44 - 59.719 So, it's it's not novel
03:44 - 02.722 in the sense that this court having a departure.
03:45 - 06.292 And there's one thing in this case, I mean, there's one
03:45 - 10.864 there's two very important reasons about the narrow issue
03:45 - 13.833 in this case, why this court should not go the way a Wardlow
03:45 - 16.436 has said before.
03:45 - 19.439 It is the defining factor.
03:45 - 21.908 There is no additional conduct.
03:45 - 24.043 X was the exact same thing.
03:45 - 27.881 The man had a gun that could be dangerous if he's a criminal.
03:45 - 32.252 But the court did not consider 3 a.m.
03:45 - 35.388 high crime area because it's not enough to bolster
03:45 - 38.391 individualized reasonable suspicion in bar.
03:45 - 41.494 This court found Hicks
03:45 - 46.065 and said many people have a license to possess marijuana
03:45 - 49.869 and therefore, like Hicks,
03:45 - 53.273 the idea of possession of marijuana in itself
03:45 - 56.442 doesn't provide a reasonable suspicion of probable cause.
03:45 - 57.644 And this court also
03:45 - 02.115 discussed another reason
03:46 - 06.486 why, if I could talk a little about it, another reason why it's a very bad idea.
03:46 - 11.190 It's a killer considered a high crime area as a defining factor.
03:46 - 14.193 So in each of the cases, Farr
03:46 - 17.964 and Hicks, exactly like this case, you have one instance, a convict.
03:46 - 23.036 I would submit that once in the conduct of fleeing from the police
03:46 - 26.773 is at least as non dangerous or non criminal
03:46 - 30.109 as possessing marijuana or a game or a gun.
03:46 - 32.712 The point of all three situations is it has to be
03:46 - 35.715 an individualized determination, and that's why there's no reasonable,
03:46 - 38.818 suspicion or talked about
03:46 - 41.821 another very important reason why
03:46 - 44.991 this should not be recognized as high crime area
03:46 - 48.695 as being the defining factor, establishing a reasonable suspicion
03:46 - 50.763 bar code with
03:46 - 55.535 approval, like Judge Strasberg's, concurring opinion in the Superior
03:46 - 59.906 Court and bar, which the other two members of the Superior Court joined in
03:47 - 05.378 and Judge Strasberg said, basically, I don't understand
03:47 - 10.183 how we can have two sets of rights, that people can have fewer rights
03:47 - 13.152 because they live in a high crime area.
03:47 - 16.055 Many of them are forced to live there. They have no choice.
03:47 - 20.259 I don't understand how the Constitution could permit
03:47 - 24.397 people have less price based on where they live.
03:47 - 28.635 It's discriminatory and it's discriminatory.
03:47 - 32.405 Studies when when we're looking down in 2000
03:47 - 36.142 would like, say, we don't have any empirical evidence.
03:47 - 39.245 Well, there was a little back then that's 25 years
03:47 - 42.248 since since Wardlow.
03:47 - 47.253 So looking at even looking again, the specific situation here,
03:47 - 51.324 it's been recognized study after study.
03:47 - 54.694 And in cases that people in high crime areas
03:47 - 58.831 are discriminated to some extent,
03:47 - 02.468 and the application of stops, frisks and arrests.
03:48 - 05.972 This court also discussed it in very last year
03:48 - 09.709 when when the court held that arrest can't count against a person.
03:48 - 12.845 At sentencing, the court cited a law review article
03:48 - 17.150 in Third Circuit cases about the fact that that is a statistical fact.
03:48 - 20.553 And because people, particularly young people, shivers.
03:48 - 26.993 It's 20 years old because people are stopped more illegally
03:48 - 30.963 by police and searched and sometimes worse,
03:48 - 36.569 they have a reason to flee and they more often flee.
03:48 - 40.473 As Justice Stevens suggested
03:48 - 44.277 in the for the for dissenters, in words low to court.
03:48 - 46.579 Arguably, he didn't use these words I'll use them.
03:48 - 49.248 The court arguably got it backwards.
03:48 - 54.454 If the court was going to distinguish rights based on where somebody lives,
03:48 - 57.824 because in a person in a low crime area
03:48 - 00.226 has much less reason to fear
03:49 - 04.297 police interactions, police aren't going around worrying about guns and or
03:49 - 07.500 and sometimes arresting people and searching them when they shouldn't.
03:49 - 11.404 So a person, a low crime area of the United States
03:49 - 15.074 Supreme Court was going to make a distinction based on where you are.
03:49 - 17.243 They got it backwards.
03:49 - 19.145 This is not more suspicious.
03:49 - 22.348 Being in a high crime area and running a and that's
03:49 - 25.585 borne out by common sense and the statistics.
03:49 - 26.319 There's.
03:49 - 29.922 So this this situation and general
03:49 - 35.828 using the high crime area as a factor.
03:49 - 39.065 If the court goes beyond a narrow question in this case,
03:49 - 42.635 it's always, unreliable,
03:49 - 46.405 because the testimony is
03:49 - 49.542 usually almost always it's subjective.
03:49 - 53.045 If an officer take the stand and he says,
03:49 - 57.750 I made five, or it's like this, officer, I made five arrests in this area for guns.
03:49 - 03.623 And by the way, in this case, he's testifying a year and a half after Mr.
03:50 - 05.825 Shivers was stopped.
03:50 - 09.796 So he said, in the last five months I've had five cases arrests for guns.
03:50 - 11.898 I arrest
03:50 - 15.034 itself, as I just pointed out, because this court pointed out in very
03:50 - 21.307 an arrest self is a discriminatory factor just because you have arrest.
03:50 - 24.777 But you have to know if you want to, if you want to really know about high
03:50 - 27.780 crime area, you really have to know how many people
03:50 - 31.350 were searched, how many people were arrested illegally.
03:50 - 33.219 You'd have to have statistics.
03:50 - 34.587 They're ironclad.
03:50 - 38.224 And so far nobody has been able to come up with objective criteria
03:50 - 41.494 for statistics that are meaningful.
03:50 - 44.430 In this case, set the motion to suppress the motion suppressing
03:50 - 47.433 and a motion before the motion to suppress hearing.
03:50 - 51.737 This was the interchange between the judge and a prosecutor.
03:50 - 55.474 It's exhibit D to my brief, the court claim,
03:50 - 59.345 because it has I mean, I think jokes have been made about high crime area.
03:50 - 02.215 I mean, everything is a high crime area.
03:51 - 05.218 The district attorney responds, yes, judge testimony
03:51 - 09.388 usually is in Philadelphia that there is a high crime area.
03:51 - 12.124 I mean, we're a city of the first class.
03:51 - 15.661 There are distinctions made, and unfortunately in this city
03:51 - 18.364 everything seems to be high crime.
03:51 - 18.898 Okay.
03:51 - 21.901 What that means, it has meant in Philadelphia,
03:51 - 24.737 is that there's geographic discrimination.
03:51 - 27.073 People in Philadelphia
03:51 - 30.276 have less rights than everybody else
03:51 - 34.380 in the state, and particularly those people.
03:51 - 39.785 When the testimony comes in about, this particular neighborhood.
03:51 - 43.189 And I've made arrests there in the in the past,
03:51 - 47.426 it's always discriminatory as a factor.
03:51 - 50.429 And, in addition
03:51 - 53.599 to some extent, the statistic,
03:51 - 57.503 it's unreliable because subjective, as I've already said, it's discriminatory.
03:51 - 01.173 It also leads to a logical conclusion.
03:52 - 02.808 I would submit,
03:52 - 04.911 let's say you're in one neighborhood
03:52 - 07.914 where 1% of the people are committing crimes.
03:52 - 10.883 Drug.
03:52 - 11.717 Pardon me?
03:52 - 14.520 You find me. Oh, yeah. It's another problem.
03:52 - 15.588 That's right.
03:52 - 16.155 That's one. No.
03:52 - 18.057 We can come up with objective criteria.
03:52 - 19.158 What is the area?
03:52 - 22.161 Among other things, how do you objectively, totally
03:52 - 23.896 understand?
03:52 - 26.465 Maybe in Pittsburgh, but that doesn't exist for someone else.
03:52 - 30.636 There are specific neighborhoods in Philadelphia and we can go through,
03:52 - 34.173 and they are distinct areas in each section to go out.
03:52 - 39.979 And then you can easily distinguish as areas that are notorious by the people
03:52 - 44.784 that they work for, violence and crime, and it transcends race and gender.
03:52 - 48.187 It's just what that particular area is.
03:52 - 51.390 So check out the easy part in all this.
03:52 - 54.860 The I don't know whether she's talking, but the practical problem
03:52 - 57.196 with that,
03:52 - 00.766 well, the practical problem, you know, is a Common Pleas Court judge is
03:53 - 04.837 and what the district attorney and the judge are talking about is it's
03:53 - 10.376 not just in those well defined high crime neighborhoods that they listen to.
03:53 - 13.145 High crime testimony from the Cur. And Mr.
03:53 - 16.382 Justice McCaffery said in Rittenhouse Square, it's not going to be defined
03:53 - 19.485 as a high primary, but growing up in South
03:53 - 23.255 Philadelphia by the voters watching it, that's what I hear.
03:53 - 24.390 Everybody do.
03:53 - 27.860 If you want to buy low, but you can't drop that when you when
03:53 - 31.764 everybody has a high crime rate, they will get arrested.
03:53 - 34.266 Not a taxi problem.
03:53 - 36.268 When they had their backs pressed.
03:53 - 40.506 The issue of crime, what are the factors that I'm going to following up accurately
03:53 - 43.376 about police officers experience? Do you mean that
03:53 - 45.311 you know, Mr.
03:53 - 50.216 Junior and participating in his department has a police officer
03:53 - 55.154 that in certain areas are that we know I was one second
03:53 - 58.290 half a week ago, just for example,
03:53 - 01.360 80% 30 high prostitution.
03:54 - 02.561 There.
03:54 - 04.730 It's easy if you go around the city
03:54 - 07.733 and you put your policeman and you have experience.
03:54 - 11.237 If only one factor in of itself
03:54 - 16.042 is discriminatory, can you say high crime is it?
03:54 - 19.779 But the concept of high crime areas is essentially
03:54 - 22.982 totally capable paperwork and police activity
03:54 - 27.753 so that they could decide whether the evidence to prove that a crime occurred.
03:54 - 31.657 If the elements of the crime now is not as simple as that.
03:54 - 33.192 I don't think it's so simple.
03:54 - 35.961 Your example is one block.
03:54 - 39.398 We knew which system more so whatever the testimony in the courts,
03:54 - 42.802 there's no requirement that high crime area be about one block.
03:54 - 45.905 That's just the Commonwealth to bring up.
03:54 - 47.506 That's the burden on the Commonwealth.
03:54 - 48.941 That's what this is about.
03:54 - 53.045 Did the Commonwealth prove sufficiently that they came to meet their facts?
03:54 - 58.017 And right now it's based on unreliable testimony and it's just yeah,
03:54 - 01.020 but it's not up to the trial judge to decide whether it's reliable or not.
03:55 - 05.691 I mean, no judge has to allow it under getting back to this case,
03:55 - 09.128 getting back to any case, high crime areas, a label.
03:55 - 11.764 When you say a high crime area we referring to Justice Socrates
03:55 - 15.167 basically talking about the police officer has to basically be able
03:55 - 18.904 to put on the record why he described it as a high crime area.
03:55 - 21.574 We had a case a couple of weeks ago, 12th and Dauphin.
03:55 - 24.310 The problem was you had two rookie police officers in the DEA.
03:55 - 27.313 It didn't take illicit information about why
03:55 - 29.782 the officers believed it was a high crime area.
03:55 - 31.450 So there was nothing on the record
03:55 - 34.453 to justify their description of a high crime area.
03:55 - 37.356 12 and often, you know where it is, not anywhere.
03:55 - 40.025 I grew up with all of you. All right. What would you say is a high crime area?
03:55 - 42.695 No, I wouldn't say it's a high crime.
03:55 - 43.596 And if it is?
03:55 - 45.264 If it is, let's put it this way.
03:55 - 47.833 Is that one block?
03:55 - 50.436 We could say we could agree generically.
03:55 - 52.037 It's a high crime area.
03:55 - 54.306 You do not get away from the problem.
03:55 - 55.374 And Hicks.
03:55 - 59.011 And in this case there's a it's a completely different issue
03:55 - 00.679 not to mix up to my case.
03:56 - 00.846 Yeah.
03:56 - 04.550 But Hicks was a recognition that not all people who carry guns are criminals.
03:56 - 05.017 That's right.
03:56 - 07.486 Not what people are from the same thing.
03:56 - 11.557 But in a case where we're talking about, again, we're going back to the totality
03:56 - 12.658 of the circumstances.
03:56 - 14.293 In Hicks, a police officer sees a guy
03:56 - 17.830 with a gun on his hip, goes over, secures the guy and arrest him
03:56 - 21.333 because he believed the gun was reasonable suspicion of probable cause.
03:56 - 23.202 Right. That doesn't necessarily mean anything.
03:56 - 27.973 If I'm in an area with known drug members, gang members, I see a guy back away,
03:56 - 29.475 I pull up and I'm in a uniform,
03:56 - 32.344 he starts running down the street, holding onto something in his waist.
03:56 - 35.581 As I've seen as a police officer a couple hundred times.
03:56 - 37.950 Why did people hold on to their waist, officer?
03:56 - 41.020 Because I've made about 100 gun arrests and about 98 of them.
03:56 - 43.556 The person ran away and he was holding on to his waistband
03:56 - 44.857 because that's where he was carrying the gun.
03:56 - 46.659 He didn't want the gun to fall out.
03:56 - 51.664 So first of all, I very, very kind of looked to the flight,
03:56 - 55.301 divided that he was holding
03:56 - 58.504 his pants in a way that showed he had a gun.
03:56 - 01.941 Here, you're adding contact to the flight.
03:57 - 05.311 This case is like Hicks. Hicks.
03:57 - 09.515 He had a gun and it was in a high crime area and in bar.
03:57 - 11.083 They was hurt.
03:57 - 13.552 They they slipped out one of this court sets.
03:57 - 16.655 Have no moment telling me the record here doesn't suggest that
03:57 - 19.625 the police officer testified that the guy ran away when he was running.
03:57 - 21.560 It was holding on their front of his pants.
03:57 - 22.161 I'm talking.
03:57 - 25.998 There's just there is no factor of outcome conflict with his pants
03:57 - 29.835 because he said, I can't see the hands.
03:57 - 32.671 And it could have been he's just trying to hold up his pants.
03:57 - 35.941 And the hearing judge and the Superior Court
03:57 - 38.844 have been doing anything but he could have been doing anything.
03:57 - 39.445 That's the point.
03:57 - 42.448 If I'm an innocent, innocent conduct, that's the point.
03:57 - 45.484 Just like having a gun is innocent conduct, if you have a license,
03:57 - 48.954 you can't find reasonable suspicion because there's a high crime here.
03:57 - 53.125 This case flight is different than when you use high crime areas.
03:57 - 55.694 One of five fact if counsel Hicks again.
03:57 - 56.295 Hicks.
03:57 - 59.231 Hicks, you were not running up against a United States
03:57 - 02.568 Supreme Court decision on the same facts reaching a different result.
03:58 - 05.271 Hicks was a Fourth Amendment case. You're right.
03:58 - 07.906 You're asking us to depart
03:58 - 11.577 to say Wadlow says, what it was Wadlow.
03:58 - 14.246 What Wardlow says, what it says.
03:58 - 16.815 Same facts, reasonable suspicion.
03:58 - 18.317 They reached X.
03:58 - 21.153 You want us to reach wide because there's something
03:58 - 24.556 about the Constitution that says Pennsylvania Constitution that says
03:58 - 28.894 we can reach a different conclusion than Wardlow.
03:58 - 29.194 Right.
03:58 - 33.899 But I'm not I'm not sure what that is because Hicks was there.
03:58 - 35.267 I said, hold on, hold on.
03:58 - 38.604 Counsel Hicks was not reaching a different conclusion on the same sentence.
03:58 - 40.139 I know that's okay.
03:58 - 43.709 That's that's what I'm trying to say is, what is it that gives us the ability,
03:58 - 45.544 other than the fact that we just don't like Wardlow?
03:58 - 48.514 And I have issues with what this court has held about ten times,
03:58 - 54.253 that the Pennsylvania Constitution is an independent search, a seizure.
03:58 - 55.587 I don't disagree with you.
03:58 - 57.990 Okay. Independent search and seizure rights.
03:58 - 00.993 So that way because we protect privacy more
03:59 - 06.732 and that is talked about being free of coercive conduct and stopping somebody.
03:59 - 10.469 Mr. shivers was stopped is coercive conduct not to say
03:59 - 14.640 said we protect people's right to privacy.
03:59 - 18.043 To be left alone would be free, of course, of conduct
03:59 - 21.146 more than the Fourth Amendment.
03:59 - 23.916 And in any case, for this court goes further.
03:59 - 27.119 It's citing the fundamental values Alexander,
03:59 - 28.954 this case decided
03:59 - 32.725 that this court decided not to follow Gary because Gary
03:59 - 38.263 was inconsistent with our basic privacy protections in Pennsylvania.
03:59 - 40.065 It was a place for them.
03:59 - 40.799 It was a place.
03:59 - 43.335 It wasn't a reasonable suspicion, probable cause dynamic.
03:59 - 45.738 But I understand you're sending me back. You're sending me tomatoes, right?
03:59 - 46.772 That's irrelevant.
03:59 - 48.474 You're sending me tomatoes, right?
03:59 - 49.441 Sending you. It's my.
03:59 - 52.444 It's my brief three pages. My brief counsel.
03:59 - 54.980 There's there's the right to privacy.
03:59 - 59.551 And you, the Pennsylvania Constitution protect flight.
04:00 - 06.125 This is to protect flight more than the Fourth Amendment is because
04:00 - 10.796 of the inherent recognition that a flight
04:00 - 13.832 could be taken for any reason.
04:00 - 17.269 And essentially, Pennsylvania citizens have a right to be left
04:00 - 20.439 alone under our right to privacy.
04:00 - 24.877 Yes, yes, I would say it protects flight more.
04:00 - 28.680 And if you look at the court said way before Wardlow what the court said
04:00 - 31.683 and Barnett in 1979,
04:00 - 35.287 way before Wardlow, and there was no hint in Jeffrey's
04:00 - 39.625 or Barnett or in matters.
04:00 - 45.664 Oh, wait, if this was in our high crime area, we would find reasonable suspicion.
04:00 - 49.001 But let me see if I could complete my thought process on this.
04:00 - 53.806 Our right to privacy protects the conduct of flight
04:00 - 57.142 because of the inherent right
04:00 - 00.145 to be left alone from police interference.
04:01 - 03.782 But Wardlow protects it as well.
04:01 - 08.120 But I believe the values of Pennsylvania Constitution protected more.
04:01 - 09.254 Well, you have to look.
04:01 - 12.691 You have to be saying that you have to be relying on the right
04:01 - 17.329 to privacy under our Constitution, giving more rights
04:01 - 20.499 than the federal constitution in this context.
04:01 - 21.266 Correct.
04:01 - 25.103 And that's I that's it's just this broad sense point.
04:01 - 25.904 What is it?
04:01 - 28.907 What is it under our Constitution
04:01 - 33.846 that would allow us to depart on this Supreme Court,
04:01 - 37.649 United States Supreme Court characterization
04:01 - 42.054 of flight as being a flight in a high crime area
04:01 - 46.558 and, being less protected than it is under our Constitution.
04:01 - 50.362 It has to be based on the right to privacy, does it not? Yes.
04:01 - 53.966 And right to left alone as as matters to discuss,
04:01 - 59.304 right to be secure from coercive conduct and also counsel.
04:01 - 03.475 In addition, is it not also that that,
04:02 - 09.081 We can't we can't imagine that
04:02 - 14.086 that whatever that plausible proxy work is in one
04:02 - 17.122 area would be,
04:02 - 20.959 would be less because of a person who has to buy or sell,
04:02 - 25.097 inherit a as opposed to find yourself in your.
04:02 - 30.035 For the constitutional right to privacy in Pennsylvania, in article one,
04:02 - 33.805 section nine can vary according
04:02 - 38.510 to which neighborhood you find yourself in at a given point in time.
04:02 - 40.212 Is that is that correct?
04:02 - 41.246 That is this case.
04:02 - 43.415 That's a that's one of the major points I'm making.
04:02 - 47.452 Is that the only distinction between high crime area
04:02 - 51.723 and people living in low crime, mid crime, mid high crime area
04:02 - 56.194 is that Wardlow says you have different Fourth Amendment rights.
04:02 - 59.264 This court shouldn't tolerate that under article one,
04:02 - 02.267 section eight to discriminate based on where somebody lives.
04:03 - 03.201 Excuse me.
04:03 - 05.270 Just. No. I'm sorry. Go ahead. Kansas.
04:03 - 05.737 Excuse me.
04:03 - 08.740 Nice to discriminate against people.
04:03 - 13.145 And if it's going to be, you know, a factor in the totality
04:03 - 17.349 of the circumstances, test, it should be considered a minimal factor.
04:03 - 19.685 It's part of six factors or whatever.
04:03 - 21.153 Five factors.
04:03 - 23.021 Because you always have the problem.
04:03 - 25.991 It's not conduct by the individual.
04:03 - 27.559 It's not conduct at all.
04:03 - 30.896 Other people have done in the past, and it's discriminatory.
04:03 - 33.098 It's always discriminatory. And
04:03 - 35.133 even though, Justice Tucker,
04:03 - 38.136 do you say it's easy to identify
04:03 - 40.005 the courts?
04:03 - 42.574 Don't treat it that way day to day?
04:03 - 45.544 I know Philadelphia they don't treat it that way day to day.
04:03 - 49.081 Crime areas described loosely in this at this case,
04:03 - 53.485 in this case, even testimony was a year and a half
04:03 - 56.855 after this defendant was seized by the police
04:03 - 02.327 and he starts talking about what happened five months earlier than his testimony.
04:04 - 05.197 And then the district attorney says, what was it?
04:04 - 08.600 Was it the same back in 2019 when the incident happened?
04:04 - 10.502 It's a little bit more now.
04:04 - 12.104 The testimony is loose.
04:04 - 15.540 It's often about, oh, I patrol this district to this area.
04:04 - 20.545 You've got the subjective determination and it's often based on
04:04 - 23.882 I had arrests in the past, whether they were good or bad.
04:04 - 28.020 So I'd say
04:04 - 30.422 whatever,
04:04 - 32.391 whatever weight.
04:04 - 34.660 And I run a milk case.
04:04 - 37.229 This court may decide
04:04 - 40.232 can be permissible, minimal or little more.
04:04 - 45.537 It should not be in this case, as in hex.
04:04 - 48.874 It should not be the defining factor.
04:04 - 50.876 There is no totality in this case.
04:04 - 52.644 There's no to tell my concern.
04:04 - 54.946 And maybe you can answer me this.
04:04 - 57.015 Even as opposed to high crime area.
04:04 - 59.518 We're going off on the definition.
04:04 - 05.123 The question I have is, why is it that in a plain, mere counter,
04:05 - 10.696 our case will permit that individual to walk away from a police force?
04:05 - 12.898 That's what we are covering.
04:05 - 16.034 But yet now, because we were,
04:05 - 20.372 I primarily interjected into a fear factor
04:05 - 24.209 rises to a level for arrest.
04:05 - 27.446 There it is the rule for me that thought
04:05 - 31.616 maybe the Commonwealth can answer, but we're going off on high crime here.
04:05 - 33.285 And to me that's the red herring.
04:05 - 37.489 The herring is why do we distinguish our case
04:05 - 42.094 for saying hate with, as I said, mayor and counter, I don't have to stop.
04:05 - 44.329 If a police officer called me, I have that freedom.
04:05 - 45.363 I can walk away
04:05 - 47.899 and nightstick.
04:05 - 49.234 I was hoping you capture.
04:05 - 52.204 The reason I was trying to, Bailey, was to get your argument there.
04:05 - 55.674 Because the issue is not high crime area.
04:05 - 57.876 That's the red herring.
04:05 - 58.110 It's.
04:05 - 02.514 Why do we distinguish between mere encounter and a high crime,
04:06 - 05.984 or being interjected into a mere counter to elevated.
04:06 - 10.388 There's the that's the prejudicial, discriminatory facts. Yes.
04:06 - 12.791 Because it's coercive conduct.
04:06 - 16.328 She was get tackled and I'm saying under article in section
04:06 - 19.331 eight, here's a guy who's sitting on a stoop.
04:06 - 23.201 It's 25 after seven on a summer evening.
04:06 - 24.936 He's not doing anything.
04:06 - 27.005 The officer has no report of the crime.
04:06 - 29.841 The officer knows nothing about him.
04:06 - 31.042 And he gets he gets up.
04:06 - 34.045 He sees these officers as they approach and he runs.
04:06 - 35.847 There's no additional conduct.
04:06 - 38.817 We've elevated high crime area
04:06 - 41.987 to a defining factor for constitutional rights,
04:06 - 46.024 even though it's contact by other people in the past.
04:06 - 48.760 And that is the nub of it.
04:06 - 49.995 Thank you.
04:06 - 51.730 Thank you very much.
04:06 - 53.799 Let's hear from, Mr.
04:06 - 55.901 Greer
04:06 - 58.904 from Commonwealth.
04:07 - 06.845 Yes. Good afternoon, Your honors, Andrew Greer for the Commonwealth.
04:07 - 10.715 Defendant's departure claim is waived under Bishop.
04:07 - 12.851 Even if it weren't, it was rejected.
04:07 - 14.152 An entry DM.
04:07 - 18.223 And even if this court were to depart from and redeem to
04:07 - 21.560 in any way, the facts here still support the seizure.
04:07 - 24.963 Yes.
04:07 - 28.333 I thought I read it during the lunch break and it said that
04:07 - 32.103 the unprovoked flight occurred as they were approaching a high crime area.
04:07 - 34.873 Yeah, I think that wasn't the
04:07 - 36.174 there wasn't the basis.
04:07 - 40.879 I think the confusion arises because the The remnant came citing Wardlow.
04:07 - 42.948 Wasn't that where the confusion arose? Sorry.
04:07 - 43.849 Could you repeat that?
04:07 - 47.819 The remand came, but the case came back? Yes.
04:07 - 49.087 Afterward.
04:07 - 54.826 Lo and then change the holding court in DM did not speak of a high crime area.
04:07 - 59.364 No, but applied Wardlow, which did speak at length.
04:08 - 03.768 About the factors that we have considered.
04:08 - 08.273 Yes. That which I will note that the dissent, which was a
04:08 - 12.477 in Wardlow concurrence in part and dissent in part,
04:08 - 16.781 and concurred on high crime area can be considered
04:08 - 22.754 and wrote separately to explain define it really to define flight
04:08 - 26.625 as opposed to like somebody already just jogging through the neighborhood.
04:08 - 29.895 The flight figures that he was quibble but it just
04:08 - 33.465 the flight was was in play there.
04:08 - 37.702 But it wasn't a discussion of facts about high crime area.
04:08 - 41.873 Then again, because I would like to speak terms
04:08 - 45.110 on that, on the or is even informed by it.
04:08 - 48.246 But then that's where
04:08 - 51.650 if in in re DM overarching,
04:08 - 57.155 then the argument the defense raised was, hey, under the PA Constitution,
04:08 - 01.226 it's actually broader with regard to reasonable suspicion.
04:09 - 06.031 It goes beyond Terry, your question about that suspicion.
04:09 - 06.464 Yeah.
04:09 - 11.036 What what crime was suspected
04:09 - 15.573 of when when the when he was thought what crime was he suspected of
04:09 - 21.680 when the police rolled up at the time they captured him, which I, I just think
04:09 - 24.816 he was standing in the doorway of a convenience store or a gas station.
04:09 - 28.320 And, and,
04:09 - 30.822 and I guess the police rolled up. Yes.
04:09 - 34.292 He takes off at the point that the police observed him.
04:09 - 37.429 What what crime is he suspected of? That's.
04:09 - 38.730 I don't think they testified
04:09 - 42.834 to having already suspected him of a particular crime at that point.
04:09 - 45.837 And there's no evidence. There's the key.
04:09 - 47.973 There's a key.
04:09 - 50.976 I was not going to bring the word up at all.
04:09 - 52.777 For my part, that's.
04:09 - 54.045 And that's the idea.
04:09 - 56.147 That's why. Why we get to the case.
04:09 - 59.818 That's why you need the high crime area, bootstrap.
04:09 - 02.554 Because you've got flight and nothing more.
04:10 - 04.422 Am I right or am I wrong?
04:10 - 06.124 Incorrect in this case, Your Honor,
04:10 - 10.061 because there is a difference between mere presence in a high crime.
04:10 - 12.497 I heard the words area and neighborhood come up.
04:10 - 13.999 Which, first of all, this wasn't.
04:10 - 19.838 It was a high crime location individual, almost a point in space.
04:10 - 24.642 In addition, this person, shivers was not merely present
04:10 - 28.046 as the teller inside was, as anyone who might have been pumping gas
04:10 - 32.450 was as anyone across the street, walking outside their own residence was.
04:10 - 35.754 He was sitting directly next to this distance,
04:10 - 40.792 as I am to defense counsel, if not closer, a named known gang member.
04:10 - 42.861 In addition to the reason,
04:10 - 44.996 there was some dispute over the record about who was a gang member,
04:10 - 48.666 there was a group of other known gang members farther away in the parking lot,
04:10 - 51.936 but that's different from him sitting next to,
04:10 - 55.673 the known gang member that was directly next to him.
04:10 - 58.143 That is conduct and association.
04:10 - 00.512 In addition to the flight.
04:11 - 01.713 You're saying this isn't Wardlow,
04:11 - 03.381 correct?
04:11 - 05.817 I'm saying Wardlow and, you know, serves as a basis.
04:11 - 08.686 But there's this is in addition to Wardlow.
04:11 - 11.623 Dissociation is sufficient.
04:11 - 17.128 That is a relevant additional factor for the reasonableness of the suspicion.
04:11 - 21.399 Where and again, in the full context, this starts with
04:11 - 24.836 they're already on their way to that location because this officer
04:11 - 29.941 at the time of the stop, not the time between stop and testify
04:11 - 33.011 at the time of the stop, 11 years of experience
04:11 - 37.749 conducting gang intelligence knows the ozone Gang specifically defines
04:11 - 43.088 their gang territory block by block, then zooms in to this gas station.
04:11 - 46.191 Out front is where that gang is known to sell drugs,
04:11 - 49.594 in addition to their violent feuding with another neighborhood gang.
04:11 - 52.597 But this is a known, drug selling location.
04:11 - 54.065 All of that is important.
04:11 - 59.504 Information which would seemingly inform,
04:12 - 02.841 control orders and the shift, shift
04:12 - 06.111 allocation, manpower and surveillance.
04:12 - 09.347 And, I mean, the,
04:12 - 11.783 you know, a
04:12 - 17.589 very obtrusive or unobtrusive, but, heavy surveillance might have revealed,
04:12 - 21.392 all kinds of criminal conduct, hand-to-hand transactions or whatever.
04:12 - 26.664 But but none of that had been seen.
04:12 - 32.270 So, given that that there was no information
04:12 - 37.208 about who shivers was, other than the fact that these other known
04:12 - 41.412 gang members were nearby, I don't know how our Constitution
04:12 - 47.652 allows assumption of their criminal act, their criminal history attaching to him.
04:12 - 50.588 It's not guilt by association. It's a factor
04:12 - 54.425 of the reasonableness of suspicion, which has never been understood.
04:12 - 59.397 To presume a crime is committed, a reasonable suspicion of what?
04:12 - 02.834 That he is
04:13 - 05.870 that engaged in criminal activity
04:13 - 08.873 generally by the fact of to just quote
04:13 - 12.777 from Wardlow informing again the conduct of light,
04:13 - 18.149 looking at what they observe, that it is the consummate act of evasion.
04:13 - 22.987 So a criminal activity afoot, not necessarily a specific crime.
04:13 - 25.056 Right, right. Which is. Yes.
04:13 - 30.128 So they were there based on previous information about this
04:13 - 35.433 being a known, drug dealing location that they went to investigate
04:13 - 40.371 and attempted a mere encounter, but for reasonable suspicion.
04:13 - 43.575 I don't think the rule can be that it's always reactionary to
04:13 - 47.045 an established crime by at least probable cause.
04:13 - 49.747 And then I'm. You know, I'm not,
04:13 - 52.517 assuming,
04:13 - 55.053 there should be a reasonable doubt at this point.
04:13 - 58.056 I'm simply focusing on shivers
04:13 - 02.627 and and asking you what crime he was suspected of.
04:14 - 06.197 And, and you have not been able to identify.
04:14 - 08.499 And I don't fault you because it's not possible.
04:14 - 13.671 And I, I see any crime for which he was suspected.
04:14 - 17.242 So we can speak euphemistically about crimes
04:14 - 20.712 others have committed in that area, or bad actors nearby, or,
04:14 - 24.249 as the chief says, criminal activity afoot, whatever that means.
04:14 - 27.619 But I still I didn't make it up to
04:14 - 32.090 I'm still not getting an answer to what crime Mr.
04:14 - 35.093 Shivers was suspected of
04:14 - 38.029 when the police rolled up.
04:14 - 43.701 And it's because all there is beyond that is then him running, like,
04:14 - 47.772 you know, I might do in courts over today and take into consideration with justice.
04:14 - 51.409 Quick question. As to whether the the the
04:14 - 53.945 jurisprudence of a
04:14 - 57.515 suspicion is from a criminal activity afoot.
04:14 - 01.519 Does that equal a distinct crime?
04:15 - 03.588 To answer your question first.
04:15 - 06.724 No, but that's why, to answer your question directly,
04:15 - 10.528 the record is devoid of a of the officer going.
04:15 - 13.531 I suspected him of this particular crime at that moment.
04:15 - 15.900 What it does show is that they were at this
04:15 - 20.071 very specific location based on their experience
04:15 - 24.108 as a drug dealing location for a gang, members of which were there.
04:15 - 28.012 They go to approach one known gang member who who's sitting right next to Mr.
04:15 - 33.851 Shivers, and that is when he turns around and takes off in headlong flight.
04:15 - 36.854 The consummate act of evasion.
04:15 - 38.790 That's what. That's what word law says.
04:15 - 43.795 Justice Daugherty raised a really great question earlier.
04:15 - 47.532 How can it be that flight
04:15 - 52.503 from a mere encounter is fine, but they can be turned around
04:15 - 56.974 and used for reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
04:15 - 01.379 Because I disagreed with the premise on that against
04:16 - 04.682 going by the word, at least the word load definition of flight.
04:16 - 07.685 And I, you know, commend the concurrence in dissent
04:16 - 11.289 for distinguishing between an individual's right to refuse,
04:16 - 14.592 police interaction and walk away
04:16 - 17.495 from what that's not flight.
04:16 - 19.764 Okay. That's that's an issue.
04:16 - 22.900 What if they're an avid jogger and they just decided to run home?
04:16 - 26.104 I mean, that's yeah, I'm not sure I can make a meaningful distinction
04:16 - 29.674 between between flight is
04:16 - 31.409 the speed with
04:16 - 34.545 which or abruptness with which you choose to avoid.
04:16 - 37.982 A mere encounter with a police officer is indicative of criminal activity.
04:16 - 43.421 I, I think I think it is, Your Honor, there's a difference between arriving in.
04:16 - 46.190 And let's just accept for the purpose of the hypothetical,
04:16 - 50.027 it is a high crime, a mother calling you and saying, get home real quick
04:16 - 51.162 or I'm going to ground you for the rest.
04:16 - 55.066 Or even indicative of, I mean, viewed, viewed
04:16 - 58.302 alternatively and thinking of our privacy, right.
04:16 - 59.737 In Pennsylvania, you know,
04:16 - 04.776 how do you know, how can we know that shivers is inside?
04:17 - 05.977 This is a bad scene.
04:17 - 07.812 Something's going to go down here.
04:17 - 09.280 I want to get away from these people.
04:17 - 10.748 I want to get away from the police.
04:17 - 13.418 I want to get away from these bad guys who are sitting around me.
04:17 - 17.255 Now, I know you're going to say that's not what happened, but how do we know?
04:17 - 20.725 Oh, I wasn't even going to say that's not what happened.
04:17 - 22.660 Well, says the legal standard has never been
04:17 - 26.297 to disprove every possible innocent explanation for the conduct.
04:17 - 27.965 Again, we don't need to know.
04:17 - 30.768 We need to know what's reasonable under the circumstance. Exactly.
04:17 - 33.471 Your honor, remember a case called Terry versus Ohio? Yes.
04:17 - 34.839 Was that a high crime area?
04:17 - 36.441 So, was that a high crime?
04:17 - 38.075 No, I don't believe so.
04:17 - 40.178 What was a guy doing but casing.
04:17 - 42.146 But was he standing with a known gang area
04:17 - 44.682 in your honor?
04:17 - 48.820 I'm sorry, I probably haven't read in full since law school, and I apologize.
04:17 - 52.490 The short answer is it's a police case.
04:17 - 54.892 In this case, I was yet casing the joint.
04:17 - 59.163 Now. No, but if you say casing the joint now, you get objection, your honor.
04:17 - 01.999 What does that mean? Like it's like high crime area.
04:18 - 03.034 It's like casing the joint.
04:18 - 05.403 It's looking inside the police officer, based upon
04:18 - 06.871 his training, education, experience.
04:18 - 09.874 Thought the guy may be looking to burglarize or to commit a robbery.
04:18 - 11.742 So the police officer approaches him.
04:18 - 12.543 He doesn't run.
04:18 - 15.546 There's no flight, no high crime area, none of that.
04:18 - 18.649 And the police officer pats him down for the officer's protection.
04:18 - 21.786 And we found that under the United States Supreme Court found
04:18 - 24.789 that's reasonable under the circumstances, right? Yes.
04:18 - 27.859 So we're not talking about what we know.
04:18 - 30.561 We don't know he's a gang member, right? Correct.
04:18 - 33.898 The Ozone gang doesn't hand out little, membership cards like the,
04:18 - 35.533 the Elks Club, does it? Correct.
04:18 - 37.702 As far as I know, that's not it. We didn't, you know.
04:18 - 38.736 So there's nothing like that.
04:18 - 41.105 All we know is he's standing with a bunch of gang members
04:18 - 43.808 in that area that a police officer described as a high crime area.
04:18 - 45.943 I don't know if that was justified on the record or not.
04:18 - 46.544 He turned around,
04:18 - 49.547 looked at the police officers, grabbed his waistband and started running.
04:18 - 51.983 All of those individually. We know
04:18 - 54.619 could be innocent facts.
04:18 - 58.356 Yes, all together, under the totality of the circumstances, what's the issue?
04:18 - 01.692 Does a reasonable police officer under those circumstances?
04:19 - 06.197 I think that the guy maybe got engaged in criminal activity. Yes.
04:19 - 08.900 And that there's a lot that goes to my question to Mr.
04:19 - 09.934 Sergeant.
04:19 - 12.904 What what is the nature of this department departure or claim?
04:19 - 16.407 Because we have I believe this court has basically said,
04:19 - 18.876 you know, we've adopted Terry.
04:19 - 22.914 We basically said Terry is fine under our heightened privacy
04:19 - 25.983 protections under article one, section eight.
04:19 - 29.153 Mr.. The your, your,
04:19 - 32.823 your opposing counsel seems to be suggesting, though, that
04:19 - 38.996 we can have Terry adopt it, but somehow apply the same facts
04:19 - 41.499 to the Terry test and reach a different conclusion
04:19 - 44.502 on reasonable suspicion based on article one, section eight.
04:19 - 45.636 Do you out?
04:19 - 47.605 Am I not really doing well to articulate
04:19 - 50.608 the difference between the types of departure claims I'm talking about?
04:19 - 55.179 I don't think you can do what?
04:19 - 58.449 How your honor, just phrased that I'm.
04:19 - 02.420 I myself am confused about the departure claim
04:20 - 04.121 because, you know, I did want to go to waiver.
04:20 - 04.722 I feel like it.
04:20 - 09.293 The goalposts have moved back and forth even as recent as this argument.
04:20 - 12.296 They're not arguing that we shouldn't have reasonable suspicion.
04:20 - 13.698 They're not arguing that we shouldn't have
04:20 - 16.701 reasonable suspicion under article one, section eight.
04:20 - 18.169 They're arguing we should have it.
04:20 - 20.371 It should just be something different. Yes.
04:20 - 24.208 And my argument is that in in re DM two,
04:20 - 28.012 as a blanket overarching statement said, PA
04:20 - 32.950 follows Terry for the in assessing the constitutionality
04:20 - 36.520 of investigative detentions, which is the question presented here
04:20 - 40.925 to the extent that defendant's trying to say, well, that's too general.
04:20 - 43.561 And what I'm arguing is this more specific point.
04:20 - 47.965 That's exactly what goes into waiver here, is that they never argued.
04:20 - 52.770 I acknowledge we have the same overarching standard as the federal Constitution,
04:20 - 56.140 but I'm arguing that certain specific facts don't add up to that.
04:20 - 58.009 Under the PA Constitution,
04:20 - 01.012 they you don't dispute that they cited the state constitution.
04:21 - 03.781 Correct. So here's where I will.
04:21 - 06.317 You know, one of the problems I have a bishop, as I pointed out
04:21 - 09.320 in my dissent, you know, how much is enough?
04:21 - 10.421 How much is enough?
04:21 - 14.759 I can tell you, for the Commonwealth, the bottom line is not identifying it
04:21 - 17.094 in the lower court before the records close.
04:21 - 18.829 This allows it it.
04:21 - 19.964 I don't think it matters here.
04:21 - 24.035 On if this court were to get to the merits because of the specificity of the facts
04:21 - 29.373 that I've gone over, but if, if the defense can just
04:21 - 33.110 if every pre-check box omnibus motion includes the.
04:21 - 37.515 I'm bringing this under U.S., NPR constitution without specifying filing
04:21 - 40.751 any further reasoning
04:21 - 43.821 than the Commonwealth, any reasonably prudent prosecutor
04:21 - 45.690 is going to put forth a motion to suppress,
04:21 - 49.560 based on the then existing law, which is flight plus high crime area.
04:21 - 54.965 They put that forth, then records closed 1925 be statement.
04:21 - 58.402 Defendant says, actually I'm contesting those two factors
04:21 - 01.405 as equaling reasonable suspicion on a
04:22 - 03.774 RDA here.
04:22 - 07.278 Could have put forth a, a lesser
04:22 - 11.215 evidentiary record and still met the standard under current law.
04:22 - 15.252 And then the defense can come in on appeal and say the record is deficient
04:22 - 17.888 to meet this new standard. I'm asking for it.
04:22 - 18.856 I think that's well put.
04:22 - 24.095 But, given, it's not a lot, obviously, but the fact that they cited both,
04:22 - 29.300 why does it that put you on notice that they're putting both in play
04:22 - 32.336 and then you, you respond with whatever law is available to you on
04:22 - 33.904 on both on both areas.
04:22 - 37.475 It's a form that just puts us
04:22 - 41.545 on notice that all they're doing is raising it under federal, NPA
04:22 - 46.083 and what they're asking for in this case is after they've done so, saying,
04:22 - 49.587 I'm moving the goalposts of what the PA Constitution,
04:22 - 52.656 not what the law already is.
04:22 - 54.925 They are not acknowledging what the law
04:22 - 57.928 is and saying, I'm saying we should depart from that.
04:22 - 01.966 That's the problem with the defender was raised about the fact that he's moving
04:23 - 04.735 or she's moving to the cross under article one section,
04:23 - 07.271 and like to give the United States Constitution.
04:23 - 11.175 There is no indication on the record that they're asking you not only to
04:23 - 15.212 raise those two issues, but to distinguish the Pennsylvania from there.
04:23 - 16.547 It is the issue.
04:23 - 22.019 That's the boilerplate request that defense counsel makes regular
04:23 - 26.223 doesn't include that distinguishing aspect,
04:23 - 30.494 which would create that, that, that, you know, yes.
04:23 - 34.598 And and in the Commonwealth's position at least, like set aside
04:23 - 38.335 the timing of Edmunds analysis, allowing us a fair opportunity
04:23 - 41.338 to put forth relevant evidence of record.
04:23 - 44.308 And I've that I mean it.
04:23 - 49.380 I understand the boilerplate point, but the, I mean, you litigate
04:23 - 52.416 both aspects all the time.
04:23 - 53.984 It's not like you're not.
04:23 - 55.719 I don't mean you personally. Yeah.
04:23 - 59.690 The Commonwealth is not unfamiliar with the jurisprudence.
04:23 - 02.893 Keep is required to keep current, obviously. Yes.
04:24 - 06.063 With the jurisprudence, of both Pennsylvania
04:24 - 09.066 and the United States. So,
04:24 - 12.837 granted that,
04:24 - 17.541 the defense did not apparently flesh out distinguishing arguments.
04:24 - 19.543 Yeah. Why?
04:24 - 22.646 Why or why isn't the Commonwealth's able
04:24 - 25.716 to brief the law of both areas?
04:24 - 28.752 Because I can say in
04:24 - 33.190 exactly what happened in this case, the defendant raised the general claim.
04:24 - 36.460 I'm raising it under both, constitutions.
04:24 - 40.464 Checked off five different boxes for things, four of which didn't apply.
04:24 - 42.833 But I won't take issue with that because one of them does.
04:24 - 46.770 So that's the reasonableness of the stop and seizure based on the
04:24 - 52.076 then existing law, which we're looking at in re DM to a prosecutor
04:24 - 55.079 puts forth the evidence showing that there was unprovoked flight
04:24 - 58.415 in a high crime area and did their best
04:24 - 01.418 to substantiate the the high crime area.
04:25 - 03.587 The defendant did not identify.
04:25 - 07.157 Yes, I acknowledge that is the law, but I'm arguing
04:25 - 09.393 we should depart from that law.
04:25 - 14.465 That's that you're saying the prosecutor would have gotten more had they known
04:25 - 17.635 that this is a partial claim, which maybe, but we disagree.
04:25 - 21.305 But here's some additional testimony or here's some additional factors. Yes.
04:25 - 24.341 And not that any particular case needs to be verified
04:25 - 28.112 by some assurance that they would, but at least would have given the opportunity,
04:25 - 31.515 and then we would be at fault for not putting for that evidence.
04:25 - 35.286 When a specific claim is raised, whether it be the Pennsylvania
04:25 - 39.156 Constitution requires more specificity for the modicum of evidence
04:25 - 43.127 to establish high crime area like Louis precedence historically.
04:25 - 47.498 Again, anecdotally, as a district attorney, I would ask, pursuant to rule
04:25 - 51.936 or after counsel would raise a motion to articulate with specificity
04:25 - 55.239 and particularity the basis of the motion in the grounds for which they base,
04:25 - 59.944 which would at least open the door for the departure claim to be raised.
04:26 - 01.979 But in this particular scenario,
04:26 - 05.449 because the Commonwealth didn't do that, the departure claim was not preserved.
04:26 - 09.753 It was you to argue your case pursuant to the existing precedent
04:26 - 15.092 regarding article one, section 8 or 9, and the fourth or whatever amendments,
04:26 - 18.095 which I mean, it's pretty straightforward in criminal law.
04:26 - 19.930 Correct. And even as, Mr.
04:26 - 25.769 Sub not so I was not seem to acknowledge during argument at in closing argument is
04:26 - 29.239 when the prosecutor mentioned, your honor, this is flight in a high crime area,
04:26 - 32.977 and then there was still no, no rebuttal of.
04:26 - 35.045 But that's exactly what what I'm contesting.
04:26 - 36.146 I mean, we're just looking for
04:26 - 40.084 just enough to put us on notice of the evidence of the goalposts.
04:26 - 44.221 We need to get through to meet the claim, not just under the law,
04:26 - 47.825 but under what they are, the claim they are preserving for appeal
04:26 - 50.494 after the record is closed, and what the law should be.
04:26 - 51.695 Counsel, are.
04:26 - 56.133 Are you suggesting that there was other evidence,
04:26 - 59.903 or other considerations that the police officer
04:26 - 03.374 had in mind, when,
04:27 - 06.710 when he,
04:27 - 09.013 pursued this defendant
04:27 - 12.850 when he was, leaving the scene?
04:27 - 16.887 No, no, Your Honor, because I believe the again,
04:27 - 20.758 this was well-developed above and beyond what the then existing.
04:27 - 22.693 That's already my point.
04:27 - 23.761 My point.
04:27 - 25.763 And let me let me ask you this.
04:27 - 29.500 I mean, what could the trial court have done if he had raised
04:27 - 32.569 precisely this argument before the trial court?
04:27 - 36.340 The trial court would have said, based upon your argument, the M.
04:27 - 39.009 I can overrule DM.
04:27 - 40.844 It's what the Superior Court did.
04:27 - 45.149 And he said, and by the way, we're bound by precedent.
04:27 - 46.784 We can't do anything about this.
04:27 - 49.586 I mean, isn't it futile?
04:27 - 53.424 I think is the word that former chief justice emeritus used on
04:27 - 58.595 a number of occasions in explaining this kind of where there are situations
04:27 - 02.299 in which, thoroughly pursuing
04:28 - 05.335 the issue at the trial court level is futile.
04:28 - 07.704 No, Your Honor, because the
04:28 - 11.575 exactly what's happening here is the question is now before
04:28 - 15.212 this, it's still before this court to decide on a closed record.
04:28 - 19.216 And there are actual consequences for this particular
04:28 - 21.785 or whichever case it's being brought under.
04:28 - 23.787 There's there's still consequences for it.
04:28 - 26.557 So that's why I'm saying there's the one question
04:28 - 29.793 you brought as to the lower court's, what does it matter to them?
04:28 - 33.197 But I'm saying as the Commonwealth and as an advocate and the party
04:28 - 36.967 who has the burden to put forth evidence to meet whatever legal claims
04:28 - 37.734 being raised,
04:28 - 40.537 it does matter, because it would be enough for the trial court
04:28 - 44.208 to say, well, under existing law, that's, you know, presumably lesser evidence
04:28 - 47.344 than was presented here is enough. But,
04:28 - 51.882 you know, the Commonwealth needs the opportunity to know.
04:28 - 54.751 Defendants presented can claim for later that the goalpost should be moved.
04:28 - 57.154 So let's try and put forth evidence.
04:28 - 57.654 He's asked.
04:28 - 58.722 Counsel, I'm not sure.
04:28 - 00.824 You, I'm not sure you've mentioned this.
04:29 - 04.995 What would your argument mean?
04:29 - 09.433 That we were we were wrong in Alexander
04:29 - 12.736 to find the departure claim
04:29 - 15.005 sufficiently preserved, it would seem.
04:29 - 18.008 It would seem that your arguments are indistinguishable
04:29 - 21.211 from the Commonwealth's waiver argument in Alexander.
04:29 - 25.682 Yeah, I, I yes, I, I struggled to find a way to reconcile
04:29 - 30.387 the rule adopted in bishop and applied in bishop with, Alexander
04:29 - 35.092 and I really tried to double check every what was stated, what wasn't.
04:29 - 38.495 But foster decided this year
04:29 - 41.732 five to at least on on waiver.
04:29 - 44.067 Defense counsel already quoted the relevant portion.
04:29 - 48.272 But although foster cited the subsection of the PA Constitution
04:29 - 51.542 in a suppression motion, he did not develop any argument before
04:29 - 54.545 either lower court that it provided greater protection.
04:29 - 58.448 This court did add, and significantly, he did not raise a departure claim
04:29 - 01.718 in his petition for allowance of appeal, although that was here.
04:30 - 05.389 But then went on said thus, while this issue appears worthy of our review
04:30 - 08.458 in another case, foster has waive the claim here,
04:30 - 11.862 and this is far from the only case coming from whether it's Philadelphia
04:30 - 17.167 or anywhere else in this commonwealth where this the actual question presented
04:30 - 20.170 will have the opportunity to be before this court.
04:30 - 23.340 And again, for the Commonwealth, it's less significant about
04:30 - 26.343 whether they raise it in a petition for allowance of appeal.
04:30 - 30.013 It's whether they raise it at an opportunity, the Commonwealth
04:30 - 32.916 or at a time the Commonwealth has an opportunity
04:30 - 35.452 to enter evidence that would meet wherever Mr.
04:30 - 38.455 Sazonov is saying what what would be enough.
04:30 - 42.259 So that's that's the real issue that I would implore this court
04:30 - 46.263 it just to find this claim waived again, if it were to reach
04:30 - 49.833 the merits under in re DM two.
04:30 - 54.571 This is not an issue of first impression and even
04:30 - 59.876 wherever this court lands in in Lewis, I would say the specificity
04:30 - 03.347 of the officer's testimony here is going to be would meet
04:31 - 06.483 any departure between Lewis
04:31 - 09.486 and here of whatever the standard is.
04:31 - 11.955 All right. Thank you very much. Thank you.
04:31 - 12.489 Thank you both.
04:31 - 15.292 The court is going to hear argument
04:31 - 18.562 in the case of the Commonwealth versus Duvall, Hawkins, Davenport.
04:31 - 21.798 This is a case involving the propriety of a search
04:31 - 24.901 and seizure by the Philadelphia police in particular.
04:31 - 27.204 In this case, it involves a traffic stop.
04:31 - 30.307 And when the police pulled this car over because of a faulty brake light.
04:31 - 33.844 When the officers noted that there was a firearm
04:31 - 36.847 in the front of the passenger side of the car,
04:31 - 40.083 our officers were concerned that that firearm
04:31 - 43.086 could somehow be, you know, be used as part of this traffic stop.
04:31 - 46.123 And for their self-protection, an officer reached through the window
04:31 - 50.560 on the passenger side to grab the firearm and seize it, and it was later
04:31 - 54.197 determined that the driver did not have a lawful purpose
04:31 - 58.101 to have that gun, and was charged in that regard.
04:31 - 02.205 Now, what the driver contends is that, look,
04:32 - 06.443 there are lots of legal reasons that someone can own a firearm
04:32 - 11.214 in the city of Philadelphia, and just because there's a firearm there,
04:32 - 14.518 that by itself does not provide the reasonable suspicion
04:32 - 17.721 necessary to justify a seizure at that point.
04:32 - 21.692 The Commonwealth, through the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office,
04:32 - 25.829 basically argues that these are high stress situations.
04:32 - 28.765 These are high stakes situations everyone knows.
04:32 - 32.069 Some of the tragedies which have happened to police officers
04:32 - 35.138 during these stops, and that is absolutely reasonable,
04:32 - 38.275 that if they see a gun, that they should be allowed to seize it,
04:32 - 41.278 at that time, and that is that it is then proper evidence
04:32 - 44.481 which can be used as a defendant as it was here.
04:32 - 47.551 Good afternoon, Madam Chief Justice, and may it please the court.
04:32 - 48.485 My name is Michael Wood.
04:32 - 51.488 I represent Devine, Hawkins, Davenport in this case.
04:32 - 54.358 I have to pull the microphone.
04:32 - 56.059 Oh, yes, of course.
04:32 - 56.793 How's this?
04:32 - 59.796 A little taller than the last person.
04:33 - 03.467 Police cannot frisk a person or seize a weapon
04:33 - 07.404 without reasonable suspicion that they are both armed and dangerous.
04:33 - 08.572 Here, Mr.
04:33 - 11.007 Hawkins, Davenport was surely armed,
04:33 - 13.276 but there was no evidence that he was dangerous.
04:33 - 14.578 Quite the contrary.
04:33 - 17.581 He was entirely cooperative, levelheaded
04:33 - 20.050 and honest with police after they pulled him over.
04:33 - 23.587 In fact, one is hard pressed to imagine what else he could have done
04:33 - 26.823 to communicate to the officers that he was not a threat.
04:33 - 30.427 And yet the officer entered his car and seized his gun.
04:33 - 32.729 The difference, though, is here.
04:33 - 36.900 Unlike, for example, there was reasonable suspicion to stop.
04:33 - 40.003 That's an important distinction, isn't it?
04:33 - 40.604 It is.
04:33 - 43.907 And certainly we're not contesting the validity of the traffic stop here.
04:33 - 46.176 What we're contesting is having established
04:33 - 50.447 that there was reasonable suspicion of, I suppose the label is criminal activity.
04:33 - 52.682 In this case, it was a defective brake light.
04:33 - 55.652 The the next question becomes, is there evidence
04:33 - 59.423 that this person is armed and dangerous and beyond that.
04:33 - 02.492 Right. I mean, it's within his reach. It is.
04:34 - 05.962 But there's also no evidence that he reached for the weapon,
04:34 - 07.697 that he was uncooperative in any way,
04:34 - 11.234 that he was intoxicated, that he failed to pull over on signal.
04:34 - 14.438 And in other words, nothing about his conduct.
04:34 - 16.973 So let me let me stop you sure you have children?
04:34 - 17.707 No, Your Honor.
04:34 - 19.176 I have children.
04:34 - 22.179 I had two, three grandsons, two daughters.
04:34 - 24.214 I carry a gun.
04:34 - 25.916 You know what I don't do?
04:34 - 29.753 I don't put my gun on the coffee table when my grandchildren are around.
04:34 - 30.554 And you know why
04:34 - 33.657 I think I do you think that is.
04:34 - 34.257 What's that?
04:34 - 35.559 Why do you think that is?
04:34 - 37.561 I suspect you don't want your children to.
04:34 - 40.530 Or your grandchildren to reach that gun. Why?
04:34 - 44.968 Because as children and people who aren't either
04:34 - 48.505 registered or trained to handle a firearm, a gun is dangerous.
04:34 - 52.275 There are certainly a lot of situations in which a gun can be dangerous.
04:34 - 52.843 Yes you're right.
04:34 - 55.545 There's not any situation where a gun cannot be dangerous.
04:34 - 58.548 It is a gun is a specifically employed tool
04:34 - 01.918 to kill people or to shoot people or to defend yourself.
04:35 - 05.155 It is an instrument of dangerousness, almost by its very definition.
04:35 - 06.756 That's correct, Your Honor.
04:35 - 10.527 The question under Terry, though, is whether the person who is armed
04:35 - 14.164 is dangerous, and that depends on the totality of the circumstances.
04:35 - 15.832 That's why I'm going into Mr.
04:35 - 17.267 Hawkins Davenport's conduct.
04:35 - 22.105 Certainly, if he had reached for the gun, wouldn't exhibit any outward hostility.
04:35 - 25.075 The mere presence of a gun does not suggest criminality.
04:35 - 28.211 But do you agree with me that it does, in fact, suggest dangerousness?
04:35 - 32.883 I agree that guns, in some general sense, are certainly dangerous.
04:35 - 36.253 Where I disagree, I think, is that every person holding
04:35 - 40.090 a gun, regardless of the context, is always dangerous as opposed
04:35 - 44.661 to only needing to become dangerous in the need of legitimate self-defense.
04:35 - 47.731 When do we when do we cross that threshold?
04:35 - 50.700 Well, I think the United States is for the gun pulls,
04:35 - 52.469 you know, and points it at a police officer.
04:35 - 54.771 Is that point does he become dangerous? Certainly.
04:35 - 58.041 He would be dangerous at that point, but it doesn't even need to get that far.
04:35 - 01.545 I think any and any amount of conduct from the person
04:36 - 05.982 that shows that they are anything other than a cooperative motorist
04:36 - 09.286 who has just been pulled over for routine traffic stop, could contribute
04:36 - 13.156 to the dangerousness finding that could be intoxication,
04:36 - 16.259 that could be refusal to get out of the car upon an order.
04:36 - 19.663 That could mean swerving in the lane in such a way that indicates
04:36 - 21.031 that they're driving under the influence.
04:36 - 24.100 It could be a wide variety of things, but it does have to be something.
04:36 - 27.837 Council.
04:36 - 30.840 The gun was within your client's reach.
04:36 - 34.044 Doesn't that make your client
04:36 - 37.047 at that point in time presently dangerous?
04:36 - 39.583 I mean, this is in a situation where the gun is in
04:36 - 42.886 the back seat and, you know, there have to be all kinds of gyrations.
04:36 - 47.691 I mean, why isn't he presently dangerous to that police officer
04:36 - 51.094 at that moment when the gun is within his reach?
04:36 - 52.462 And casting?
04:36 - 55.599 I see the far that's our focus right now.
04:36 - 58.668 The protection of the police officer, his safety.
04:36 - 00.837 Correct. That? Absolutely. Yes.
04:37 - 02.973 I think the language from Pennsylvania versus Mims
04:37 - 06.142 is that officer safety is a legitimate and weighty interest.
04:37 - 07.711 I'm certainly not contesting that here.
04:37 - 13.750 Why isn't why isn't he presently dangerous when the gun is within his reach?
04:37 - 19.289 When he has, he's now engaged in a forced stop with a police officer.
04:37 - 23.126 Well, because he's given the officers no indication that he wishes them
04:37 - 24.995 any harm at all. He's certainly not.
04:37 - 25.996 Why does he have to?
04:37 - 29.265 The police officer at that juncture has to make a decision.
04:37 - 31.501 Is he presently
04:37 - 34.504 dangerous because of the gun being in reach?
04:37 - 35.939 That's right.
04:37 - 39.509 And and even under the armed and dangerous prong of Terry,
04:37 - 42.345 this has to be individualized suspicion.
04:37 - 46.316 In other words, it has to be based on the conduct of the individual
04:37 - 50.086 as opposed to whether guns are dangerous in some more general sense.
04:37 - 54.658 For that, for sure, we've established as a lawful stop.
04:37 - 57.727 And, the officer
04:37 - 00.730 Torrez seized the gun on the scene.
04:38 - 07.270 Why is why is his the officer grabbing the gun?
04:38 - 10.440 Not a reasonable extension of Terry?
04:38 - 11.975 In other words.
04:38 - 15.478 In other words, in in Terry, you have the lawful
04:38 - 18.648 frisk, for officer safety.
04:38 - 24.220 And, here, you have a lawful stop.
04:38 - 28.291 And I'm not sure how we could distinguish,
04:38 - 33.163 taking the gun here for officer safety from Terry.
04:38 - 34.431 Sure. So we.
04:38 - 37.567 Terry, the reason the person was stopped was that
04:38 - 40.704 there was reasonable suspicion he was about to commit an armed robbery.
04:38 - 43.506 I mean, he's casing this. I think it was a jewelry store.
04:38 - 46.109 And there was also indication that he had a gun on his hip.
04:38 - 49.379 The officer, based on his training experience, puts those two things together
04:38 - 49.946 and says,
04:38 - 50.914 this is a person who
04:38 - 54.184 is not about to use a gun for self-defense or if somebody starts attacking them.
04:38 - 57.253 This is a person contemplating a gunpoint robbery.
04:38 - 01.257 And at that point, certainly that person is dangerous and is limited
04:39 - 04.494 to suspected criminal activity that involves a gun.
04:39 - 07.163 No, I don't think it's limited that narrowly,
04:39 - 12.435 but I think that fact in Terry is what distinguished the basis for the stop
04:39 - 16.439 from the basis from the frisk forward all these years to all the times
04:39 - 19.976 Terry's been applied outside of the context of a suspect armed robber.
04:39 - 20.744 Sure.
04:39 - 23.480 And in every one of those cases, there's some evidence
04:39 - 27.083 of dangerousness beyond the mere presence of a weapon in plain view.
04:39 - 27.784 Yes, Your Honor.
04:39 - 32.255 So in Pennsylvania versus Mimms, for example, the the driver had,
04:39 - 35.125 committed, what, the 10th Circuit calls the clandestine
04:39 - 37.994 act of concealing his weapon from the police officer.
04:39 - 41.564 That could certainly play into the analysis in Michigan versus long.
04:39 - 44.567 The driver was not only intoxicated, but on cooperative.
04:39 - 47.437 And certainly those factors play in as well.
04:39 - 51.441 And I would also point out that this court has followed a similar logic in a case
04:39 - 53.243 like Commonwealth versus Lagana,
04:39 - 56.012 where, again, a person is standing outside in the rain
04:39 - 59.983 casing some kind of business, and there's an indication that they have a gun.
04:40 - 03.720 Again, there there's some indication that they are going to use that gun
04:40 - 07.590 for purposes of unlawful violence as opposed to legitimate self-defense.
04:40 - 11.327 This was based upon a traffic
04:40 - 15.265 infraction that ultimately led to the plain view of a firearm.
04:40 - 19.202 Our case law would have permitted the officer
04:40 - 22.639 to require that your client step out of the car, correct?
04:40 - 23.206 That's right.
04:40 - 24.808 Would have even permitted
04:40 - 27.877 the police officer to put your client in his police car.
04:40 - 28.878 Correct?
04:40 - 29.612 I believe that's right.
04:40 - 33.049 Yes. Instead, he just reached in and grabbed the gun.
04:40 - 39.856 Why is it that your argument is that the police officer's
04:40 - 43.092 not allowed to grab the gun, but he could grab the body?
04:40 - 48.198 What I would submit, Your Honor, is that this is a more significant intrusion
04:40 - 50.567 than just asking someone to get out of the car.
04:40 - 54.637 We're talking not just about the physical trespass into the space of the car.
04:40 - 56.339 Is this court recognized in Saunders?
04:40 - 00.410 That is, while certainly not as intrusive as something like Alexander,
04:41 - 03.479 where there's a full on search of the car and clothes containers and so forth.
04:41 - 07.984 It is still a search, subject to scrutiny, and does violate the person's
04:41 - 10.987 kind of right to be left alone in their private space.
04:41 - 14.224 We then add to that the seizure of the property,
04:41 - 17.794 which, as far as the officer knew at that time, was entirely lawfully owned.
04:41 - 21.965 Whereas in Saunders, this was a case where the defendant had
04:41 - 24.367 already told that the officer. Right. This is contraband.
04:41 - 25.635 I don't have a license for this.
04:41 - 30.240 And the and so the court concluded with, with some disagreement that there really
04:41 - 34.811 is no legitimate interest in what the officer knows to be contraband.
04:41 - 39.215 But again, this is a stop on reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause.
04:41 - 42.952 And and, and so reasonableness kicks in.
04:41 - 46.155 So if we look at the flip side,
04:41 - 49.158 in this in this situation is real life situation.
04:41 - 52.996 Would it not be unreasonable for the officer
04:41 - 57.433 to get that gun out of the wingspan of the, of the actor?
04:41 - 02.005 I, I I'm a little confused because I think that ends up being the same question.
04:42 - 02.472 Right?
04:42 - 06.342 If either it is reasonable or it's not, and I'm submitting that it's not without
04:42 - 11.347 knowing whether a gun is legal or illegal, it's inherently dangerous.
04:42 - 13.383 Apropos of justice McCaffrey's question.
04:42 - 15.952 Would you agree? Sure.
04:42 - 21.090 So, given that the stop is lawful,
04:42 - 24.794 it's necessary that,
04:42 - 27.363 safety be preserved?
04:42 - 28.231 Sure.
04:42 - 32.969 So given that, would it, would it have been would anything
04:42 - 36.639 other than seizing that gun at that moment have been reasonable?
04:42 - 39.809 Yes. Your honor, I think it would have been reasonable to order Mr.
04:42 - 41.477 Hawkins Davenport out of the car.
04:42 - 44.480 I think it would have been reasonable to order him to keep his hands on the,
04:42 - 48.051 driver's wheel or whatever it is that the officer normally orders.
04:42 - 50.820 And frankly, it would have been probably reasonable
04:42 - 53.856 to secure him outside of the car, as Justice Daugherty suggested,
04:42 - 57.427 because that's already what's authorized by Mims here.
04:42 - 01.431 What the Commonwealth is asking for is essentially, as I understand it,
04:43 - 05.168 an attempt to get rid of context and ignore the totality of
04:43 - 08.905 the circumstances in favor of just identifying a single fact
04:43 - 11.541 and then basing everything based on that.
04:43 - 14.477 It as far as I can tell,
04:43 - 15.778 would
04:43 - 19.148 encourage police officers to treat even lawful gun owners
04:43 - 22.785 as presumptive criminals, people who would be willing to use a gun against them
04:43 - 27.457 without a temporary seizure for officer safety, and more importantly,
04:43 - 32.128 probably 99% of the time, the defendant's safety or the driver's safety.
04:43 - 34.430 I mean, what if what if the officer sees that?
04:43 - 34.964 I mean,
04:43 - 38.601 if we accept what you're suggesting, you can't temporarily seize the weapon.
04:43 - 41.270 What if the guy goes to reach for his glove compartment?
04:43 - 43.006 The officer thinks he's reaching for his gun,
04:43 - 46.009 which is sitting two feet from him, or the center console,
04:43 - 48.411 or he does anything else that the officer perceives
04:43 - 51.447 to be him reaching for the gun, or makes the officer nervous.
04:43 - 53.483 We just had an officer involved
04:43 - 55.785 shooting in Philadelphia where the person had a knife.
04:43 - 59.455 The, the fellow, the fellow downtown and the police officer
04:43 - 00.656 heard somebody else say gun.
04:44 - 01.691 The guy had a knife in his hand.
04:44 - 04.861 A police officer shot him a if we if we accept
04:44 - 08.197 what you're suggesting, which is there can't be any temporary seizure here.
04:44 - 13.136 I think you're putting both officers and civilians in danger.
04:44 - 15.371 I understand that, Your Honor.
04:44 - 18.107 And I certainly don't want to put anybody in danger here.
04:44 - 22.945 All I'm suggesting is that the officer consider the totality of the circumstances
04:44 - 25.381 that Terry required, as this court has required,
04:44 - 28.251 and that when there's no evidence that this person is anything other
04:44 - 33.222 than a cooperative, lawful gun owner, that the presence of a gun by itself,
04:44 - 37.360 without anything else is not enough to have a license for a permit to carry.
04:44 - 39.629 They later found out that he did not.
04:44 - 41.798 So your client. What you say you're.
04:44 - 43.166 I don't understand what you're suggesting.
04:44 - 45.968 He wasn't a licensed and lawful gun owner, right?
04:44 - 47.370 I mean, what I'm suggesting is
04:44 - 50.940 based on the officer's information at the time they made the seizure.
04:44 - 53.142 What's the remedy? Suppression?
04:44 - 53.843 Yes, Your Honor.
04:44 - 58.081 If the seizure was unlawful, then the evidence is suppressed as a result.
04:44 - 02.185 So I certainly don't want to denigrate the interest here.
04:45 - 02.485 Right.
04:45 - 05.788 Officers have a legitimate and weighty interest in their own safety.
04:45 - 08.791 And, of course, they're charged with protecting public safety.
04:45 - 12.462 But we do have a circuit split to some degree on this question.
04:45 - 16.899 And the Sixth Circuit, seventh circuit, as well as Arizona and Idaho.
04:45 - 20.336 I, I should point out, actually, I thought as well that the, you know,
04:45 - 23.739 the Supreme Court of New Mexico had followed that line of reasoning.
04:45 - 26.442 Mr. Erlich pointed out to me yesterday there was a case that I think
04:45 - 29.312 he can tell you about a little bit more, where they've since departed
04:45 - 32.315 from that rationale, there still remains several jurisdictions
04:45 - 36.119 across the country that have accepted the argument that I'm making here, right,
04:45 - 36.819 that there needs to be
04:45 - 40.289 some evidence of dangerousness beyond the mere presence of a weapon.
04:45 - 42.024 And there's no evidence
04:45 - 45.628 that I've been able to find that either police officers or the public at large
04:45 - 49.732 are more at risk, more in danger than those here in those jurisdictions.
04:45 - 50.466 Mr. wood,
04:45 - 54.604 if he had placed him in his police car,
04:45 - 58.774 and he was able to contact
04:45 - 02.111 to determine whether he was license,
04:46 - 05.114 and he found out that he was not licensed,
04:46 - 08.317 he was then placed under arrest,
04:46 - 11.654 would not have inevitable discover your search incident to arrest.
04:46 - 15.358 Have waived any injury by recovering that gun.
04:46 - 20.429 And if so, why should we rule for any reason based upon inevitable discovery?
04:46 - 24.734 So inevitable discovery is an additional burden on the Commonwealth
04:46 - 28.471 to show that, notwithstanding the initial illegality, they inevitably
04:46 - 30.940 would have found the evidence through other means.
04:46 - 34.277 And as far as I know, none of that was developed on the record below.
04:46 - 38.781 Now, it may be that a case on similar facts that develops that record
04:46 - 41.951 inevitable discovery might apply, but I don't believe the Commonwealth
04:46 - 43.019 is made that out here.
04:46 - 45.655 So your argument is for this court.
04:46 - 48.691 But the mere fact that cherry says armed
04:46 - 54.230 and presently dangerous, your position is because you don't believe
04:46 - 58.467 presently dangerous was proven by the Commonwealth.
04:46 - 00.303 That's correct, Your Honor.
04:47 - 05.274 And I would I would point out that if the court meant that all armed
04:47 - 08.444 people were automatically dangerous, as I think the Commonwealth is suggesting,
04:47 - 10.279 they would have just said armed.
04:47 - 12.381 Hypothetically, if the Commonwealth
04:47 - 13.716 at the
04:47 - 19.622 motion asked the court or at a hearing, asked the court to take judicial notice
04:47 - 23.125 that firearms are inherently dangerous.
04:47 - 28.631 Would that have satisfied the second
04:47 - 33.769 prong of the second factor at the Tari analysis, armed and presently dangerous?
04:47 - 36.872 Not by itself, Your Honor, because the question under Terry is
04:47 - 40.977 whether the person is presently dangerous, not whether guns are dangerous.
04:47 - 44.947 In some general sense, concept is as the evidence brought out,
04:47 - 48.951 it was within the arm span of your client
04:47 - 52.855 and arguably under constructive possession.
04:47 - 55.224 Sure, you have it.
04:47 - 58.227 So why would that not have?
04:47 - 00.930 I'm just trying to tease out. So are you.
04:48 - 03.966 What it appears to me is you're asking now the Commonwealth
04:48 - 08.204 in types of cases like this today, all they have to do is ask for it.
04:48 - 11.173 If it's in the wingspan, constructive possession.
04:48 - 14.844 Well, they have to ask for judicial notice that the firearm is
04:48 - 16.279 inherently dangerous.
04:48 - 20.149 Therefore, it's logical that he was armed and presently dangerous
04:48 - 22.518 because he see it within the arm span
04:48 - 26.956 of a judicially noted object.
04:48 - 28.658 That's not what I'm asking for here, Your Honor.
04:48 - 31.861 What I'm asking for is for the officer during the traffic stop
04:48 - 34.497 to consider the totality of the circumstances.
04:48 - 38.067 As I say, any number of factors could contribute to dangerousness
04:48 - 39.935 beyond the mere presence of the weapon.
04:48 - 44.040 But when all of those factors are absent, then all we have is armed
04:48 - 45.875 instead of armed and dangerous.
04:48 - 49.478 So you seem to be I mean, I'm I seem to be minimizing
04:48 - 53.215 the dangerousness of police traffic stops aren't.
04:48 - 55.051 I mean, police traffic stops.
04:48 - 56.819 Wouldn't you agree?
04:48 - 59.055 Have it carry a certain amount of danger?
04:48 - 00.156 Yes, sir.
04:49 - 03.492 Walking up to a vehicle, not knowing what state
04:49 - 07.263 the driver is, in, what condition the driver is, and anything like that.
04:49 - 09.365 There's an unlike just seeing a person
04:49 - 12.968 walking down the street carrying an open sidearm, which is legal.
04:49 - 18.708 A traffic stop comes with its own unique set of vulnerabilities
04:49 - 21.977 for the law enforcement officer, as well as rest of the people in the vehicle.
04:49 - 23.446 I think that's right, Your Honor.
04:49 - 24.780 I think this court has recognized
04:49 - 27.750 that Supreme Court of United States has recognized that
04:49 - 30.853 the vast majority of traffic stops conclude without a need.
04:49 - 34.557 There are some small, small minority of them that do lead to violence,
04:49 - 38.728 and officers should take precautions to prevent that when they need to.
04:49 - 43.432 But the mere fact that it is a traffic stop doesn't automate automatically.
04:49 - 46.001 Make whoever's in the car armed and dangerous.
04:49 - 47.903 Otherwise I suppose there be.
04:49 - 48.270 Well, no.
04:49 - 50.439 But but that's. But but you can't ignore that.
04:49 - 53.776 And here, here number one, you know you're starting with an inherent
04:49 - 56.979 you're starting with an inherent, inherent risk of danger for the police
04:49 - 00.216 officer to stop this vehicle and approach the vehicle blindly.
04:50 - 01.650 Right. That's right.
04:50 - 04.320 That police officer is on guard.
04:50 - 06.389 Now, maybe, you know, they don't have their weapons drawn.
04:50 - 09.625 That might be a little bit excessive, but they've they've been trained to park
04:50 - 12.628 vehicles, certain ways to have a place to retreat to.
04:50 - 14.330 There's there's training that they receive
04:50 - 16.932 for purposes of initiating a traffic stop. And they come up.
04:50 - 19.935 Usually they have two officers they might approach on both sides.
04:50 - 22.738 There's there's a lot of reasons why they treat,
04:50 - 24.540 vehicle
04:50 - 27.610 stops carefully because of the dangerousness of them.
04:50 - 30.079 Combine that with the fact that, okay, you've already
04:50 - 32.081 have you already have a heightened, dangerous circumstance.
04:50 - 34.984 Now, as the police officers approach, oh my gosh.
04:50 - 39.722 Within hand shot of of the driver is a weapon.
04:50 - 43.159 So I'm kind of
04:50 - 45.628 you keep going to all he had was a weapon.
04:50 - 46.929 But don't we have to take that
04:50 - 50.065 on top of the dangerousness inherent in the stop itself?
04:50 - 50.866 Sure.
04:50 - 53.936 I mean, certainly this court should consider to consider the totality
04:50 - 57.840 of the circumstances, including what it has found about traffic stops in general.
04:50 - 02.912 But what Terry has always required is individualized suspicion.
04:51 - 06.248 And so while the gentleman was there another individual
04:51 - 07.383 in possession of the weapon?
04:51 - 10.386 No, no, he's the only person in the car, isn't it?
04:51 - 14.356 You know, of course it's individualized as to him being armed, what I'm suggesting
04:51 - 17.660 is the fact that other people at other times
04:51 - 21.263 may have been dangerous during a traffic stop has very little to say about
04:51 - 25.334 whether he individually was dangerous during this particular traffic stop.
04:51 - 30.105 Doesn't the reasonableness calculus here have to take him?
04:51 - 33.576 Necessarily have to take into account
04:51 - 37.480 the immediacy with which he could grab and use that weapon?
04:51 - 39.315 Yes, of course.
04:51 - 43.319 And that coupled with the fact that it's only a temporary seizure,
04:51 - 48.958 in other words, absent some other facts developing that presumably upon
04:51 - 51.961 confirming that the
04:51 - 55.831 gun was legally possessed, which was not the case, but upon learning
04:51 - 58.934 that it was legally possessed, the officer would have again absent
04:51 - 01.704 something else would have presumably been returning the gun.
04:52 - 03.439 Right? That's right.
04:52 - 06.442 The mere, I guess I should point out,
04:52 - 08.477 I'm not.
04:52 - 12.448 I'm certainly not suggesting this is as invasive as Alexander,
04:52 - 15.150 or even as invasive, really, as a frisk of the person,
04:52 - 17.086 which really kind of involves quite an invasive,
04:52 - 18.621 you know, touching and so forth.
04:52 - 23.025 What I am suggesting is that this level of intrusion was not nothing.
04:52 - 26.128 It was not de minimis, as the Superior Court seemed to to
04:52 - 29.164 to indicate that having someone come into your car,
04:52 - 32.668 you know, trespass physically into the space and then take your,
04:52 - 36.839 your private property, that as far as they knew at the time, he possessed lawfully,
04:52 - 41.210 is certainly something that is is worthy of balancing on the other side
04:52 - 44.413 of this court's entirely legitimate concern for officer safety.
04:52 - 48.784 Well, an officer to a traffic stop can be killed
04:52 - 52.955 by a licensed gun just as easily as an unlicensed gun.
04:52 - 55.090 Correct? That's right. Yes.
04:52 - 59.495 And and certainly this doesn't turn on the legality of the gun,
04:52 - 01.397 as it ultimately turns out to be. Right?
04:53 - 03.299 I mean, I think Adams B Williams makes that point
04:53 - 07.369 pretty clearly that as you as you point out, Justice Chief Justice Todd, that,
04:53 - 09.538 you know, there are some situations
04:53 - 12.541 in which lawfully owned guns can be used to harm people.
04:53 - 15.911 But it's another step further to say
04:53 - 20.449 we don't care about the rest of the totality of the circumstances.
04:53 - 23.752 The individual's conduct, in other words, doesn't matter to the analysis.
04:53 - 25.354 So let me follow up on that.
04:53 - 26.722 What's an officer to do?
04:53 - 30.726 I mean, if you're correct, are they to wait
04:53 - 34.296 for the circumstance to develop
04:53 - 37.299 that the driver reaches for the gun?
04:53 - 41.503 I mean, you know, they're these are momentary kinds
04:53 - 44.139 of decisions and interactions.
04:53 - 48.143 I mean, what you're suggesting is unrealistic in the real world.
04:53 - 51.213 What I'm suggesting is that the officer use
04:53 - 53.248 the tools that are already available to them,
04:53 - 56.785 ordering someone out of the car or those kinds of that less intrusive.
04:53 - 01.023 I mean, getting back to just the Socrates earlier question,
04:54 - 05.361 why is that less intrusive than momentarily seizing the gun?
04:54 - 08.998 Well, both because it involves a physical trespass into the car,
04:54 - 11.667 and it also involves the seizure of private property,
04:54 - 14.503 even though there's no indication that it's evidence of a crime.
04:54 - 18.907 So I think the Mimms court pointed out that the only difference between
04:54 - 22.044 allowing someone to stay in their car during a traffic stop
04:54 - 24.079 and getting out of the car during a traffic stop
04:54 - 27.616 is where you're sitting while this investigation is going on
04:54 - 31.553 here, we're talking about not just the physical position of somebody's body,
04:54 - 33.355 but we're talking about the disposition
04:54 - 36.659 of their property and the sanctity of their privates space.
04:54 - 39.328 Okay, Mr. Wood, nice job.
04:54 - 41.130 Thank you. Let's hear from Mr. Lick.
04:54 - 43.365 Thank you very much from the Commonwealth.
04:54 - 49.872 May it please the court by public for the Commonwealth.
04:54 - 52.741 Under Terry, we ask two questions.
04:54 - 55.744 First, we ask, was there a lawful detention?
04:54 - 58.747 Everyone agrees there was a lawful detention here.
04:54 - 01.617 And the second concern with Terry is whether or not
04:55 - 04.620 a reasonable person would be warranted in the belief
04:55 - 08.357 that his safety was in danger under the circumstances.
04:55 - 12.628 And I think very clearly, for reasons that many of you have already articulated,
04:55 - 15.597 that was clearly the the the case here.
04:55 - 20.469 We have, lots of case law from the United States Supreme Court
04:55 - 24.973 talking about the inherent danger of traffic stops on top of that,
04:55 - 29.445 we have case law talking about the inherent danger of guns here.
04:55 - 31.914 We have both those circumstances together.
04:55 - 36.418 It's perfectly true that in the approximate at least 60s
04:55 - 41.790 between when, defendant is pulled over and when the officer sees the gun,
04:55 - 44.927 he doesn't, during that time do anything that is
04:55 - 48.030 independently threatening or menacing.
04:55 - 49.231 But they offer. Yeah.
04:55 - 53.302 Just, because you mentioned traffic stop.
04:55 - 58.140 Would you agree that, that,
04:55 - 02.044 were we to affirm in this case,
04:56 - 06.248 the affirmative should be limited to traffic stop situations?
04:56 - 08.751 The reason I ask that is, you know,
04:56 - 13.322 because we're not making a decision, which only applies to, you know, Mr.
04:56 - 14.757 Hawkins. Davenport.
04:56 - 18.994 So, you know, there is, like, a universal mandate or.
04:56 - 21.196 I mean, it is, you know, wider application, obviously.
04:56 - 24.333 So, you would not argue or would you,
04:56 - 27.870 that,
04:56 - 30.839 that were we to affirm here
04:56 - 35.110 that that would necessarily mean that supposing,
04:56 - 39.648 somebody, outside of Philadelphia was walking down a Pennsylvania street
04:56 - 43.252 with an open carry, you know, gun in a holster on the hip?
04:56 - 48.223 That, that person then J walked j one,
04:56 - 52.795 so the police could lawfully stop that person.
04:56 - 56.698 If jaywalking was enforced as it is, say, in Dallas, Texas, where
04:56 - 00.002 where I was stopped and I was lost, and you get a ticket for,
04:57 - 03.205 but it is enforced in some places, believe it or not.
04:57 - 05.340 Anyway. Anyway,
04:57 - 08.343 so, under
04:57 - 11.346 or would you maintain that
04:57 - 16.151 the police officer in that circumstance could disarm that person automatically
04:57 - 19.888 without any further fact, just by verse,
04:57 - 24.293 just by virtue of the stop being lawful and the person being armed.
04:57 - 27.029 So let me say two things in response to that.
04:57 - 31.200 Justice Wecht The first is that I think this is an easy case because it's
04:57 - 34.469 so well-established under the case law about the particular
04:57 - 37.472 inherent danger of of car stops.
04:57 - 40.542 So I think that this case is the easy one.
04:57 - 44.813 In terms of the jaywalking case, I would argue that that would be okay,
04:57 - 48.584 because I think that if we have, the danger would flow from
04:57 - 52.187 the forced detention combined with having a deadly weapon.
04:57 - 54.857 Now, I don't want to denigrate the fact
04:57 - 57.926 that there is a standard that talks about armed and dangerous,
04:57 - 01.330 and I could imagine some circumstances where somebody would be armed
04:58 - 02.130 and not dangerous.
04:58 - 04.600 You can be armed with a large variety of things.
04:58 - 08.070 You can be armed with a screwdriver, you could be armed with a fork.
04:58 - 11.640 And if we have something that isn't a deadly weapon, such as a gun,
04:58 - 14.877 you might need a more particular law analysis.
04:58 - 20.315 There might also be particular unusual circumstances where a police officer knows
04:58 - 24.386 in advance that the person who's stopping is lawfully licensed, and there's
04:58 - 28.557 somebody who has a completely law abiding, individual,
04:58 - 31.760 maybe an officer stopping another off duty officer or
04:58 - 34.997 something like that, where he knows that the gun is on, is unloaded.
04:58 - 40.002 But I would argue, if pressed, that in the jaywalking situation, that itself
04:58 - 44.106 would present a situation where we're simply going
04:58 - 47.943 and taking custody of the gun temporarily for the duration of the stop
04:58 - 49.211 would be permissible.
04:58 - 52.047 Thank you for not throwing a high, high crime area six.
04:58 - 56.852 So, as as I've
04:58 - 00.055 indicated, I think armed and dangerous are both important.
04:59 - 04.059 It's honestly unclear how much the Terry Court thought about
04:59 - 06.028 what that standard meant, because there are times
04:59 - 07.930 they say armed and dangerous, as are other times.
04:59 - 10.933 And Terry, they say armed and thus dangerous.
04:59 - 15.404 But it's clear that the sort of danger that's necessary to be presented,
04:59 - 20.609 it can be, under some circumstances, something that arises from a particular
04:59 - 24.613 suspicious or menacing thing, but a defendant does.
04:59 - 27.316 But it doesn't always have to arise in that way.
04:59 - 30.319 The danger can arise from the situation.
04:59 - 32.454 And I think the case which is most on
04:59 - 36.091 point is Pennsylvania versus Mimms, Pennsylvania.
04:59 - 39.294 Excuse me, Pennsylvania versus Mimms is a case
04:59 - 41.830 where it's a completely routine traffic stop.
04:59 - 44.666 It's a stop for driving with an expired license.
04:59 - 49.338 This common graph, agreed in Mimms that he did nothing suspicious at all.
04:59 - 50.706 The officers stopped some.
04:59 - 54.810 What are some out of the car and see is that he has a bulge under his clothing.
04:59 - 56.044 That's it.
04:59 - 59.247 The United States Supreme Court said it's absolutely clear
04:59 - 04.920 the officer was justified in frisking him and removing what turned out to be a gun.
05:00 - 06.688 Here we have two significant
05:00 - 09.691 differences from Mimms, but I think they both cut in my favor.
05:00 - 13.695 We have something that not a bulge that might be a gun or something
05:00 - 14.429 innocuous.
05:00 - 18.600 We have a gun and we also have something which is less intrusive, as Mr.
05:00 - 20.235 Woods said, than the full frisk.
05:00 - 24.506 We we simply have a taking without any touching of the person.
05:00 - 26.274 So Mr.
05:00 - 30.512 Woods, my distinguished opponent really has attempted to distinguish Mimms
05:00 - 31.913 in a couple of ways.
05:00 - 35.851 The way he did, just a few minutes ago was to say,
05:00 - 39.521 well, Mimms involved the clandestine act of concealment.
05:00 - 43.325 It's true that the gun in Mimms was concealed, but
05:00 - 45.627 it's important to recognize that Mimms.
05:00 - 48.764 There was no allegation or indication that Mr.
05:00 - 53.168 Mimms did anything sneaky, that he went and suddenly grab something
05:00 - 56.138 and put it under his coat for all we know, with appeared
05:00 - 59.141 he was simply traveling with the gun under his coat.
05:00 - 03.712 So that was it would be very odd to sort of distinguish Mimms on that basis.
05:01 - 07.015 I think, and say that the frisking members was okay, and this one wasn't.
05:01 - 11.219 Mr.. Was was a concealed situation which could have been completely lawful.
05:01 - 14.489 Right. Yes. But but if it's if you
05:01 - 16.391 it's, it's isn't it.
05:01 - 21.029 Just as I may be wrong on this, isn't it just as illegal to conceal a weapon
05:01 - 21.930 on your body
05:01 - 26.001 without a concealed carry permit, as it is to conceal a weapon in your vehicle?
05:01 - 29.071 Well, actually, under Pennsylvania law, the Pennsylvania General
05:01 - 32.874 Assembly in Pennsylvania has been very concerned about guns in vehicles.
05:01 - 35.143 So if you don't have a license, it's illegal
05:01 - 38.346 to have a gun in your vehicle, whether it's concealed or open.
05:01 - 38.947 That's what I mean.
05:01 - 41.116 Equally concealed in your vehicle doesn't
05:01 - 44.119 mean in the glove compartment, it means in the vehicle anywhere.
05:01 - 44.820 Right? Right.
05:01 - 48.790 So so concealment is not an element of the crime under 6106.
05:01 - 51.059 It's treated exactly the same.
05:01 - 53.228 I want to note there were two other ways that Mr.
05:01 - 56.231 Woods has attempted in this briefing to distinguish memes.
05:01 - 00.068 One is to say that everything that Mimms said about frisking
05:02 - 02.971 was all dictum, because it wasn't argued below,
05:02 - 06.541 and I don't think that's accurate in the Pennsylvania Superior Court
05:02 - 09.578 decision and Mimms, which is published, there's a specific holding that
05:02 - 13.315 the frisk was lawful when it got up to this horrible court.
05:02 - 15.183 Chief justice
05:02 - 18.320 next read that the opinion specifically saying it was lawful
05:02 - 20.889 and the majority assumed argue whether it was a lawful
05:02 - 23.758 but ruled against the Commonwealth on a different basis.
05:02 - 27.095 That then was reversed by the US Supreme Court when the U.S.
05:02 - 28.130 Supreme Court had that.
05:02 - 31.967 I think both issues were very much in contention, and the court reached
05:02 - 35.770 both and remanded for a proceeding consistent with its opinion.
05:02 - 38.607 So I don't think its decision can be dismissed.
05:02 - 41.476 This dictum, I think that the third thing that Mr.
05:02 - 44.246 Woodson sort of indicated that this sort of Mimms
05:02 - 47.849 really doesn't provide guidance today because there's been such a change
05:02 - 48.216 in the law.
05:02 - 51.253 One, we all know that many more people are licensed to carry.
05:02 - 54.556 I think ultimately that's an issue for us Supreme Court.
05:02 - 55.891 But what I would point out
05:02 - 58.927 is that the fact that so many people are licensed to carry
05:02 - 03.598 today is relevant for tarring purposes, but that goes to the Hicks
05:03 - 07.802 issue, the issue of whether you can lawfully stop somebody.
05:03 - 09.738 We're not dealing with that.
05:03 - 11.039 Here is the Hicks opinion.
05:03 - 15.277 Took pains to point out, the fact that whether or not you can stop
05:03 - 18.446 somebody is a different standard than once
05:03 - 22.551 a police officer has lawfully stopped somebody, he's doing his job.
05:03 - 26.454 He's forced to be in close quarters with somebody which is armed.
05:03 - 31.126 That presents a very different issue, and their safety is paramount,
05:03 - 32.394 particularly since.
05:03 - 36.064 And the officers, the chief justice, indicated, that can be equally jeopardized
05:03 - 40.335 by somebody who lawfully has a license or who doesn't have a license.
05:03 - 43.338 The other thing that I'm sorry.
05:03 - 44.406 No, no. Go ahead. Yeah.
05:03 - 44.940 The other thing
05:03 - 48.043 I just wanted to point out, is that there was a case
05:03 - 50.879 that, unfortunately, I didn't discover in time for my briefing,
05:03 - 53.248 but I wanted to notify the court about that
05:03 - 55.383 because I think it's particularly interesting.
05:03 - 59.888 It's a decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico called state versus Cabazon.
05:04 - 02.224 So in
05:04 - 07.095 257 Pacific third 957.
05:04 - 10.098 That's New Mexico Supreme Court, 2011.
05:04 - 13.335 What is so interesting about that is it's very similar facts.
05:04 - 16.938 It's a completely routine stop where they reach in and grab a gun.
05:04 - 21.676 And the New Mexico Supreme Court said, not only is this consistent
05:04 - 24.946 with the Fourth Amendment, it is completely consistent
05:04 - 28.917 with the heightened protection of the New Mexico Constitution.
05:04 - 32.454 New Mexico, like Pennsylvania, rejects the automobile exception
05:04 - 34.122 and has heightened protection.
05:04 - 36.324 But they said it's completely fine.
05:04 - 38.460 Even under our heightened state constitution.
05:04 - 40.829 There's no state constitutional issue here.
05:04 - 44.132 But that's the one case I found where this has been independently analyzed
05:04 - 47.469 under a state Supreme Court and found to pass muster.
05:04 - 49.504 Thank you, thank you.
05:04 - 51.840 If there are no further questions, I'd ask you firm.
05:04 - 53.708 Thank you. Thank you both excellent arguments.
05:04 - 57.512 So I am going
05:04 - 01.516 to provide a preview for the case that we're going to hear.
05:05 - 04.552 Next it is the Commonwealth, the Coles.
05:05 - 09.157 We've we've had a couple previews for you involving police officers rights.
05:05 - 13.862 Well police officer actions in stopping
05:05 - 17.666 detaining, arresting, searching individuals versus
05:05 - 22.570 the citizens rights, specifically fourth amendment of the Federal Constitution,
05:05 - 25.140 article one, section eight of the Pennsylvania Constitution
05:05 - 25.974 and the protections
05:05 - 28.977 provided to our citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.
05:05 - 32.013 This is another one of those types of cases.
05:05 - 36.818 The facts of this case is that a police officer pulls up,
05:05 - 40.021 to a corner in Philadelphia, sees
05:05 - 44.059 a group of people smoking a marijuana.
05:05 - 48.496 Cigaret can see the plumes of smoke and smell the marijuana and sees three people.
05:05 - 51.766 Now, interestingly, the a police officer does not know which
05:05 - 54.769 of the three individuals on the stoop sitting close to each other.
05:05 - 58.106 Which one of them is smoking marijuana?
05:05 - 01.009 However, as the officer gets out of the car,
05:06 - 03.745 one of those individuals,
05:06 - 06.748 miss calls, flees and runs.
05:06 - 08.350 Police officers give pursuit.
05:06 - 11.353 They chase her into a home that is not her home.
05:06 - 14.356 In the home, she discards a black
05:06 - 17.592 North Face backpack, which is later recovered.
05:06 - 22.630 The police officers then go in and search the backpack because it was discarded.
05:06 - 26.401 The, thought is that the defendant, Miss Coles, is arrested at this point.
05:06 - 29.404 The defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy
05:06 - 31.272 in the backpack that she discarded in a home
05:06 - 34.275 that is not her home, and they find a firearm.
05:06 - 36.978 She is then, I guess, formally arrested at that point.
05:06 - 40.081 The issue that the court is going to look at,
05:06 - 43.218 and that has been raised for us here,
05:06 - 46.321 is whether flight
05:06 - 49.591 from an area where someone,
05:06 - 53.428 whoever that may be, not necessarily the person who runs is smoking
05:06 - 59.601 marijuana, is enough to give the officers reasonable suspicion to stop
05:06 - 02.937 and do a carry frisk, or a reasonable suspicion
05:07 - 06.775 to stop the individual and do a patdown, in order to,
05:07 - 11.379 see if that individual does in fact have a weapon on them or something like that.
05:07 - 15.617 And the argument is that this, this woman who fled from the corner,
05:07 - 19.587 the police had no right to chase her, had no right to stop her.
05:07 - 22.323 And therefore the gun that is then later recovered inside
05:07 - 25.894 the home is fruits of the poisonous tree and should be suppressed.
05:07 - 29.731 Again, the facts of this case are what they are,
05:07 - 34.469 but there's greater implications for other cases in Pennsylvania
05:07 - 38.907 and the protections afforded to citizens, what police officers can and cannot do,
05:07 - 42.510 and how this will apply to other cases down the road will be interesting.
05:07 - 46.147 So you can hear arguments on both sides of whether or not this was an appropriate,
05:07 - 49.551 stop and frisk and ultimate recovery of a gun, or
05:07 - 53.288 if it violated the individual's, rights against unreasonable search and seizure
05:07 - 55.423 status.
05:07 - 57.091 Good afternoon, Madam Chief Justice.
05:07 - 59.461 May it please the court. My name again is Mike wood.
05:07 - 00.995 I am representing.
05:08 - 01.563 Oh, I'm sorry.
05:08 - 04.566 The sirens to stop.
05:08 - 08.837 They go by during our criminal cases
05:08 - 11.840 just for effect.
05:08 - 17.312 So in this case, I'm representing Elise Coles, the appellant.
05:08 - 19.380 This matter?
05:08 - 22.417 For decades, this court has emphasized that police need
05:08 - 26.721 individualized, reasonable suspicion in order to see someone here.
05:08 - 29.757 The only individualized reason that police sees miss calls
05:08 - 31.826 was that she ran from them.
05:08 - 34.662 However, as this court's precedent makes clear, light from
05:08 - 37.665 police is such a tenuous and inconclusive factor
05:08 - 40.635 that it's not enough to establish reasonable suspicion.
05:08 - 43.638 And to that flight, the only thing the Commonwealth can add
05:08 - 46.474 is the fact that Miss Coles was sitting in a group of people
05:08 - 48.676 while someone in the group was smoking marijuana.
05:08 - 52.814 Crucially, however, police never saw Miss Coles smoking, holding a joint,
05:08 - 57.151 showing any signs of intoxication or even smelling like marijuana.
05:08 - 01.155 In short, police chased her because she ran and that was illegal
05:09 - 04.926 in Commonwealth versus Machos.
05:09 - 08.730 Sure you don't, you don't disagree that,
05:09 - 12.767 but assuming
05:09 - 16.404 assuming reasonable suspicion sufficiently individualized
05:09 - 19.774 that the marijuana smoking the that that would
05:09 - 22.477 give that would be a crime.
05:09 - 23.411 That's right. Yes.
05:09 - 27.081 So even under the Medical Marijuana Act, while use of edibles
05:09 - 30.184 and vaporizers is legal, that smoking a marijuana is not.
05:09 - 32.987 So this doesn't turn on whether she had a license
05:09 - 35.990 or the issues that were present in Commonwealth versus bar.
05:09 - 39.861 So as to the flight component and Commonwealth versus Mattos,
05:09 - 43.698 this court cautioned against flight being a strong indicator of guilt.
05:09 - 47.335 It held that allowing police to chase someone because they ran
05:09 - 50.972 would, quote, frightened countless citizens into surrendering
05:09 - 53.975 whatever privacy rights they may still have.
05:09 - 57.078 And in some ways, that language stands in contrast with the words of the U.S.
05:09 - 58.846 Supreme Court, which in Illinois
05:09 - 02.150 versus Wardlow, as was discussed at some length earlier today.
05:10 - 06.120 The Supreme Court suggested not only that it's the consulate act of evasion,
05:10 - 08.957 but that it's, quote, certainly suggestive of guilt.
05:10 - 11.326 And as far as I know, this court has never gone that far.
05:10 - 14.596 This court has rightly recognized that flight is a weak factor,
05:10 - 18.166 that at best, has a tenuous relationship with criminal activity.
05:10 - 19.467 That's that's all true.
05:10 - 21.302 But if I if I could just sure.
05:10 - 24.172 You did try to get to the the key point,
05:10 - 27.108 for the and perhaps,
05:10 - 34.182 it, I don't think anybody maintains here that mere flight would be enough.
05:10 - 38.186 I don't I don't think that's the, grab them and, the but here
05:10 - 41.856 the police approach because,
05:10 - 44.459 they clearly have reasonable suspicion
05:10 - 47.328 that the marijuana laws being violated.
05:10 - 52.700 And so the only issue with that is the individualization, right?
05:10 - 55.937 And so, I guess they saw the cloud
05:10 - 58.940 of smoke or whatever, and they see the,
05:10 - 01.943 and now should we go?
05:11 - 07.949 So the aggregation of those circumstances, you say, is still not enough, right?
05:11 - 08.883 So that's right.
05:11 - 12.120 I'm certainly not suggesting that this court should not consider the flight
05:11 - 14.155 or shouldn't consider the marijuana or anything like that.
05:11 - 17.458 It's that putting these two things together, given how weakened,
05:11 - 20.461 at least in the case of the marijuana smoking, how not individualized
05:11 - 24.265 they are, even together, they don't rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.
05:11 - 28.236 Now, I think it's important to point out that if police wanted
05:11 - 31.339 to establish reasonable suspicion here, they easily could have done so.
05:11 - 35.276 All they had to do was take half a second and notice who was holding the joint
05:11 - 37.979 or the blond or whatever it was. Well, that does it.
05:11 - 40.148 Why does, I guess, why does that matter?
05:11 - 41.949 Not that I have a lot of experience in this,
05:11 - 43.785 but this arguably could have been a hot
05:11 - 47.255 potato situation where they were passing around the joint.
05:11 - 48.289 Right.
05:11 - 50.792 And certainly if they'd seen them passing around the joint.
05:11 - 51.859 Anyone who touches it,
05:11 - 55.229 they've got reasonable suspicion to stop that person, because at that time
05:11 - 58.032 it wasn't being passed, but it was a group of people.
05:11 - 00.501 They said, a cloud of marijuana.
05:12 - 03.571 You're saying that that's not even a reasonable suspicion that that
05:12 - 07.341 one or all were sharing a marijuana joint?
05:12 - 10.812 Certainly it's reasonable suspicion that somebody in the group was smoking,
05:12 - 13.081 but reasonable suspicion, reasonable suspicion that all of them
05:12 - 16.617 were sharing a joint know without evidence that they were passing it around,
05:12 - 20.421 or that one or more of them was acting intoxicated or something like that.
05:12 - 23.424 I would suggest that there needs to be individualized suspicion
05:12 - 26.394 that the person they're stopping has committed a crime.
05:12 - 28.996 And I think it's important to point out factually, not just
05:12 - 31.799 did they see the smoke, not just did they smell the odor,
05:12 - 34.802 but they actually saw the joint in somebody's hand.
05:12 - 38.272 And at that point, all the officer has to do is look from the joint
05:12 - 41.275 to a person's face, and there's a reasonable suspicion.
05:12 - 45.513 So instead with the officer did was Chase
05:12 - 48.516 after Miss Coles precisely because she ran.
05:12 - 51.552 And ultimately, reasonableness is the touchstone here.
05:12 - 54.589 Whatever else reasonableness might mean, it's not reasonable
05:12 - 58.326 for police officers to ignore evidence that's staring them right in the face.
05:12 - 00.661 But that's what they did here.
05:13 - 04.766 So it was this opportunity to individualize that distinguishes
05:13 - 08.903 this case from the out of jurisdiction cases that my, my colleagues cite,
05:13 - 13.040 because I think there are some limited situations in which police
05:13 - 17.211 might be justified in detaining a small group of people for a one person crime
05:13 - 19.413 if they have nothing else to go on.
05:13 - 24.318 For example, in the I'm sorry, one person crime I did, I keep coming back to these
05:13 - 28.389 these arguments that try to isolate conduct.
05:13 - 31.392 Who said it's a one person crime?
05:13 - 34.462 I suppose what I mean is there's nothing inherent to the crime
05:13 - 38.599 of smoking marijuana that requires the persistence of multiple people.
05:13 - 41.169 If we accept your analysis and we isolate this incident
05:13 - 44.172 to look to the one person, you know, these guys are simply
05:13 - 46.641 doing a little hot potato or passing a joint around.
05:13 - 49.577 It's only the one person who, when the police officers pull up,
05:13 - 52.847 standing there holding the joint, that can be stopped, right.
05:13 - 55.950 If there's no other evidence that anyone else was involved,
05:13 - 57.685 other than their mere presence being there,
05:13 - 59.520 I would suggest that they have reasonable suspicion
05:13 - 01.489 for the one person, but not for the others.
05:14 - 04.192 On the other hand, if they see the joint being passed around,
05:14 - 07.595 or if they see, say, bloodshot eyes or other signs of intoxication,
05:14 - 10.765 that gives them individualized suspicion to stop the other people.
05:14 - 12.433 But we don't have that here,
05:14 - 15.536 so that the flight, while the flight, of course, is individualized.
05:14 - 18.372 But that's I guess that's why I'm going back to that.
05:14 - 19.841 We have to put that in isolation as well.
05:14 - 22.276 So we go in the back and the seven of us are smoking a joint.
05:14 - 24.779 I decide I'm going to smoke a joint arrest up Ma.
05:14 - 29.050 If a police officers walk in, I don't have to fly, do I know?
05:14 - 30.618 I certainly don't have to flee.
05:14 - 31.919 You can, but you may.
05:14 - 34.388 But you could if you weren't smoking.
05:14 - 37.358 And unless there was some other factor that was present
05:14 - 40.494 there, I would suggest that the officers wouldn't be justified in chasing you.
05:14 - 44.866 So how does the officer conduct an investigatory detention?
05:14 - 47.468 To find out who we spoke to? Had the joint?
05:14 - 50.471 Well, there are certain circumstances under which they can do that,
05:14 - 54.609 but they need to establish at the outset that they have reasonable suspicion
05:14 - 57.612 as to each of the people that they're trying to stop.
05:14 - 59.947 But again, how do you know the purpose
05:14 - 02.950 of an investigative detention is
05:15 - 06.087 to say with me, investigate, of course.
05:15 - 08.689 So how do you investigate if everybody just flees?
05:15 - 09.323 I mean,
05:15 - 12.326 from what you're saying, a police officer can't investigate any crime because
05:15 - 16.530 unless he catches the one person in the act, the police officer
05:15 - 19.500 can't approach, they can't walk up, they can't ask a question,
05:15 - 21.669 where do we go from? Where do we go from?
05:15 - 24.839 No, I'm certainly not suggesting that the officers can investigate.
05:15 - 28.109 I'm suggesting that the tools that are available to them are consistent
05:15 - 30.411 with the tools that they have during any mere encounter, right?
05:15 - 33.814 Asking questions, seeing if people want to cooperate and if they don't
05:15 - 37.952 know that this is an investigation.
05:15 - 40.521 Police officer has reasonable suspicion. You just said it.
05:15 - 43.524 Somebody smoking pot or smoking a joint in that group.
05:15 - 47.628 So I won't investigate who's who's got the marijuana.
05:15 - 50.264 Who's smoking. Are they all smoking? They all flee.
05:15 - 53.267 You're telling me I can't do anything except chase the guy with the joint?
05:15 - 54.769 That's what I'm suggesting, Your Honor.
05:15 - 56.604 Unless there's something else there. Right.
05:15 - 58.873 Other signs of intoxication where they see the joint
05:15 - 00.675 being passed around or something like that.
05:16 - 03.611 If all they have to go on is this mere presence in the group
05:16 - 05.513 and flight without say.
05:16 - 08.716 And I hesitate to use the phrase but high crime area or something like that,
05:16 - 13.721 then all they really have is flight and this kind of mere presence here.
05:16 - 16.924 Example. True. There was a circle of
05:16 - 21.228 individuals,
05:16 - 23.164 trading money for drugs.
05:16 - 25.933 The only individuals that were comfortable were the ones that
05:16 - 29.337 when the music stopped at either the counter, the money in their hand.
05:16 - 32.673 So I think in that situation, certainly
05:16 - 36.610 the act of selling drugs is kind of, by its very nature, a multi-person crime.
05:16 - 39.480 At the very minimum, you have the seller and you have the buyer.
05:16 - 43.451 And so if you see two people and they're engaged in this transaction,
05:16 - 46.153 then yes, you've got reasonable suspicion to stop both of them.
05:16 - 50.191 But they're there's conduct on behalf of both of those people here.
05:16 - 53.260 Really the only conduct that Miss Coles has is her flight
05:16 - 56.263 and her decision to associate with these people.
05:16 - 01.936 Is there a finding by the trial court that appellant was not smoking marijuana?
05:17 - 05.172 The finding, I believe, was
05:17 - 09.910 that they were going up to investigate who was smoking, and then she takes off.
05:17 - 11.345 So I don't think there was one finding
05:17 - 14.348 one way or the other about whether she was smoking individually.
05:17 - 17.284 And I think that's ultimately because the officer didn't look
05:17 - 20.621 from the joint in somebodys hand to the face of that person.
05:17 - 23.991 So what's that?
05:17 - 25.259 I'm sorry. It was kind of dark.
05:17 - 26.894 Yeah, it was 830 at night.
05:17 - 29.930 I think that night had followed that point, but certainly
05:17 - 32.933 there was enough light for the officer to see that there was a joint.
05:17 - 36.470 And at that point, I certainly would assume that would be enough to,
05:17 - 40.408 you know, recognize her face, which, you know, I don't know how big this joint was,
05:17 - 42.309 but certainly smaller than than a person's face.
05:17 - 46.313 So I would like to say, well,
05:17 - 49.650 we thought it was Cheech and Chong.
05:17 - 52.019 Well, he brought
05:17 - 54.989 here. So,
05:17 - 00.928 Before wrapping up, I would like to discuss very briefly
05:18 - 04.698 this court's decision in Ray, S.J., because in some ways it presented
05:18 - 06.100 similar facts to what we have here.
05:18 - 07.568 S.J. was in a group of people.
05:18 - 09.570 I think they said it was about 12 people.
05:18 - 11.338 Somebody in the group is smoking a joint.
05:18 - 12.339 Police come up,
05:18 - 14.108 and then he tries to kind of worm his way
05:18 - 17.111 to the back of the group, hiding from the police officer.
05:18 - 21.115 And under there were two, crucial distinctions, though,
05:18 - 23.784 that I would point out between this case and S.J.
05:18 - 25.786 first, the stop in S.J.
05:18 - 28.789 for what it's worth and for whatever this court decides,
05:18 - 32.226 and the shivers case occurred in an area that was known for drug use.
05:18 - 33.894 In fact, the officer who made the arrest in
05:18 - 37.798 that case had made half a dozen other drug arrests in that very area.
05:18 - 42.970 Second, and frankly, more importantly for the individualized, point
05:18 - 46.373 is that SJ himself smelled like marijuana.
05:18 - 49.410 So that gave the officer some reason to think not only that he was
05:18 - 52.179 present in the group, and not only that, he was hiding because he didn't
05:18 - 55.249 want to interact with police and have a chance to smell the.
05:18 - 00.254 Well, I suppose I don't know how close they were to them.
05:19 - 03.057 They were allowed the car, right.
05:19 - 05.459 And they had really good stickers.
05:19 - 08.362 I think that right.
05:19 - 11.832 And but I would point to other signs of intoxication that might have been more,
05:19 - 13.968 you know, evident at a distance. Right.
05:19 - 16.036 Also, were in the dark.
05:19 - 16.937 Well, right.
05:19 - 19.607 But there's enough light to see that there's a joint here.
05:19 - 22.610 So there is certainly enough light to make at least some observations.
05:19 - 27.548 So had we seen, say, slurred speech or not speech, excuse me, but,
05:19 - 30.417 but staggering gait or some kind of indication
05:19 - 33.954 that this person had a problem with balance or that their eyes were bloodshot.
05:19 - 36.323 I mean, I take your point about the distance between, you know,
05:19 - 37.892 where the officers were and where she was,
05:19 - 41.362 but if there was some individualized reason to think she was smoking,
05:19 - 43.330 that would present a different situation.
05:19 - 46.333 And I think that's what they had in S.J., that they don't have here.
05:19 - 50.070 Obviously, it's not a high crime area and certainly not an area known for drug use,
05:19 - 53.974 but more than that, they don't have any indication from her conduct
05:19 - 57.444 that she had just been smoking other than the flight,
05:19 - 00.714 which by itself is not enough, and even considered in conjunction
05:20 - 03.817 with these other kind of mere presence type factors.
05:20 - 08.255 I would submit to this court, is distinguishable from SJ on that basis.
05:20 - 09.223 Okay. All right.
05:20 - 12.560 How do we how do we get to this particular issue in light of the fact
05:20 - 16.497 that the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion
05:20 - 20.534 by finding that your client lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy
05:20 - 24.171 in the backpack that she abandoned in the house that she had no relationship to.
05:20 - 27.474 Well, so we prevailed in front of the trial court,
05:20 - 30.211 and then the Superior Court reversed that that decision.
05:20 - 32.146 And now we're here for this court's review.
05:20 - 35.950 So we didn't have any, the Superior Court's decision was that she,
05:20 - 39.153 she she lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack
05:20 - 42.223 because she abandoned it in a house that she ran into,
05:20 - 43.791 and she had no connection to it. Right.
05:20 - 46.427 But that was the direct result of the police officer's decision
05:20 - 50.030 to chase her, which is this court recognized in machos, unless that is,
05:20 - 54.235 supported by reasonable suspicion, any abandonment that happens after
05:20 - 58.505 the chase has started is, is, you know, fruit of the poisonous tree.
05:20 - 00.341 If it's not supported by reasonable suspicion,
05:21 - 04.945 correct me if I'm wrong. And,
05:21 - 06.614 by tossing
05:21 - 09.650 in those cases where the police officers implemented
05:21 - 12.653 a chase, in this particular case, your client ran
05:21 - 16.090 the police officers didn't do anything to kind of force her to run.
05:21 - 19.193 She just ran, which caused the police officers to run,
05:21 - 21.528 I guess, in the same direction after her. Right.
05:21 - 25.132 And so she seized at the moment, the police officers start chasing her.
05:21 - 29.003 So at that moment, unless they had reasonable suspicion to support the Chase,
05:21 - 31.805 then everything that happens after that is proved a poisonous tree.
05:21 - 33.140 How do we know they were chasing her?
05:21 - 35.609 Couldn't they just been running down the street to see what she was running to?
05:21 - 38.579 I you know, I'd have to defer to the record on that, but I do believe
05:21 - 41.982 they said we decided to chase her, you know, as a result of seeing her run.
05:21 - 44.385 All right.
05:21 - 45.986 Thank you very much.
05:21 - 46.987 Well done, Mr.
05:21 - 49.990 Serena.
05:21 - 51.325 The commonwealth.
05:21 - 53.460 Good afternoon, Your Honor. May it please the court.
05:21 - 55.829 Grady Trevino, on behalf of the Commonwealth,
05:21 - 58.465 I want to begin just before I forget, by.
05:21 - 04.038 I think my colleague has unintentionally misstated the relevant facts of SJ,
05:22 - 09.143 in the sense that he's argued in his reply brief in here today that in SJ,
05:22 - 13.013 one of the relevant facts was that the police smelled
05:22 - 16.216 an odor of marijuana on SJ himself.
05:22 - 18.419 While that fact is true,
05:22 - 22.423 that did not occur until after the police had already stopped.
05:22 - 26.327 SJ so when this court was considering whether or not
05:22 - 28.295 there was a reasonable suspicion,
05:22 - 31.865 they did not consider that factor because that factor isn't relevant.
05:22 - 35.969 This case is very similar to SJ.
05:22 - 39.273 It's actually stronger than SJ.
05:22 - 43.177 And let me just begin by I think it's important that we understand
05:22 - 45.279 what the relevant facts are. In this case.
05:22 - 48.048 They're very brief, but the police are on patrol.
05:22 - 49.950 They're driving down the street.
05:22 - 54.188 They see Miss Coles and two other people sitting on the corner on some steps.
05:22 - 58.292 There are multiple plumes of smoke around them.
05:22 - 02.629 The officers smell burnt marijuana,
05:23 - 05.699 and they see,
05:23 - 09.737 hand-rolled brown cigarets a couple of times.
05:23 - 11.605 The officer says cigarets, plural.
05:23 - 15.943 One time he says, the hand-rolled cigar singular.
05:23 - 19.146 So there's no question
05:23 - 22.950 that Miss Coles and two other people are at the
05:23 - 24.418 precise
05:23 - 27.421 spot where a crime is then taking place.
05:23 - 31.125 The police can say they don't know who it is.
05:23 - 34.628 Who specifically has the, blunt
05:23 - 38.132 in his or her hand at the time, as the trial court
05:23 - 41.235 itself says, everything in this case happened very quickly.
05:23 - 43.137 The police are driving down the street.
05:23 - 45.072 They see what I just described.
05:23 - 49.376 They stopped their car, and they're attempting to do exactly what Mr.
05:23 - 50.911 Wood is claiming that they should have done.
05:23 - 53.447 They stop their car, they get out.
05:23 - 56.884 They approach on foot to try to investigate
05:23 - 01.922 and miss calls, but nobody else flees from the scene.
05:24 - 03.724 She runs into the house.
05:24 - 06.760 The other two people she was with stay at the scene.
05:24 - 10.531 At that point, the police pursue miss calls.
05:24 - 12.900 She goes into a house.
05:24 - 15.569 There's a backpack in there that she had been wearing.
05:24 - 17.538 The police eventually find a gun in the back.
05:24 - 20.107 Commonwealth under Matos.
05:24 - 23.110 If the moment the police start chasing
05:24 - 26.814 the individual, they the law indicates that
05:24 - 29.817 the person is seized and should have probable cause.
05:24 - 32.820 What was the basis for the probable cause?
05:24 - 36.690 When the police officers start chasing his client?
05:24 - 39.493 Well, I would say, Your Honor, and in this case, we're dealing with
05:24 - 43.831 reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, but what we.
05:24 - 46.200 I'm still okay.
05:24 - 50.070 Well, what we had here are the the facts that I just described as miss calls and
05:24 - 54.842 two other people sitting on the corner, multiple plumes of smoke around them.
05:24 - 57.511 The smell of burnt marijuana.
05:24 - 01.081 Officers, you see the brown hand-rolled cigarets?
05:25 - 03.917 The officer gets out of the car. There's been no seizure.
05:25 - 06.153 The police can always get out of the car and approach
05:25 - 09.156 somebody to talk to them, to say, hey, what's going on?
05:25 - 10.891 At that point?
05:25 - 13.927 This calls, flees across the street, runs into the house.
05:25 - 15.462 She's not
05:25 - 18.465 seized until the police take off after her.
05:25 - 22.002 The police don't pursue her until she's, of course, already fled.
05:25 - 25.305 So the fight is clearly irrelevant.
05:25 - 29.877 This court in DM has said that that flight is highly relevant.
05:25 - 33.780 Based upon what was the reasonable suspicion?
05:25 - 35.949 Your argument for her being
05:25 - 39.419 present with individuals who were smoking or smelling marijuana?
05:25 - 42.523 The officer there's no question that
05:25 - 46.360 there are three people at the scene miss calls and two other people.
05:25 - 48.829 There's no question that
05:25 - 53.133 somebody or some people among that three person group is smoking marijuana.
05:25 - 56.937 The police can't say for sure which one person or two
05:25 - 00.173 people or three people were, because everything happens so quickly.
05:26 - 04.978 But when they get out of the car to to try to investigate, to see
05:26 - 10.584 what happened, Miss Coles takes off, flees across the street and into a house.
05:26 - 13.887 The other two people remain there.
05:26 - 16.757 It's if I could follow up on Justice Daugherty.
05:26 - 19.760 They had a generalized suspicion
05:26 - 24.565 that someone in this group was smoking marijuana.
05:26 - 31.305 So you're saying the, individualized suspicion is based upon her flight?
05:26 - 34.808 My argument is that the
05:26 - 38.579 suspicion is based upon the totality of the circumstances which this court
05:26 - 42.382 what we what part of what I said was wrong there.
05:26 - 48.155 I'm not sure why suspicion that that someone, or some
05:26 - 53.527 2 or 3 of people in this group of three were smoking marijuana.
05:26 - 57.831 They had generalized specific she flees credit
05:26 - 02.102 individualized suspicion is based upon her flight.
05:27 - 04.171 Correct.
05:27 - 06.173 Well, I would say it's not just her flight.
05:27 - 10.844 It's it's a that distinguishes her from the other two people who were there.
05:27 - 13.180 She has the right to leave. She has the right to run.
05:27 - 15.449 She is right to at that point,
05:27 - 18.452 for many reasons, she could have wanted to leave that group.
05:27 - 22.022 But that's that's always here with these people who are smoking dope.
05:27 - 24.658 I mean, that could have just been, you know, the start at the moment.
05:27 - 25.525 And then she flees.
05:27 - 28.929 How does how does that then become
05:27 - 33.300 individualized suspicion that she was smoking marijuana?
05:27 - 33.934 What?
05:27 - 36.103 Well, let me say first, Your Honor, in every case
05:27 - 39.206 where there's a reasonable suspicion, we can always come up
05:27 - 42.476 with innocent explanations as to why a person was.
05:27 - 47.714 But there was a generalized suspicion that someone was smoking dope.
05:27 - 48.682 Right?
05:27 - 52.653 The question here is where was the individual lie?
05:27 - 57.491 Suspicion that she was absent, the fact that she fled?
05:27 - 59.860 Well, I would
05:27 - 03.397 argue that, first of all, there are cases from other jurisdictions
05:28 - 07.434 following the Fourth Amendment, and this court has repeatedly said
05:28 - 11.938 that in terms of investigative stops, we follow the Fourth Amendment.
05:28 - 15.842 We do not depart where if the suspicion is focused
05:28 - 18.845 on a small enough group of people,
05:28 - 22.349 even if they can't tell which one of the 2 or 3 people
05:28 - 25.819 is committed to the crime, that that's sufficient individualized
05:28 - 28.822 suspicion for an investigative detention.
05:28 - 32.025 Now, we don't have to decide that here, because we have more than that.
05:28 - 34.695 We have flight. And it's true.
05:28 - 36.730 People are people. Flight.
05:28 - 40.734 It's the fact that you're relying on to individualize
05:28 - 44.271 the suspicion that that's what oh, my.
05:28 - 45.839 That's what I'm hung up on.
05:28 - 50.844 I mean, prior to the fact of her, fleeing the scene or leaving,
05:28 - 54.815 this group, there is no individualized suspicion
05:28 - 57.884 that she had engaged in any criminal activity.
05:28 - 03.590 Well, there was individualized suspicion based on the fact that she only two other
05:29 - 06.460 people were there where there were multiple plumes
05:29 - 09.062 of marijuana smoke wafting around them,
05:29 - 12.332 generalized suspicion that somebody in that group was smoking dope.
05:29 - 13.700 Right.
05:29 - 16.703 And what I'm saying, Your Honor, is that
05:29 - 20.040 if we wanted to just limit it to that, there are cases.
05:29 - 22.976 And I cited in a footnote because that's not the facts of this case,
05:29 - 26.480 but there are cases, the facts in this case, they are the facts, aren't they?
05:29 - 28.081 The police couldn't identify, I guess.
05:29 - 30.951 I'm sorry I didn't get the police couldn't identify who. Wait.
05:29 - 31.518 That's correct.
05:29 - 35.989 And there in there, for example, I cite the case from the third circuit
05:29 - 40.160 where the police drive up and there's two cars that are parked next to one another.
05:29 - 42.963 The police know that
05:29 - 44.931 people and or a person, at least one of those
05:29 - 47.968 cars, is smoking marijuana, but they can't tell which car.
05:29 - 49.269 And it could be both cars.
05:29 - 52.639 And the Third Circuit said that's enough to stop both cars.
05:29 - 56.610 That's sufficient individualized suspicion, because we're limiting it
05:29 - 59.880 to just those people in those two cars.
05:29 - 03.617 Another case I cite from the Eighth Circuit, there was conduct
05:30 - 09.089 related to both of those two cars from which reasonable suspicion was derived.
05:30 - 10.223 I don't believe so.
05:30 - 12.492 No, Your Honor, it's just the odor of marijuana.
05:30 - 14.728 That was the only conduct.
05:30 - 17.264 There's another case that I saw from the Eighth Circuit,
05:30 - 21.601 where the police go into a laundromat and they find a gun magazine,
05:30 - 25.772 and there's two people there, and a circuit says that's enough
05:30 - 27.874 for the police to stop both of those people,
05:30 - 30.510 because there's a limited number of people.
05:30 - 34.581 Can I jump in just to see if I can, formulate this, if I may?
05:30 - 37.951 So your particular answer is that the law is.
05:30 - 40.353 And here's where the criminal activity is afoot.
05:30 - 43.557 I think it's in apropos of Terry, is that,
05:30 - 49.262 that the police, that they, they have,
05:30 - 53.099 suspicion, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
05:30 - 54.334 They roll up
05:30 - 58.672 and then there's clay, and it's the combination of the flight that ensues
05:30 - 01.908 with the criminal activity afoot that
05:31 - 05.412 combines to form the individualized, reasonable suspicion.
05:31 - 05.946 Isn't that the.
05:31 - 07.080 That's. That's correct, Your Honor.
05:31 - 08.982 That's the totality of the circumstances.
05:31 - 10.717 And that's the case that this.
05:31 - 12.752 Let me let me follow up on that.
05:31 - 15.856 You can have generalized I think we're talking
05:31 - 18.091 we're just saying the same thing differently.
05:31 - 22.796 There's general like reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
05:31 - 26.800 is afoot, generalized reasoning among those three particular people.
05:31 - 29.636 It's not like it's entire, you know, it's not very crowded.
05:31 - 31.271 Now, let's not get to this entire room.
05:31 - 32.939 There's three people like that.
05:31 - 34.140 Yeah, I got it.
05:31 - 36.610 Which is makes this case, different than missler.
05:31 - 41.481 But, so the only thing that individualized is
05:31 - 45.385 that generally is reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
05:31 - 47.053 afoot is that Chief Lee's.
05:31 - 49.022 That's correct.
05:31 - 50.624 I'm not. That's correct. I'm not going to disagree.
05:31 - 52.025 I'm not going to disagree. But I'm going.
05:31 - 53.960 But I'm going to want to. Sure.
05:31 - 56.596 If that's what your what
05:31 - 59.599 your argument is and you want us to hold
05:32 - 03.803 that generalized suspicion of,
05:32 - 09.509 illegal activity can be individual sliced by the flight
05:32 - 12.812 of one of the people in the group, is that when you have
05:32 - 17.250 when you have a small number of people,
05:32 - 20.053 when a crime is occurring there
05:32 - 24.357 and when the person flees in response to the police approaching,
05:32 - 28.194 we consider the totality of the circumstances.
05:32 - 31.564 That's the test that this court and the United States
05:32 - 35.702 Supreme Court has repeatedly held is the standard.
05:32 - 38.672 And so if I understand you following Justice Daniels,
05:32 - 42.909 I believe this case, as we've argued, presents
05:32 - 45.912 an opportunity for this court to, in essence, clarify
05:32 - 50.984 the boundaries of individual suspicion and in group settings.
05:32 - 57.524 So it's your your position would be or your rule for us would to be that
05:32 - 02.662 if there is generalized suspicion with a group of individuals
05:33 - 08.268 that the general general, the generalized suspicion is sufficient
05:33 - 13.506 and it's elevated by an individual fleeing or walking away from that group.
05:33 - 16.109 That's what rises to the reasonable suspicion.
05:33 - 18.712 I'm not saying it's walking away.
05:33 - 24.684 It's the flight which this court has specifically stated is extremely relevant.
05:33 - 25.652 That's the DM case.
05:33 - 27.854 That's not me. That's the DM case.
05:33 - 31.391 There's been no argument in this case that DM should be overruled.
05:33 - 34.127 I'm just saying what this court self has said.
05:33 - 39.699 How is how does that comport with the notion that flight in
05:33 - 43.636 and of itself is not an illegal?
05:33 - 45.171 It's not illegal per se.
05:33 - 48.174 I mean, you could flee for any reason.
05:33 - 49.709 That's that's correct. You're wrong.
05:33 - 51.911 But we don't parse out.
05:33 - 54.047 And this court has said that in
05:33 - 57.050 not the normal DM case, there's another DM case that I cite.
05:33 - 01.788 We don't parse out individual factors and say, well, this is not enough.
05:34 - 03.690 This is not enough. This is not enough.
05:34 - 06.926 We look at the totality of the circumstances,
05:34 - 09.996 and I would ask this court to look at its own decision.
05:34 - 13.967 And SJ and SJ, what you have is you have a group of 12 people.
05:34 - 16.136 So the group is much larger than what we have here.
05:34 - 18.772 Here we have three people. SJ we have 12 people.
05:34 - 22.108 The police can smell the marijuana.
05:34 - 22.876 I know that
05:34 - 27.047 some people are smoking marijuana, but they don't see SJ holding a bunch.
05:34 - 32.252 When the police arrive, the group and SJ begins to walk away.
05:34 - 33.386 Nobody flees.
05:34 - 36.389 They begin to walk away, but SJ kind of worms
05:34 - 39.359 himself to the front of the group
05:34 - 41.561 and this occurred in a high crime area.
05:34 - 42.429 There's this.
05:34 - 43.463 There you go.
05:34 - 47.901 That that is, the predicate for SJ.
05:34 - 51.638 I mean, forgetting about any discussion we had otherwise
05:34 - 55.175 today about high crime areas or anything of that nature.
05:34 - 59.279 That case was decided in the context of case law
05:34 - 03.149 that said flight in a high crime area is enough.
05:35 - 04.751 I would disagree on that.
05:35 - 07.754 That that SJ was decided in the 90s
05:35 - 12.092 and in Illinois versus war, though, was I think 2000, 2001.
05:35 - 14.094 SJ was decided before that case.
05:35 - 18.164 And I would say that what's relevant in terms of the location of the individuals
05:35 - 23.770 in SJ and in this case is that a crime is taking place right where they are.
05:35 - 27.207 So the fact that, you know,
05:35 - 31.578 I thought the same thing had some effort to conceal or I know
05:35 - 35.215 or SJ kind of when the police arrive, the group starts to walk away.
05:35 - 38.218 SJ they actually use the word worm kind of worm
05:35 - 40.753 some way worms his way to the front of the group.
05:35 - 44.491 But language was, I believe, quote unquote attempts to hide among the other members
05:35 - 46.759 of the group. Right. In this case.
05:35 - 50.263 In this case, miss calls
05:35 - 53.800 fleas, as this court has said, and DM is this court's language.
05:35 - 57.937 Headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion.
05:35 - 01.741 Once again, there's been no argument in this case, at least,
05:36 - 03.543 that DM should be overruled.
05:36 - 08.548 That, Pennsylvania provides greater protections than does the U.S.
05:36 - 10.717 Supreme Court under the federal constitution.
05:36 - 14.254 So I understand Justice Donoghue, your concerns, but my argument
05:36 - 18.124 is, is that I'm not even sure I have concerns with that because,
05:36 - 21.694 you can evade for legal reasons.
05:36 - 23.396 That's correct, of course,
05:36 - 27.133 but that brings you back to the point that there's nothing wrong with flying.
05:36 - 28.201 That's correct.
05:36 - 31.004 I mean, you're on a reasonable suspicion.
05:36 - 34.007 This court itself has said, and it's cited,
05:36 - 38.811 and it's just Daugherty in the case that I cite, citing Kansas first, Glover,
05:36 - 40.280 that reasonable suspicion
05:36 - 44.117 is considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence.
05:36 - 48.521 So it can be more likely than not that Miss Coles is completely innocent,
05:36 - 51.925 and there can still be reasonable suspicion.
05:36 - 54.494 And I think if we just look at Terry itself,
05:36 - 58.231 Terry, they're just two men walking back and forth in front of a store
05:36 - 01.601 window in the middle of an afternoon, talking to each other.
05:37 - 02.869 There's nothing.
05:37 - 05.104 There's nothing per se illegal about that.
05:37 - 08.741 Who the police observed over the course of 20 minutes
05:37 - 12.111 and then saw saw them talking to someone else
05:37 - 15.582 who they perceived at that moment to be the getaway guy.
05:37 - 19.786 I mean, why why did I shouldn't where the police, the police develop
05:37 - 23.056 their reasonable suspicion over a period of time
05:37 - 25.858 because then you're on it, because the people were walking back
05:37 - 28.861 and forth, looking inside the store window in the afternoon.
05:37 - 31.965 I don't understand what is per se illegal about that.
05:37 - 34.567 Maybe. Maybe they're interested in buying an item in there.
05:37 - 37.570 Maybe they're interested in a woman who was working in the store.
05:37 - 38.671 We don't know.
05:37 - 39.973 And that's the whole point,
05:37 - 42.976 is that we can always come up with innocent explanations.
05:37 - 45.745 But but that doesn't matter when we're dealing with
05:37 - 48.748 reasonable suspicion, which is a very low standard.
05:37 - 51.584 Are there any other questions for Mr. Greer?
05:37 - 53.920 Thank you both. Nicely done. Good argument.
05:37 - 54.721 Very nice.
05:37 - 55.521 Thank you.
05:37 - 58.024 Mr. Minter, would you adjourn for the day?